It is not pretended that the above is in the exact order, or the exact words of the conversation. This was often desultory, and I can only answer for having given generally the expression, and always the substance of what passed.
July 10. 1792 . My lre of — 1 to the President, directed to him at Mt Vernon, had not found him there, but came to him here. He told me of this that he would take an occasion of speaking with me on the subject. He did so this day. He began by observing that he had put it off from day to day because the subject was painful, to wit his remaining in office which that letter sollicited. He said that the decln he had made when he quitted his military command of never again acting in public was sincere. That however when he was called on to come forward to set the present govmt in motion, it appeared to him that circumstances were so changed as to justify a change in his resoln: he was made to believe that in 2 years all would be well in motion he might retire. At the end of two years he found some things still to be done. At the end of the 3d year he thought it was not worth while to disturb the course of things as in one year more his office would expire he was decided then to retire. Now he was told there would still be danger in it. Certainly if he thought so, he would conquer his longing for retirement. But he feared it would be said his former professions of retirement had been mere affectation, that he was like other men, when once in office he could not quit it. He was sensible too of a decay of his hearing perhaps his other faculties might fall off he not be sensible of it. That with respect to the existing causes of uneasiness, he thought there were suspicions against a particular party which had been carried a great deal too far, there might be desires, but he did not believe there were designs to change the form of govmt into a monarchy. That there might be a few who wished it in the higher walks of life, particularly in the great cities but that the main body of the people in the Eastern states were as steadily for republicanism as in the Southern. That the pieces lately published, particularly in Freneau’s paper seemed to have in view the exciting opposition to the govmt. That this had taken place in Pennsylve as to the excise law, accdg to informn he had recd from Genl Hand that they tended to produce a separation of the Union, the most dreadful of all calamities, and that whatever tended to produce anarchy, tended of course to produce a resort to monarchical government. He considered those papers as attacking him directly, for he must be a fool indeed to swallow the little sugar plumbs here there thrown out to him. That in condemning the admn of the govmt they condemned him, for if they thought there were measures pursued contrary to his sentiment, they must conceive him too careless to attend to them or too stupid to understand them. That tho indeed he had signed many acts which he did not approve in all their parts, yet he had never put his name to one which he did not think on the whole was eligible. That as to the bank which had been an act of so much complaint, until there was some infallible criterion of reason, a difference of opinion must be tolerated. He did not believe the discontents extended far from the seat of govmt. He had seen spoken with many people in Maryld Virginia in his late journey. He found the people contented happy. He wished however to be better informed on this head. If the discontent were more extensive than he supposed, it might be that the desire that he should remain in the government was not general.
My observns to him tended principally to enforce the topics of my lre. I will not therefore repeat them except where they produced observns from him. I said that the two great complaints were that the national debt was unnecessarily increased, that it had furnished the means of corrupting both branches of the legislature. That he must know everybody knew there was a considerable squadron in both whose votes were devoted to the paper stock-jobbing interest, that the names of a weighty number were known several others suspected on good grounds. That on examining the votes of these men they would be found uniformly for every treasury measure, that as most of these measures had been carried by small majorities they were carried by these very votes. That therefore it was a cause of just uneasiness when we saw a legislature legislating for their own interests in opposition to those of the people. He said not a word on the corruption of the legislature, but took up the other point, defended the assumption, argued that it had not increased the debt, for that all of it was honest debt. He justified the excise law, as one of the best laws which could be past, as nobody would pay the tax who did not chuse to do it. With respect to the increase of the debt by the assumption I observed to him that what was meant objected to was that it increased the debt of the general govmt and carried it beyond the possibility of paiment. That if the balances had been settled the debtor states directed to pay their deficiencies to the creditor states, they would have done it easily, and by resources of taxation in their power, and acceptable to the people, by a direct tax in the South, an excise in the North. Still he said it would be paid by the people. Finding him really approving the treasury system I avoided entering into argument with him on those points.
Gunston hall. Sep. 30. 92 . ex relatione G. Mason.
The constn as agreed to till a fortnight before the convention rose was such a one as he wd have set his hand heart to. 1. The presidt. was to be elected for 7. years. Then ineligible for 7. more. 2. Rotation in the Senate. 3. A vote of ⅔ in the legislature on particular subjects, expressly on that of navign. 1 The 3. New Engld states were constantly with us in all questions (Rho isld not there, N. York seldom) so that it was these 3. states with the 5. Southern ones against Pennsylva Jersey Delaware.
With respect to the importn of slaves it was left to Congress. 2 This disturbed the 2 Southernmost states who knew that Congress would immediately suppress the importn of slaves. Those 2 states therefore struck up a bargain with the 3. N. Engld states. If they would join to admit slaves for some years, the 2 Southernmost states wd. join in changing the clause which required ⅔ of the legislature in any vote. It was done. These articles were changed accordingly, from that moment the two S. states and the 3 Northern ones joined Pen. Jers. Del. made the majority 8. to 3. against us instead of 8. to 3 for us as it had been thro’ the whole convention. Under this coalition the great principles of the constn were changed in the last days of the Convention.
Anecdote. Yates, Lansing Hamilton represented N Y. Yates Lansing never voted in one single instance with Ham. who was so much mortified at it that he went home. When the season for courts came on, Yates a judge Lansing a lawyer went to attend their courts. Then Ham. returned.
Anecdote. The constitn as agreed at first was that amendments might be proposed either by Congr or the legislatures. A commee was appointed to digest redraw. Gov Morris King were of the commee. One morng Gov. M. moved an instn. for certain alterns (not ½ the members yet come in). In a hurry without understanding it was agreed to. The committee reported so that Congr. shd have the exclusive power of proposg. amendmts. G. Mason observd it on the report opposed it. King denied the constrn. Mason demonstrated it, asked the commee by what authority they had varied what had been agreed. G. Morris then imprudently got up said by authority of the convention, produced the blind instruction before mentd. which was unknown by ½ of the house not till then understood by the other. They then restored it as it stood originally. 1
He said he considd Hamilton as having done us more injury than Gr. Britain all her fleets armies. That his (Mason’s) plan of settling our debt would have been something in this way. He would have laid as much tax as could be paid without oppressing the people. Particularly he would have laid an impost of about the amount of the first laid by Congress, but somewhat different in several of it’s articles. He would have suspended all application of it one year during which an office should have been open to register unalienated certificates. At the end of the year he would have appropriated his revenue. 1st. To pay the civil list. 2. The interest of these certif. 3. Instalments of the principal. 4. A surplus to buy up the alienated certificates still avoiding to make any other provision for these last. By the time the unalienated certificates should have been all paid, he supposed half the alienated ones would have been bought up at market. He would then have proceeded to redeem the residue of them.
Bladensbg. Oct. 1 . This morning at Mt Vernon I had the following conversation with the President. He opened it by expressing his regret at the resolution in which I appeared so fixed in the lre I had written him of retiring from public affairs. He said that he should be extremely sorry that I should do it as long as he was in office, and that he could not see where he should find another character to fill my office. That as yet he was quite undecided whether to retire in March or not. His inclinations led him strongly to do it. Nobody disliked more the ceremonies of his office, and he had not the least taste or gratification in the execution of it’s functions. That he was happy at home alone, and that his presence there was now peculiarly called for by the situation of Majr Washington 1 whom he thought irrecoverable should he get well he would remove into another part of the country which might better agree with him. That he did not believe his presence necessary: that there were other characters who would do the business as well or better. Still however if his aid was thought necessary to save the cause to which he had devoted his life principally he would make the sacrifice of a longer continuance. That he therefore reserved himself for future decision, as his declaration would be in time if made a month before the day of election. He had desired Mr. Lear to find out from conversation, without appearing to make the inquiry, whether any other person would be desired by any body. He had informed him he judged from conversations that it was the universal desire he should continue, the expectation that those who expressed a doubt of his continuance did it in the language of apprehension, and not of desire. But this, says he, is only from the north, it may be very different in the South. I thought this meant as an opening to me to say what was the sentiment in the South from which quarter I came. I told him that as far as I knew there was but one voice there which was for his continuance. That as to myself I had ever preferred the pursuits of private life to those of public, which had nothing in them agreeable to me. I explained to him the circumstances of the war which had first called me into public life, and those following the war which had called me from a retirement on which I had determd. That I had constantly kept my eye on my own home, and could no longer refrain from returning to it. As to himself his presence was important, that he was the only man in the U. S. who possessed the confidce of the whole, that govmt was founded in opinion confidence, and that the longer he remained, the stronger would become the habits of the people in submitting to the govmt. in thinking it a thing to be maintained. That there was no other person who would be thought anything more than the head of a party. He then expressed his concern at the difference which he found to subsist between the Sec. of the Treasury myself, of which he said he had not been aware. He knew indeed that there was a marked difference in our political sentiments, but he had never suspected it had gone so far in producing a personal difference, and he wished he could be the mediator to put an end to it. That he thought it important to preserve the check of my opinions in the administration in order to keep things in their proper channel prevent them from going too far. That as to the idea of transforming this govt into a monarchy he did not believe there were ten men in the U. S. whose opinions were worth attention who entertained such a thought. I told him there were many more than he imagined. I recalled to his memory a dispute at his own table a little before we left Philada, between Genl. Schuyler on one side Pinkney myself on the other, wherein the former maintained the position that hereditary descent was as likely to produce good magistrates as election. I told him that tho’ the people were sound, there were a numerous sect who had monarchy in contempln. That the Secy of the Treasury was one of these. That I had heard him say that this constitution was a shilly shally thing of mere milk water, which could not last, was only good as a step to something better. That when we reflected that he had endeavored in the convention to make an English constn of it, and when failing in that we saw all his measures tending to bring it to the same thing it was natural for us to be jealous: and particular when we saw that these measures had established corruption in the legislature, where there was a squadron devoted to the nod of the treasury, doing whatever he had directed ready to do what he should direct. That if the equilibrium of the three great bodies Legislative, Executive, judiciary could be preserved, if the Legislature could be kept independant, I should never fear the result of such a government but that I could not but be uneasy when I saw that the Executive had swallowed up the legislative branch. He said that as to that interested spirit in the legislature, it was what could not be avoided in any government, unless we were to exclude particular descriptions of men, such as the holders of the funds from all office. I told him there was great difference between the little accidental schemes of self interest which would take place in every body of men influence their votes, and a regular system for forming a corps of interested persons who should be steadily at the orders of the Treasury. He touched on the merits of the funding system, observed that [there?] was a difference of opinion about it some thinking it very bad, others very good. That experience was the only criterion of right which he knew this alone would decide which opn was right. That for himself he had seen our affairs desperate our credit lost, and that this was in a sudden extraordinary degree raised to the highest pitch. I told him all that was ever necessary to establish our credit, was an efficient govmt an honest one declaring it would sacredly pay our debts, laying taxes for this purpose applying them to it. I avoided going further into the subject. He finished by another exhortation to me not to decide too positively on retirement, here we were called to breakfast.
Oct. 31. 1792 . I had sent to the President [Joseph Ignatius de] Viar [Joseph de] Jaudenes’s 1 letter of the 29th. inst whereupon he desired a consultation of Hamilton, Knox, E. R. myself on these points. 1. What notice was to be taken hereof to Spain? 2. Whether it should make part of the communicn to the legislature? I delivered my opinion that it ought to be communicated to both houses, because the communications intended to be made being to bring on the question whether they would declare war against any which of the nations or parts of the nations of Indns. to the South, it would be proper this information should be before them, that they might know how far such a declaration would lead them. There might be some who would be for war agt the Indians if it were to stop there, but who would not be for it if it was to lead to a war agt Spain. I thot it should be laid before both houses, because it concerned the question of Declaring war which was the function equally of both houses. I thot a simple acknolegmt of the rect of the lre should be made by me to the Spanish Chargés, expressing that it contained some things very unexpected to us, but that we should refer the whole, as they had proposed to the negotiators at Madrid. This would secure to us a continuation of the suspension of Indian hostilities which the Govr. of N. Orleans said he had brought about till the result of the negocian at Madrid should be known, would not commit us as to running or not running the line, imply any admission of doubt about our territorial right avoid a rupture with Spain which was much to be desired, while we had similar points to discuss with Gr. Br.
Hamilton declared himself the advocate for peace. War would derange our affairs, greatly, throw us back many years in the march towards prosperity; be difficult for us to pursue, our countrymen not disposed to become souldiers; a part of the Union feeling no interest in the war, would with difficulty be brought to exert itself; and we had no navy. He was for everything which would procrastinate the event. A year, even, was a great gain to a nation strengthening as we were. It laid open to us, too, the chapter of accidents, which, in the present state of Europe, was a pretty pregnant one. That while, however, he was for delaying the event of war, he had no doubt it was to take place between us for the object in question. That jealousy perseverance were remarkable features in the character of the Span. govmt, with respect to their American possns that so far from receding as to their claims against us, they had been strengthening themselves in them. He had no doubt the present communication was by authority from the court. Under this impression, he thought we should be looking forward to the day of rupture, preparing for it. That if we were unequal to the contest ourselves, it behoved us to provide allies for our aid. That in this view, but two nations could be named, France Eng. France was too intimately connected with Spain in other points, of too great mutual value ever to separate for us. Her affairs too, were such, that whatever issue they had, she could not be in a situation to make a respectable mediation for us. England alone, then, remained. It would not be easy to effect it with her; however, he was for trying it, and for sounding them on the proposition of a defensive treaty of alliance. The inducements to such a treaty, on their part, might be, 1. The desire of breaking up our former connections, which we knew they had long wished. 2. A continuance of the statu quo in commerce for 10 years, which he believed would be desirable to them. 3. An admission to some navigable part of the Mississipi, by some line drawn from the lake of the woods to such navigable part. He had not, he said, examined the map to see how such a line might be run so as not to make too great a sacrifice. The navign of the Missis being a joint possn we might then take measures in concert for the joint security of it. He was therefore for immediately sounding them on this subject thro’ our Minister at London yet so as to keep ourselves unengaged as long as possible in hopes a favorable issue with Spain might be otherwise effected. But he was for sounding immediately for not slipping an opportunity of securing our object.
E. R. concurred in general with me. He objected that such an alliance could not be effected with[out?] pecuniary considn probably, which we could not give And what was to be their aid? If men, our citizens would see their armies get foothold in the U. S. with great jealousy. It would be difficult to protect them. Even the French during the distresses of the late war excited some jealous sentiments.
Hamilton said, money was often but not always demanded, the aid he should propose to stipulate would be in ships.—Knox non dissentiente.
The President said the remedy would be worse than the disease, and stated some of the disagreeable circumstances which would attend our making such overtures.
Knox’s indirect hints in favor of this alliance brought to my recollection his conversn of yesterday, that he wished it.
Nov. 92 . Hamilton called on me to speak about our furnishing supplies to the French colony of St. Domingo. 1 He expressed his opn that we ought to be cautious not go too far in our application of money to their use, lest it should not be recognized by the mother country. He did not even think that 2 some kinds of govt they might establish would give a sufficient sanction. I observed that the National Convent was now met, would certainly establish a form of govmt; that as we had recognized the former govmt because establd by authority of the nation, so we must recognize any other which should be establd by the authority of the nation. He said we had recognized the former, because it contained an important member of the antient, to wit the King, wore the appearance of his consent; but if, in any future form they should omit the king, he did not know that we could with safety recognize it, or pay money to it’s order.
Nov. 11. 1792 . Blodget’s calculation of the circulating medium of Philadelphia the Bank of U. S. their whole stock . . . . . . . . . . . . .
½ of this payable in gold silver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
of which ¾ only are paid . . . . . . .
double this amount issued in paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
only ⅓ of it here . . . . . . . . . . . . .
the bank of N. A. has issued . .
Amount of circulating paper of both banks . . .
add the specie in circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
this amounts to 60 D. each (of paper) for every inhabitant.
and the bank of the U. S. draws 10. pr. cent per ann profit from that.
the circulating cash of Gr. Br. is about . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 millns £ sterl.
the circulating paper . . . . . about 30
50 = 225,000,000 doll.
which is about 28. doll. a head on the poputn of Gr. Britn.
Nov. 19. 92 . Beckley brings me the pamphlet written by Hamilton, before the war, in answer to Common Sense. It is entitled Plain Truth. 1 Melancthon Smith sends it to Beckley, in his letter says, it was not printed in N. York by Loudon, because prevented by a mob, and was printed in Philada, and that he has these facts from Loudon.
Nov. 21. 1792 . Mr. Butler tells me, that he dined last winter with Mr. Campbell from Denmark, in company with Hamilton, Lawrence, Dr. Shippen, T. Shippen, and one other person whom he cannot recollect. That after dinner political principles became the subject of conversation; that Hamilton declared openly, that “there was no stability, no security in any kind of government but a monarchy.” That Lawrence took him up, entered the lists of argument against him; that the dispute continued long, and grew warm, remarkably so as between them; that T. Shippen, at length, joined Lawrence in it; in fine, that it broke up the company. Butler recommended to the company, that the dispute having probably gone farther than was intended it ought to be considered as confined to the company.
1792. Dec. 10 . Present: A. H., Genl Knox, E. R. Th J. at the President’s.
It was agreed to reject meeting the Indians at the proposed treaty, rather than to admit a mediation by Gr. Br. but to admit the presence of Govr. Simcoe, 1 not as a party if that was insisted on, that I should make a verbal communication to Mr. Hammond, in substance, as on the back hereof, which I previously read to the President.
Dec. 12 . I made the communication to Mr. Hammond. He said the attendance of Govr. Simcoe was a circumstance only mentioned by him, but not desired; that he would decline it without difficulty, declared it to be their most ardent wish that peace should take place, for their fur trade was entirely interrupted; he urged as decisive proofs of the sincerity of their wish, 1. that they had kept the late Indian council together 6 weeks at a very great expense, waiting for the 6 Nations. 2. that the Indians at that council were so perfectly satisfied of their desire that they should make peace, that they had not so much as mentioned in council the applying to the British for any supplies. I immediately communicated this to the President.
Heads of conversation with Mr. Hammond. [Dec. 12, 1792.]
That I communicated to the President his information of the consent of the Western Indians to hold conferences of peace with us, in the presence of Govr Simcoe.
Took care to apprize him of the informality of the conversn—yt it was accidl—private;—the present to be considered equally so:—unnecessary to note to him that nothing like a Mediation was suggested.
1. Because so informal a conversn cd not include so formal a thing as a Mediation.
2. Bec. an establd principle of public law among the white nations of America, that while the Indians included within their limits retain all other natl rights, no other white nation can become their patrons, protectors or mediators, nor in any shape intermeddle between them those within whose limits they are.
That Gr. Br. wd not propose an example wch wd authorize us to cross our boundary, take under our protection the Indians within her limits.
3. Because should the treaty prove ineffectual, it wd singularly commit the friendship of the two nations.
That the idea of Govr Simcoe’s attendance was presented only as a thing desird by the Indians: that the consequences of this had been considd.
It is not necessary in order to effect a peace.
Our views so just so moderate that we have no fear of effecting peace if left to ourselves. If it cannt be effected, it is much better that nobody on the part of Engld shd hve ben present;—for however our govmt is persuaded of the sincerity of yr assurances yt y’ hve not excited the Indians, yet our citizens in general are not so.
It will be impossible to persuade them the negocns were not defeatd by Brit. agents: that therefore tho’ we do not pretend to make the exclus of Govr Simcoe a sine quâ non, provided he be there as a spectator, not as a party
Yet we shd consider his declining to attend either by himself or any other person, as an instance of their frdshp as an evidence of it particularly calculated to make due impression on the minds of our citizens.
That the place (Aux Glaise) fixed on by the Indians is extremely inconvent to us, because of the distance and difficulty of transportg provns there.
300,000 rations will probably be requisite if 3000 Indians attend.
That if we had time we would have proposed some other place, e. g. the Maumee towns; but there not being time, we shall do our best to make provn. 1. We shall collect carry as much as possible through the Miami channel. 2. We shall hope for their permission to have purchases made in upper Canada, brought along the lake.
1792. Dec. 13 . The President called on me to see the model drawings of some mills for sawing stone. After shewing them he in the course of subsequent conversation asked me if there were not some good manufactories of porcelain in Germany, that he was in want of table china had been speaking to Mr. Shaw who was going to the East Indies to bring him a set, but he found that it would not come till he should be no longer in a situation to want it. He took occasion a second time to observe that Shaw said it would be 2. years at least before he could have the china here, before which time he said he should be where he should not need it. I think he asked the question about the manufactories in Germany merely to have an indirect opportunity of telling me he meant to retire, and within the limits of two years.
Dec. 17 . Hammond says the person is here to whom the 6 Nations delivered the invtn for Simcoe to attend, who says they insisted on it would consider his non-attendance as an evidence that he does not wish for peace. But he says that Simcoe has not the least idea of attending—that this gentleman says he may procure in Upper Canada any quantity of provns which the people will sett up express during winter, that he will return carry our request whenever we are ready.
Dec. 17 . The affair of Reynolds 1 his wife.—Clingham Muhlenb’s clerk. testifies F. A. Muhl. Monroe Venable.—also Wolcott at Wadsworth.—known to J[ames] M[onroe] E. R [andolph] Beckley Webr.
Thursday Dec. 27. 92 . I waited on the President on some current business. After this was over, he observed to me he thought it was time to endeavor to effect a stricter connection with France, and that G. Morris should be written to on this subject. He went into the circumstances of dissatisfaction between Spain Gr. Brit. us, observed there was no nation on whom we could rely at all times but France, and that if we did not prepare in time some support in the event of rupture with Spain England we might be charged with a criminal negligence. [I was much pleased with the tone of these observations. It was the very doctrine which had been my polar star, and I did not need the successes of the Republican arms in France lately announced to us, to bring me to these sentiments. For it is to be noted that on Saturday last (the 22d) I received Mr. Short’s letters of Oct. 9. 12. with the Leyden gazettes to Oct. 13. giving us the first news of the retreat of the D. of Brunswic, and the capture of Spires Worms by Custine, and that of Nice by Anselme.] I therefore expressed to the President my cordial approbation of these ideas: told him I had meant on that day (as an opportunity of writing by the British packet would occur immediately) to take his orders for removing the suspension of paiments to France which had been imposed by my last lre to G. Morris, but was meant as I supposed only for the interval between the abolition of the late constn by the dethronement of the king and the meeting of some other body; invested by the will of the nation with powers to transact their affairs; that I considered the national convention then assembled as such a body, and that therefore we ought to go on with the paiments to them or to any government they should establish. That however I had learned last night that some clause in the bill for providing reimbursement of the loan made by the bank to the U. S. had given rise to a question before the house of representatives yesterday which might affect these paiments; a clause in that bill proposing that the money formerly borrowed in Amstdm to pay the French debt appropriated by law (1790. August 4. c. 34. s. 2.) to that purpose, lying dead as was suggested, should be taken to pay the bank, and the Presidt. be authorized to borrow 2. millions of dol. more out of which it should be replaced, and if this should be done the removal of our suspension of paiment as I had been about to propose, would be premature. He expressed his disapprobation of the clause above mentioned, thought it highly improper in the legislature to change an appropriation once made, and added that no one could tell in what that would end. I concurred, but observed that on a division of the house the ayes for striking out the clause were 27. the noes 26 whereon the Speaker gave his vote against striking out, which dividing the house; the clause for the disappropriation remained of course. I mentd suspicions that the whole of this was a trick to serve the bank under a great existing embarrassment. That the debt to the bank was to be repd by instalments, that the 1st. instalment was of 200,000 D. only, or rather 160,000 D. (because 40,000 of the 200,000 d. would be the U. States’ own dividend of the instalment). Yet here were 2,000,000 to be paid them at once, to be taken from a purpose of gratitude honor to which it had been appropriated.
Dec. 30. 92 . I took the occasion furnished by Pinckney’s letter of Sep. 19. asking instrns how to conduct himself (as to the French revolution), to lay down the Catholic principal of republicanism, to wit-that every people may establish what form of government they please, and change it as they please. The will of the nation being the only thing essential. I was induced to do this in order to extract the President’s opn on the question which divided Hamilton myself in the conversn of Nov. 92 and the previous one or the first week of Nov. on the suspension of paimts to France. and if favorable to mine, to place the principles of record in the letter books of my office. I therefore wrote the letter of Dec. 30. to Pinckney sent it to the President, he returned me his approbation in writing in his note of the same date. Which see.
Feb. 7. 1793 . I waited on the President with letters papers from Lisbon. After going through these I told him that I had for some time suspended speaking with him on the subject of my going out of office because I had understood that the bill for intercourse with foreign nations was likely to be rejected by the Senate in which case the remaining business of the department would be too inconsiderable to make it worth while to keep it up. But that the bill being now passed I was freed from the considerations of propriety which had embarrassed me. That c. (nearly in the words of a letter to Mr. T. M. Randolph of a few days ago) 1 and that I should be willing, if he had taken no arrangemts. to the contrary to continue somewhat longer, how long I could not say, perhaps till summer, perhaps autumn. He said so far from takeng arrangements on the subject, he had never mentioned to any mortal the design of retiring which I had expressed to him, till yesterday having heard that I had given up my house that it was rented by another, thereupon he mentd. it to Mr. E. Randolph asked him, as he knew my retirement had been talked of, whether he had heard any persons suggested in conversations to succeed me. He expressed his satisfn at my change of purpose, his apprehensions that my retirement would be a new source of uneasiness to the public. He said Govr. Lee had that day informed of the genl. discontent prevailing in Virga of which he never had had any conception, much less sound informn: That it appeared to him very alarming. He proceeded to express his earnest wish that Hamilton myself could coalesce in the measures of the govmt, and urged here the general reasons for it which he had done to me on two former conversns. He said he had proposed the same thing to Ham. who expresd his readiness, and he thought our coalition would secure the general acquiescence of the public. I told him my concurrence was of much less importce than he seemed to imagine; that I kept myself aloof from all cabal correspondence on the subject of the govmt saw spoke with as few as I could. That as to a coalition with Mr. Hamilton, if by that was meant that either was to sacrifice his general system to the other, it was impossible. We had both no doubt formed our conclusions after the most mature consideration and principles conscientiously adopted could not be given up on either side. My wish was to see both houses of Congr. cleansed of all persons interested in the bank or public stocks; that a pure legislature being given us, I should always be ready to acquiesce under their determns even if contrary to my own opns, for that I subscribe to the principle that the will of the majority honestly expressed should give law. I confirmed him in the fact of the great discontents to the South, that they were grounded on seeing that their judgmts interests were sacrificed to those of the Eastern states on every occn. their belief that it was the effect of a corrupt squadron of voters in Congress at the command of the Treasury, they see that if the votes of those members who had an interest distinct from contrary to the general interest of their constts had been withdrawn, as in decency honesty they should have been, the laws would have been the reverse of what they are in all the great questions. I instanced the new assumption carried in the H. of Repr. by the Speaker’s votes. On this subject he made no reply. He explained his remaing. in office to have been the effect of strong solicitations after he returned here declaring that he had never mentd. his purpose of going out but to the heads of depnts Mr. Madison; he expressed the extreme wretchedness of his existence while in office, and went lengthily into the late attacks on him for levees c—and explained to me how he had been led into them by the persons he consulted at New York, and that if he could but know what the sense of the public was, he would most cheerfully conform to it.
Feb. 16. 93 . E. R. tells J. Mad. myself a curious fact which he had from Lear. When the Presidt went to N. Y. he resisted for 3 weeks the efforts to introduce levees. 1 At length he yielded, left it to Humphreys and some others to settle the forms. Accdly an anti-chamber presence room were provided, when those who were to pay their court were assembled, the President set out, preceded by Humphreys, after passing thro’ the anti-chamber the door of the inner room was thrown in Humphreys entered first calling out with a loud voice, “the President of the U. S.” The President was so much disconcerted with it that he did not recover it the whole time of the levee, and when the company was gone he said to Humphreys “Well, you have taken me in once, but by God you shall never take me in a second time.”
There is reason to believe that the rejection of the late additional assumption by the Senate was effected by the President thro’ Lear, operating on Langdon. Beckley knows this.
Feb. 20. 1793 . Colo. W. S. Smith called on me to communicate intelligence from France. He had left Paris Nov. 9. He says the French Ministers are entirely broken with Gouvr. Morris, shut their doors to him will never receive another communication from him. They wished Smith to be the bearer of a message from the Presidt. to this effect, but he declined they said in that case they would press it thro’ their own minister here. He says they are sending Genet here with full powers to give us all the privileges we can desire in their countries, particularly in the W. Indies, that they even contemplate to set them free the next summer: that they propose to emancipate S. America, and will send 45. ships of the line there next spring, Miranda at the head of the expedn: that they desire our debt to be paid them in provns, and have authorized him to negotiate this. In confirmn of this he delivers a letter to the Presidt. from Lebrun min. for forn. affrs, in which Lebrun says that Colo. Smith will communicate plans worthy of his (the Pr’s) great mind, he shall be happy to receive his opn as to the means the most suitable to effect it.
I had 5. or 6. days ago received from Ternant extracts from the lres of his ministers, complaing of both G. Morris Mr. Short. I sent them this day to the Presidt. with an extract from a private lre of Mr. Short, justifying himself, I called this eveng on the Presidt. He said he considd. the extracts from Ternant as very serious, in short as decisive: that he saw that G. Morris cd. be no longer contind there consistent with the public good, that the moment was critical in our favor ot not to be lost: that he was extremely at a loss what arrangement to make. I asked him whether G. Morris Pinckney mt. not change places. He sd that wd. be a sort of remedy, but not a radical one. That if the French ministry conceived G. M. to be hostile to them, if they hd. bn. jealous merely on his proposing to visit London, they wd. nevr. be satisfd. with us at placing him at London permanently. He then observed that tho’ I had unfixed the day on which I had intendd. to resign, yet I appeared fixed in doing it at no great distance of time: that in this case, he cd. not but wish that I wd. go to Paris, that the moment was important, I possessed the confidence of both sides might do great good; that he wished I could do it were it only to stay there a year or two. I told him that my mind was so bent on retirement that I could not think of launching forth again in a new business, that I could never again cross the Atlantic; and that as to the opportunity of doing good, this was likely to be the scene of action, as Genet was bringing powers to do the business here, but that I could not think of going abroad. He replied that I had pressed him to continue in the public service refused to do the same myself. I said the case was very different; he united the confidce. of all America, and was the only person who did so: his services therefore were of the last importance; but for myself my going out would not be noted or known, a thousand others could supply my place to equal advantage therefore I felt myself free: and that as to the mission to France I thought Pinckney perfectly proper. He desired me then to consider maturely what arrangemt shd. be made.
Smith in speaking of Morris said that at his own table in presence of his company servts. he cursed the French ministers as a set of damned rascals; said the king wd. still be replaced on his throne. He said he knew they had written to have him recalled, expected to be recalled. He consulted Smith to know whether he cd. bring his furniture here duty free. Smith has mentd. the situatn of G. Morris freely to others here.
Smith said also that the ministers told him they meant to begin their attack at the mouth of the Missi, and to sweep along the bay of Mexico Southwardly, and that they would have no objns to our incorporating into our govmt the two Floridas.
Feb. 26. 1793 . Notes on the proceedings of yesterday. [See the formal opinions given to the President in writing signed 1 ]
1st. Qu. We were all of opinion that the treaty shd. proceed merely to gratify the public opinion, not from any expectation of success. I expressed myself strongly that the event was so unpromising that I thought the preparations for a campaign should go on without the least relaxation, and that a day should be fixed with the Commrs. for the treaty beyond which they should not permit the treaty to be protracted, by which day orders shd. be given for our forces to enter into action. The President took up the thing instantly after I had said this, and declared he was so much in the opn that the treaty would end in nothing that he then in the presence of us all gave orders to Genl. Knox not to slacken the preparations for the campaign in the least but to exert every nerve in preparing for it. Knox said something about the ultimate day for continuing the negotias. I acknoleged myself not a judge on what day the campaign should begin, but that whatever it was, that day should determine the treaty. Knox said he thought a winter campaign was always the most efficacious against the Indians. I was of opn since Gr. Britain insisted on furnishing provns, that we should offer to repay. Hamilton thot we should not.
2d. Qu. I considered our right of preemption of the Indian lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdn, or paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extingmt of a present right, which gave us no present right whatever but of preventing other nations from taking possession and so defeating our expectancy: that the Indians had the full, undivided independant sovereignty as long as they chose to keep it that this might be forever: that as fast as we extended our rights by purchase from them, so fast we extended the limits of our society, as soon as a new portion became encircled within our line, it became a fixt limit of our society: that the Executive with either or both branches of the legislature could not alien any part of our territory: that by the L. of nations it was settled that the Unity indivisibility of the society was so fundamental that it could not be dismembered by the Constituted authorities, except 1. where all power was delegated to them (as in the case of despotic govmts) or 2. where it was expressly delegated. That neither of these delegations had been made to our general govmt therefore that it had no right to dismember or alienate any portion of territory once ultimately consolidated with us: and that we could no more cede to the Indians than to the English or Spaniards, as it might according to acknolegd. principles remain as irrevocably and eternally with the one as the other. But I thought that as we had a right to sell settle lands once comprehended within our lines, so we might forbear to exercise that right, retaining the property, till circumstances should be more favorable to the settlement, and this I agreed to do in the present instance if necessary for peace.
Hamilton agreed the doctrine of the law of nations as laid down in Europe, but that it was founded on the universality of settlement there, conseqly. that no lopping off of territory cd. be made without a lopping off of citizens, which required their consent: but that the law of nations for us must be adapted to the circumstance of our unsettled country, which he conceived the Presidt Senate may cede: that the power of treaty was given to them by the constn, without restraining it to particular objects, conseqly. that it was given in as plenipotentiary a form as held by any sovereign in any other society.—E. R. was of opn there was a difference between a cession to Indns. to any others, because it only restored the ceded part to the condn in which it was before we bought it, and consequently that we might buy it again hereafter. Therefore he thought the Exec. Senate could cede it. Knox joined in the main opn. The Presidt. discovd no opn, but he made some efforts to get us to join in some terms which could unite us all, and he seemed to direct those efforts more towards me: but the thing could not be done.
3d. Qu. We agreed in idea as to the line to be drawn, to wit so as to retain all lands appropriated, or granted or reserved.
4th. Qu. We all thought if the Senate should be consulted consequently apprized of our line, it would become known to Hammond, we should lose all chance of saving anything more at the treaty than our Ultimatum.
Qu. whether we should furnish the 3. millns. of livres desired by France to procure provns? I was of opn we ot to do it, the one part as an arrearage (abt. 318,000) the residue as an advance towards our payments to be made in Paris in Sep. Nov. next. E. R. was for furnishing the whole sum asked but under such blind terms, that if the present French government should be destroyed the former one reestablished, it might not be imputed to us as a proof of our taking part with the present, but might be excused under a pretext that we thought we might owe it. Knox of the same opn.
Hamilton saw the combinn of powers agt. France so strong, as to render the issue very doubtful. He therefore was agt. going beyond the 318,000. D. understood to be in arrear.
The Presidt at this meeting mentd the declaration of some person in a paper of Fenno 1 that he would commence an attack on the character of Dr. Franklin; he said the theme was to him excessively disagreeable on other considerations, but most particularly so as the party seemed to do it as a means of defending him (the Presidt) agt the late attacks on him, that such a mode of defence would be peculiarly painful to him, he wished it could be stopped. Hamilton E. R. undertook to speak to Fenno to suppress it, without mentiong. it as the President’s wish. Both observed that they had heard this declarn mentd. in many companies that it had excited universal horror detestation.
The paper in Fenno must lie between two persons, viz, Adams Izard, because they are the only persons who could know such facts as are there promised to be unfolded. Adams is an enemy to both characters, and might chuse this ground as an effectual position to injure both. Izard hated Franklin with unparalleled bitterness but humbly adores the Presidt. because he is in loco regis. If the paper proceeds, we shall easily discover which of these two gentlemen is the champion. In the meantime the first paper leads our suspicions more towards Izard than Adams from the circumstance of stile, and because he is quite booby enough not to see the injury he would do to the President by such a mode of defence.
Feb. 28 . Knox, E. R. and myself met at Knox’s where Hamilton was also to have met, to consider the time manner place of the President’s swearing in. 1 Hamilton had been there before had left his opn with Knox, to wit, that the Presid. shd ask a judge to attend him in his own house to administer the oath, in the presence of the heads of deptmts, which oath should be deposited in the Secy. of state’s office. I concurred in this opn. E. R. was for the President’s going to the Senate chamber to take the oath, attended by the Marshal of the U. S., who should then make proclmn c. Knox was for this and for adding the house of Repr. to the presence, as they would not yet be departed. Our individl. opns were written to be communicated to the Presidt. out of which he might form one. In the course of our conversn Knox stickling for parade, got into great warmth and swore that our govmt must either be entirely new modeled or it would be knocked to pieces in less than 10 years, and that as it is at present he would not give a copper for it, that it is the President’s character, not the written constn which keeps it together.
Same day. Conversn with Lear. He expressed the strongest confidence that republicanism was the universal creed of America, except of a very few; that republican adminn. must of necessity immediately overbear the contrary faction, said that he had seen with extreme regret that a number of gentlemen had for a long time been endeavoring to instil into the President that the noise agt. the admn of the govmt was that of a little faction, which wd soon be silent which was detested by the people, who were contented prosperous: that this very party however began to see their error and that the sense of America was bursting forth to their conviction.
Mar. 2. 1793 . See in the papers of this date, Mr. Giles’s resolutions. 1 He one or two others were sanguine enough to believe that the palpableness of these resolns rendered it impossible the house could reject them. Those who knew the composition of the house 1. of bank directors 2. holders of bank stock 3. stock-jobbers. 4. blind devotees, 5. ignorant persons who did not comprehend them 6. lazy good-humored persons, who comprehended acknoleged them, yet were too lazy to examine, or unwilling to pronounce censure. The persons who knew these characters foresaw that the 3. first descriptions making ⅓ of the house, the 3. latter would make ½ of the residue, and of course that they would be rejected by a majority of 2. to 1. But they thought that even this rejection would do good, by shewing the public the desperate abandoned dispositions with which their affairs were entrusted. The resolns were proposed, and nothing spared to present them in the fulness of demonstration. There were not more than 3. or 4. who voted otherwise than had been expected.
It is known that [William Vans] Murray of Maryld deals in paper.
Mar. 23. 1793 . The following list of paper-men is communicated to me by Mr. Beckley. 1
Stockholders | h-repr | senate |
Other paper | 16 | 5 |
3 | 2 | |
19 | 7 | |
Suspected | 2 | 4 |
Mar. 30. 93 . At our meeting at the Presid’s Feb. 25. in discussing the question whether we should furnish to France the 3.000.000 desired, Hamilton in speaking on the subject used this expression “when Mr. Genet arrives, whether we shall receive him or not, will then be a question for discussion,” 1 which expression I did not recollect till E. R. reminded me of it a few days after. Therefore on the 20th. inst. as the Prest was shortly to set out for M. Vernon, I observed to him that as Genest might arrive in his absence, I wishd. to know beforehand how I should treat him, whether as a person who wd. or wd. not be receivd? He said he could see no ground of doubt but that he ought to be received. On the 24th he asked E. R.’s opn on the subject; saying he had consulted Colo. Hamilton thereon who went into lengthy considns of doubt and difficulty, and viewing it as a very unfortunate thing that the Presidt shd have the decisn. of so critical a point forced on him; but in conclusion said, since he was brot into that situan he did not see but that he must receive Mr. Genest. E. R. told the Presidt. he was clear he shd. be recd the Presidt said he hd never hd any doubt on the subject in his mind.—Afterwards on the same day he spoke to me again on it, and said Mr. Genest should unquestionably be received, but he thought not with too much warmth or cordiality, so only as to to be satisfactory to him. 2 I wondered at first at this restriction; but when E. R. afterwards communicated to me this conversn of the 24th. I became satisfied it was a small sacrifice to the opn of Hamilton.
Mar. 31 . Mr. Beckley tells me that the merchants bonds for duties on 6. mo. credit became due the 1st. inst. to a very great amount. That Hamilton went to the bank on that day and directed the bank to discount for those merchts. all their bonds at 30. days, and that he would have the Collectors credited for the money at the Treasury. Hence the Treasury lumping its receipts by the month in it’s printed accts. these sums will be considered by the public as only recd. on the last day, conseqly. the bank makes the month’s interest out of it. Beckley had this from a mercht. who hd a bond discounted who supposes a million of dollars were discounted at the bank here. Mr. Brown got the same informn from another mercht. who supposed only 600.000 D discounted here. But they suppose the same orders went to all the branch banks to a great amount.
Eod die. Mr. Brown tells me he has it from a mercht. that during the last winter the Directors of the bank ordd. the freest discounts. Every man could obtain it. Money being so flush, the 6. per cents run up to 21/ 22/. Then the Directors sold out their private stocks. When the discounted notes were becoming due they stopped discounts, not a dollar was to be had. This reduced 6. per cents to 1813 then the same directors bought in again.
Apr. 7. 93 . Mr. Lear called on me introduced of himself a conversation of the affairs of the U. S. He laughed at the cry of prosperity the deriving it from the establmt of the treasury: he said that so far from giving into this opn that we were payg off our national debt he was clear the debt was growing on us: that he had lately expressed this opn to the Presidt who appeared much astonished at it. I told him I had given the same hint to the P. last summer, lately again had suggested that we were even depending for the daily subsistence of govmt on borrowed money: he said that was certain, was the only way of accounting for what was become of the money drawn over from Holland to this country.—He regretted that the Pr. was not in the way of hearing full informn, declared he communicated to him everything he could learn himself: that the men who vaunted the present govmt so much on some occasions were the very men who at other times declared it was a poor thing, such a one as could not stand, he was sensible they only esteemed it as a stepping stone to something else, and had availed themselves of the first moments of the enthusiasm in favor of it, to pervert it’s principles make of it what they wanted: that tho’ they raised the cry of Anti-federalism against those who censured the mode of admn, yet he was satisfd whenever it should come to be tried that the very men whom they called Anti-federalists were the men who would save the govmt, he looked to the next Congress for much rectification.
Eod die. Mr. Beckley tells me that a gentleman, heartily a fiscalist, called on him yesterday, told him he had been to N. York. into the Prison with Duer, 1 with whome he hd. mch. conversn. that Pintard Duer’s agent has about 100,000 D. worth of property in his hands bids defiance: that this embarrasses Duer much, who declares that if certain Persons do not relieve him shortly, he will unfold such a scene of villainy as will astonish the world.
Apr 18 . The President sends a set of Questions to be considered 2 calls a meeting. Tho’ those sent me were in his own hand writing, yet it was palpable from the style, their ingenious tissu suite that they were not the President’s, that they were raised upon a prepared chain of argument, in short that the language was Hamilton’s, and the doubts his alone. They led to a declaration of the Executive that our treaty with France is void. E. R. the next day told me, that the day before the date of these questions, Hamilton went with him thro’ the whole chain of reasoning of which these questions are the skeleton, that he recognized them the moment he saw them.
We met. The 1st. question whether we should receive the French minister Genest was proposed, we agreed unanimously that he should be received, Hamilton at the same time expressing his great regret that any incident had happd. which should oblige us to recognize the govmt. The next question was whether he shd. be received absolutely, or with qualificns. Here H. took up the whole subject, and went through it in the order in which the questions sketch it. See the chain of his reasoning in my opn of Apr 28. Knox subscribed at once to H’s opn that we ought to declare the treaty void, 1 acknoleging at the same time, like a fool that he is, that he knew nothing about it. I was clear it remained valid. E. R. declared himself of the same opn. but on H.’s undertaking to present to him the authority in Vattel (which we had not present) and to prove to him that, if the authority was admitted, the treaty might be declared void, E. R. agreed to take further time to consider. It was adjourned. We determd Unanimly the last qu. that Congress shd nt be called. There havg been an intimation by E. R. that in so great a question he shd chuse to give a written opn, this being approvd by the Pres. I gave in mine Apr 28. H. gave in his. I believe Knox’s was never thought worth offering or asking for. E. R. gave his May 6. concurring with mine. The Presidt. told me the same day he had never had a doubt about the validity of the treaty: but that since a question had been suggested he thought it ot to be considered: that this being done, I might now issue Passports to sea vessels in the form prescribed by the French treaty. I had for a week past only issd. the Dutch form; to have issd. the French wd have been presupposing the treaty to be in existence. The Presidt. suggested that he thot it wd be as well that nothing should be sd of such a question havg been under considn.
May 6 written.
1793. May 6 . The President shews me a draught of a lre from Colo. H. 1 to the Collectors of the customs, desirg them to superintend their neighborhood, watch for all acts of our citizens contrary to laws of neutrality or tending to infringe those laws, inform him of it; particularly to see if vessels should be building pierced for guns. I told the Pr. that at a conference a few days before Colo. H. E. R. had concurred in opn agt. me that for us to build and sell vessels fit for war would be a breach of neutrality, but that I understood them as agreeing that no opn should go from the public on that question as not being now necessary: that as to the 1st part of the letter I did not of a sudden decide it to be improper.—he, on this, returned the [draught?] to Ham. with a desire that he, E. R. myself would confer on it.
May 7 . We met as trustees of the sinkg. fund. For the opn I delivered see my note of May 8. to E. R. for his see his answer of May 9.—On the business of the sinkg. fund, we had meant to have come to a resoln to ask of the Pres. if there was any money under the loans at our disposal, the occasion of laying it out being favble. But H. producd. a lre just recd. from our bankers informg. him of the impossibility of effecting the new loan which had been ordered (and of which I had not heard before) on this I declared it is my opn that if the money on hand was not sfft to pay our next instllmt to France also to purchase public debt, (of which I could not be a judge, only knowg. that our next instllmt. wd. be of bettween 6 700,000 D. was approachg.) I should be against failing in the paymt. which was a positive engagemt. whereas the purchase of public debt was voluntary. So nothing was done.
When the question was whether the proclmn of Apr. 22. 1 should be issued, E. R. observed that there should be a letter written by me to the ministers of the belligerent powers to declare that it should not be taken as conclusive evidence against our citizens in foreign courts of admiralty for contraband goods.—Knox suddenly adopted the opn before Hamilton delivered his. Hamilton opposed it pretty strongly. I thought it an indifferent thing but rather approved E. R.’s opn. The President was against it; but observed that as there were three for it, it should go. This was the first instance I had seen of an opportunity to decide by a mere majority including his own vote.
May. 12 . Lear called on me to-day. Speaking of the lowness of stocks, (16/) I observed it was a pity we had not money to buy on publick acct. He said yes, that it was the more provoking as 2 millions hd been borrowed for that purpose drawn over here, yet were not here. That he had no doubt those would take notice of the circumstance whose duty it was to do so.—I suppose he must mean the President.
May 20. 93 . — Qu: Shall the Privateer fitted out at Charleston her prizes be ordered out of the ports of the U. S.? 1
Explain circumstance wch. drove Genet into the Southern passage induced him to land at Charleston.
Fr. citizens sollicitg commn. to Arm.—Governr. winkg. at it. Words of XXII. art. 2 shall not be lawful for enemies of Fr. fit out privateers. Implication yt shll be lawful for French.
So understood universally, by every one here—by ourselves at Charleston—by Genet. Still true it is not expressly permitted—may be forbidden. But till forbidden must be slight offence. The Prohibition to be future not Retrospective.
What Right to order away?
XVII makes lawful to enter with prizes and stay.
In whom is the Right to these privateers prizes?
Fr. citizens retain fidelity in forn. country have right to return to defence of country by sea or land, may confer on that, associate, contribute money, may buy vessel with own money—man her themselves on codn commt no hostils. within limts. of U. S. as soon as out of limits themselves vessel free as any other.
Fr. citizens ante-residents, on same footing as new visitants.
When take a vessel at sea, property, transferrd. by laws of war. This point understood at former conferce. for if not transferrd. should be given up. If right transferrd. then XVIIth article authorises entry no half-way act justifiable.
Obj. it is Punishmt for the offence.
Ans. No offence till forbidden.—Looks only to future.
Minister newly arrived.
First from the Republic.
Popularity of French nation cause.
Proposals he brings.
No call of Guarantee
Free trade to islands to France } by treaty
Shall such a mission to recd. with reprimand?
for whom. For England?
For confederated princes?
Our reward the Cyclops’ boon to Ulysses. last devoured Od. i. 369.
Are we playing y’ part England plaid? force France to attack us?
Yt we may take side with the confederatg. princes?
The party wishing that is very small.
H. K. were of opn for giving up the prize, but if that could not be, then to order away the privateer prize; and if that cd. not be, then to order away the privateer.
T. J. of opn that neither could be given up or ordd. away.
E. R. for ordering away the privateer nothing more.
The President confirmed the last opinion it seemed to be his own. 1
1793. May 23 . I had sent to the President yesterday draughts of a letter from him to the Provisory Exec. council of France, and of one from myself to Mr. Ternant, both on the occasion of his recall. I called on him to-day. He said there was a word in one of them which he had never before seen in any of our public communications, to wit “our republic.” The letter prepared for him to the Council begun thus “the citizen Ternant has delivered to me the letter wherein you inform me that, yielding c. you had determined to recall him from his mission as your min. plen. to our republic. ” He had underscored the words our republic. He said that certainly ours was a republican government, but yet we had not used that stile in this way; that if any body wanted to change its form into a monarchy he was sure it was only a few individuals, that no man in the U. S. would set his face against it more than himself; but that this was not what he was afraid of; his fears were from another quarter, that there was more danger of anarchy being introduced. He adverted to a piece in Freneau’s paper of yesterday, he said he despised all their attacks on him personally, but that there never had been an act of the government, not meaning in the Executive line only, but in any line which that paper had not abused. He had also marked the word republic thus √ where it was applied to the French republic. (See the original paper) He was evidently sore warm, and I took his intention to be that I should interpose in some way with Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appointment of translating clerk to my office. But I will not do it. His paper has saved our constitution which was galloping fast into monarchy, has been checked by no one means so powerfully as by that paper. It is well universally known that it has been that paper which has checked the career of the Monocrats, the President, not sensible of the designs of the party, has not with his usual good sense, and sang froid, looked on the efforts and effects of this free press, seen that tho’ some bad things had passed thro’ it to the public, yet the good have preponderated immensely.
June 7. 93 . Mr. Beckley, who is returned from N. York within a few days, tells me that while he was there S. John Temple, Consul Genl. of the Northern states for Gr. Br. shewed him a letter from Sr. Gregory Page Turner 1 a member of parliament for a borough in Yorkshire, who he said had been a member for 25 years, and always confidential for the ministers, in which he permitted him to read particular passages of the following purport “that the government were well apprized of the predominancy of the British interest in the U S. that they considered Col. Hamilton, Mr. King Mr. W. Smith of S. Carolina as the main supports of that interest, that particularly they considered Colo. Hamilton not Mr. Hammond as their effective minister here, that if the antifederal interest (that was his term) at the head of which they considered Mr. Jefferson to be, should prevail, these gentlemen had secured an asylum to themselves in England.” Beckley cd. not understand whether they had secured it themselves, 2 or whether they were only notified that it was secured to them. So that they understand that they may go on boldly, in their machinations to change the govmt, and if they should be overset chuse to withdraw, they will be secure of a pension in England as Arnold, Deane c had. Sr. John read passages of a letter (which he did not put into Beckley’s hand as he did the other) from Ld. Grenville saying nearly the same things. This letter mentions to Sr. John that tho’ they had divided the Consul-generalship and given the Southern department to Bond, yet he, Sr. John, was to retain his whole salary. [By this it would seem as if, wanting to use Bond, they had covered his employment with this cloak.] Mr. Beckley says that Sr. John Temple is a strong republican.—I had a proof of his intimacy with Sr. John in this circumstance. Sr. John received his new Commission of Consul for the Northern department, and instead of sending it thro’ Mr. Hammond, got Beckley to enclose it to me for his Exequatur. I wrote to Sr. John that it must come thro’ Mr. Hammond, enclosing it back to him. He accordingly then sent it to Mr. Hammond.
In conversation with the President to-day, and speaking about Genl. Greene, he said that he Genl. Greene had always differed in opn about the manner of using militia. Greene always placed them in his front: himself was of opn they should always be used as a reserve to improve any advantage, for which purpose they were the finest fellows in the world. He said he was on the ground of the battle of Guilford with a person who was in the action who explained the whole of it to him. That general Greene’s front was behind a fence at the edge of a large field, thro’ which the enemy were obliged to pass to get at them; that in their passage thro’ this they must have been torn all to peices if troops had been posted there who would have stood their ground; that the retreat from that position was through a thicket, perfectly secure. Instead of this he posted the N. Caroline militia there, who only gave one fire fell back, so that the whole benefit of their position was lost. He thinks that the regulars with their field pieces would have hardly let a single man get through that field.
Eod die (June 7). Beckley tells me that he has the followg fact from Govr. Clinton. That before the proposn. for the present general govmt i. e. a little before, Hamilton conceived a plan for establishing a monarchical govmt in the U S. he wrote a draught of a circular letter, which was to be sent to about — persons, to bring it about. One of these letters, in Hamilton’s handwriting is now in possn. of an old Militia genl. up the North river, who, at that time was thought orthodox enough to be entrusted in the execution. This general has given notice to Govr. Clinton that he has this paper, and that he will deliver it into his hands no one’s else. Clinton intends the first interval of leisure to go for it, and he will bring it to Philade. “Beckley is a man of perfect truth as to what he affirms of his own knolege, but too credulous as to what he hears from others.” 1
June 10. 93 . Mr. Brown gives me the following specimen of the phrenzy which prevailed at New York on the opening of the new govmt. The first public ball which took place after the President’s arrival there, Colo. Humphreys, Colo. W. S. Smith, Mrs. Knox, were to arrange the ceremonials. These arrangements were as follows. A Sopha at the head of the room raised on several steps whereon the Presidt. Mrs. Washington were to be seated. The gentlemen were to dance in swords. Each one when going to dance was to lead his partner to the foot of the Sopha, make a low obeisance to the Presidt. his lady, then go dance, when done bring his partner again to the foot of the Sopha for new obeisances then to retire to their chairs. It was to be understood too that gentlemen should be dressed in bags. Mrs. Knox contrived to come with the President to follow him Mrs. Washington to their destination, she had the design of forcing an invitn from the Presidt. to a seat on the Sopha. She mounted up the steps after them, unbidden, but unfortunately the wicked Sopha was so short, that when the Presidt Mrs. Washington were seated, there was not room for a 3. person; she was obliged therefore to descend in the face of the company to sit where she could. In other respects the ceremony was conducted rigorously according to the arrangements, the President made to pass an evening which his good sense rendered a very miserable one to him. 1
June 12 . Beckley tells me that Klingham 2 has been with him to day relates to him the following fact. A certificate of the old Congress had been offered at the treasury refused payment so indorsed in red ink as usual. This certificate came to the hands of Francis (the quondam clerk of the treasury, who on account of his being dipped in the infamous case of the Baron Glaubec, Hamilton had been obliged to dismiss, to save appearances, but with an assurance of all future service, he accdly got him establd. in New York) Francis wrote to Hamilton that such a ticket was offered him but he could not buy it unless he would inform him give him his certificate that it was good. Hamilton wrote him a most friendly letter sent him the certificate. He bot the paper came on here, got it recognized, whereby he made 2500 Dollars. Klingham saw both the letter certificate.
Irving, 1 a clerk in the treasury, an Irishman, is the author of the pieces now coming out under the signature of Veritas, 2 attacking the President. I have long suspected this detestable game was playing by the fiscal party, to place the Presidt. on their side.
July 5. 1793 . A meeting desired by A. H. at my office. Himself, Knox myself met accdly. He said that according to what had been agreed on in presence of the President, in conseqce of Mr. Genet’s declining to pay the 45,000 D. at his command in the treasury to the holders of the St. Domingo bills, we had agreed to pay the holders out of other monies to that amount: that he found however that these bills would amount to 90,000 D. and the question was whether he should assume 90,000 to be paid out of the September instalment. This he said wd. enable holders to get discounts at the banks, would, therefore be equal to ready money, save them from bankruptcy. Unanimously agreed to.
We also agreed to a lre written by Genl. Knox to Govr. Mifflin to have a particular inquiry made whether the Little Sarah 1 is arming c or not.
I read lre from the Presidt. about the Swallow lre of marck at N. York. compld. of by the French Consul. Agreed as the case was new, to let it wait for the Presidt. 2
I read also Govr. Lee’s lre abt the Govr. of S. C.’s proclamn. respectg pestilential disease in W. Indies. We are all of opn the evidence is too slight for interferce. doubt the power to interfere. Therefore let it lie.
Mr. Genet called on me and read to me very rapidly instrns he had prepared for Michaud 3 who is going to Kentucky, an address to the inhab. of Louisiana, another to those of Canada. In these papers it appears that besides encouraging those inhabitants to insurrection, he speaks of two generals at Kentucky who have proposed to him to go take N. Orleans if he will furnish the exp. about £3,000 sterl. He declines advancing it, but promises that sum ultimately for their expenses, proposes that officers shall be commissd. by himself in Kentucky Louisiana, that they shall rendezvous out of the territories of the U. S. suppose in Louisiana, there making up a battalion to be called the— —of inhabitants of Louisiana Kentucky and getting what Indns. they could, to undertake the expedn against N. Orleans, and then Louisiana to be established into an independant state connected in commerce with France and the U. S. That two frigates shall go into the river Mississippi and cooperate against N. Orleans. The address to Canada, was to encourage them to shake off English yoke, to call Indians to their assistance, and to assure them of the friendly disposns of their neighbors of the U. S.
He said he communicated these things to me, not as Secy. of state, but as Mr. Jeff. I told him that his enticing officers souldiers from Kentucky to go against Spain, was really putting a halter about their necks, for that they would assuredly be hung, if they commd. hostilities agt. a nation at peace with the U S. That leaving out that article I did not care what insurrections should be excited in Louisiana. He had, about a fortnight ago sent me a commn for Michaud as consul of France at Kentucky, desired an Exequatur. I told him this could not be given, that it was only in the ports of the U S. they were entitled to consuls, that if France shd have a consul at Kentucky Engld and Spain would soon demand the same, we shd have all our interior country filled with foreign agents. He acquiesced, asked me to return the commission his note, which I did. But he desired I would give Michaud a lre of introduction for Govr. Shelby. I sent him one a day or two after. He now observes to me that in that letter I speak of him only as a person of botanical natural pursuits, but that he wished the Govr. to view him as something more, as a French citizen possessing his confidence. I took back the letter, wrote another. See both.
The Secretary of the Treasury having communicated to General Knox and myself, that he had been informed that the Little Sarah had much augmented her arms, and was greatly advanced in her preparations, we concurred in opinion, that the governor (of Pennsylvania) should be desired to have a re-examination of the fact. It was done, and a report made, that she had entered the port with only four guns, and now had fourteen. The next day, being Sunday the 7th instant, I received a letter from the governor by express, informing me, that he understood she would sail that day. I went instantly to town. He told me he had received the intelligence the night before, and had sent Mr. Dallas at midnight to M. Genet. Mr. Dallas told me, that, on his proposing the subject of detaining the vessel, he flew into a great passion, talked extravagantly, and concluded by refusing to order the vessel to stay.
As the governor had sent for General Knox also, I told him I would in the meantime go to M. Genet, and speak with him on the subject. I went. On his coming into the room I told him I had called on the subject of the Little Sarah; that our information was, that she was armed contrary to the decision of the President, which had been communicated to him, and that she would sail that day; and I requested that he would detain her till we could inquire into the fact, and lay it before the President, who would be here on Wednesday.
He took up the subject instantly in a very high tone, and went into an immense field of declamation and complaint. I found it necessary to let him go on, and in fact could do not otherwise; for the few efforts, which I made to take some part in the conversation were quiet ineffectual. It is impossible for me to state the particulars of what he said. Such of the general topics as I can now recollect were these. He charged us with having violated the treaties between the two nations, and so went into the cases which had before been subjects of discussion; complained that we suffered our flag to be insulted and disregarded by the English; that they stopped all our vessels, and took out of them whatever they suspected to be French property; that they had taken all the provisions he had embarked in American vessels for the colonies; that if we were not able to protect their vessels in our ports, nor their property on the high seas, we ought to permit them to protect it themselves; that they, on the contrary, paid the highest respect to our flag; that, though it was notorious that most of the cargoes sent from America were British property, yet, being in American vessels, or pretended American vessels, they never touched it, and thus had no chance of retaliating on their enemies; that he had been thwarted and opposed in everything he had had to do with the government; that he found himself in so disagreeable a situation, that he sometimes thought of packing up and going away, as he found he could not be useful to his nation in any thing.
He dwelt on the friendly propositions he brought from his nation, on the instructions and dispositions with which he came to do whatever would gratify us; that to such propositions such a return ought not to have been made by the executive, without consulting Congress; and that, on the return of the President, he would certainly press him to convene Congress. He had by this time got into a moderate tone, and I stopped him at the subject of calling Congress, explained our constitution to him, as having divided the functions of government among three different authorities, the executive, legislative, and judiciary, each of which were supreme in all questions belonging to their departments, and independent of the others; that all the questions, which had arisen between him and us, belonged to the executive department, and, if Congress were sitting could not be carried to them, nor would they take notice of them.
He asked if they were not the sovereign. I told him so, they were sovereign in making laws only, the executive was sovereign in executing them, and the judiciary in construing them where they related to their department. “But,” said he, “at least, Congress are bound to see that the treaties are observed.” I told him no; there were very few cases indeed arising out of treaties, which they could take notice of; that the President is to see that treaties are observed. “If he decides against the treaty, to whom is a nation to appeal?” I told him the constitution had made the President the last appeal. He made me a bow, and said, that indeed he would not make me his compliments on such a constitution, expressed the utmost astonishment at it, and seemed never before to have had such an idea.
He was now come into perfect good humor and coolness, in which state he may with the greatest freedom be spoken with. I observed to him the impropriety of his conduct in persevering in measures contrary to the will of the government, and that too within its limits, wherein unquestionably they had a right to be obeyed. “But,” said he, “I have a right to expound the treaty on our side.” “Certainly,” said I, “each party has an equal right to expound their treaties. You, as the agent of your nation, have a right to bring forward your exposition, to support it by reasons, to insist on it, to be answered with the reasons for our exposition where it is contrary; and when, after hearing and considering your reasons, the highest authority in the nation has decided, it is your duty to say you think the decision wrong, that you cannot take upon yourself to admit it, and will represent it to your government to do as they think proper; but in the meantime, you ought to acquiesce in it, and to do nothing within our limits contrary to it.”
He was silent as to this, and I thought was sensible it was right. I brought him to the point of the Little Sarah, and pressed his detaining of her till the President’s return. “Why detain her?” said he. “Because,” said I, “she is reported to be armed with guns acquired here.” He said the guns were all French property, and surely we did not pretend to control them in the disposal of their own property; that he could name to me the French vessels, from which he had taken every gun. I told him I would be obliged to him for any evidence of that fact, with which he would furnish me, and repeated my request to detain the vessel. He was embarrassed and unwilling. He said he should not be justified in detaining her. I told him it would be considered a very serious offence indeed if she should go away; that the government was determined on that point, and, thinking it was right, would go through with it.
After some hesitation he said he could not make any promise, it would be out of his duty, but that he was very happy in being able to inform me, that the vessel was not in readiness, and therefore could not sail that day. I asked him if I might rely, that she would not be ready to sail before the return of the President. He then spoke of her unreadiness indefinitely as to time, said she had many things to do yet, and would not be ready for some time, he did not know when. And whenever I tried to fix it to the President’s return he gave the same answer, that she would not be ready for some time, but with the look and gesture, which showed he meant I should understand she would not be gone before that time. “But,” said he, “she is to change her position and fall down the river to-day; but she will not depart yet.” “What,” said I, “will she fall down to the lower end of the town?” “I do not exactly know where,” said he, “but somewhere there for the convenience of getting ready some things; but let me beseech you not to permit any attempt to put men on board of her. She is filled with high-spirited patriots, and they will unquestionably resist; and there is no occasion, for I tell you she will not be ready to depart for some time.”
I told him then I would take it for granted she would not be ready before the President’s return, that in the meantime we would have inquiries made into the facts, and would thank him for information on the subject, and that I would take care that the case should be laid before the President the day after his return. He promised to give me a state of facts the next day.
I then returned to the governor, told him what had passed, and that I was satisfied, that, though the vessel was to fall somewhere down the river, she would not sail. He thereupon ordered the militia to be dismissed.
On repeating to him and Mr. Dallas what M. Genet had said we found it agreed in many particulars with what he had said to Mr. Dallas; but Mr. Dallas mentioned some things which he had not said to me, and particularly his declaration that he would appeal from the President to the people. He did, in some part of his declamation to me, drop the idea of publishing a narrative or statement of transactions; but he did not on that, nor ever did on any other occasion in my presence, use disrespectful expressions of the President. He, from a very early period showed, that he believed there existed here an English party, and ascribed to their misinformations, industry, and manœuvres some of the decisions of the executive. He is not reserved on this subject. He complains of the partiality of the information of tho seemployed by government, who never let a single movement of a French vessel pass unnoticed, nor ever inform of an English one arming, or not till it is too late to stop her.
The next day, Monday, I met the secretaries of the treasury and war in the governor’s office. They proposed our ordering a battery to be erected on Mud Island immediately, guns to be mounted, to fire on the vessel and even to sink her if she attempted to pass. I refused to concur in the order, for reasons assigned in another paper. The vessel was then at Gloucester Point. Whether any intention of this proposition got out, I do not know, but she very soon after fell down to Chester. On a suggestion, that there were fifteen or twenty Americans on board, we desired Mr. Rawle to take measures to prosecute them.
A recapitulation of questions whereon we have given opinions. 1
Does the treaty with France leave us free to prohibit her from arming vessels in our ports? Th: J. H. K. R. unanimous it does.
As the treaty obliges us to prohibit the enemies of France from arming in our ports, leaves us free to prohibit France, do not the laws of neutrality oblige us to prohibit her. Same persons unan. they do.
How far may a prohibition now declared be retrospective to the vessels armed in Charlestown before the prohibition, to wit the Citoyen Genet Sans Culottes what is to be done with these prizes? Th: J.—It cannot be retrospective at all; they may sell their prizes, continue to act freely as other armed vessels of France. H. K.—The prizes ought to be given up to the English, the privateers suppressed. R.—They are free to sell their prizes the privateers shd. be ordered away, not to return here till they shall have been to the domns of their own sovereign thereby purged the illegality of their origin. This last opinion was adopted by the President.
Our citizens who have joined in these hostilities agt nations at peace with the U S. Are they punishable? E. R. gave an official opinion they were. Th: J. H. K. joined in the opinion. All thought it our duty to have prosecutions instituted against them, that the laws might pronounce on their case. In the 1st. instance two only were prosecuted merely to try the question to satisfy the complt. of the British min. because it was thought they might have offended unwittingly. But a subsequent armament of a vessel at New York taking place with full knolege of this prosecution, all the persons engaged in it, citizens foreigners, were ordd. to be prosecutd.
May the prohibition extend to the means of the party arming, or are they only prohibited from using our means for the annoyance of their enemy. Th: J. of opn they are free to use their own means, i. e. to mount their own guns c. H. K. of opn they are not to put even their own implements or means into a posture of annoyance. The President has as yet not decided this.
May an armed vessel arriving here be prohibited to employ their own citizens found here, as seamen or mariners? Th: J.—They cannot be prohibited to recruit their own citizens. H. Knox.—They may ought to be prohibited. No decision yet by the President.
It appears to me the President wished the Little Sarah had been stopped by military coercion, that is by firing on her. Yet I do not believe he would have ordered himself had he been here, tho he would be glad if we had ordered it.
The U S. being a ship building nation may they sell ships prepared for war, to both parties? Th: J.—They may sell such ships in their ports to both parties, or carry them for sale to the domns of both parties. E. R. of opn. they could not sell them here, that if they attempted to carry them to the domns of the parties for sale, they might be seized by the way as contraband. H. of same opn, except that he did not consider them as seizable for contraband, but as the property of a power, making itself a party in the war by an aid of such a nature, consequently that it would be a breach of neutrality.
H. moves that the govmt of France be desired to recall Mr. Genet. Knox adds that he be in the meantime suspended from his functions. Th: J. proposes that his correspondence be communicated to his govmt with friendly observns. Presidt silent. 1
July 15 . Th. J. H. K. met at the President’s. Govr. Mifflin had appld to Knox for the loan of 4. cannon to mount at Mud Isld. Informd him he shd station a guard of 35 militia there, asked what arrangemt for rations the genl. govmt had taken. Knox told him nothing could be done as to rations he wd. ask the Presidt for the cannon. In the meantime he promd. him to put the cannon on board a boat, ready to send off as soon as permission was obtd. The Presidt. declared his own opn first fully that when the orders were given to the governrs. to stop vessels armg c in our ports even by military force, he took for granted the govrs. wd use such diligence as to detect those projects in embryo stop them when no force was requisite or a very small party of militia wd. suffice: that here was a demand from the governr. of Penve. to land 4. cannon under pretext of executing orders of the genl. govmt, that if this was granted we shd. be immedly. appld to by every other governor, that not for one place only, but several, our cannon wd. be dispersd. all over the U S. that for this reason we hd. refusd. the same request to the govrs. of S. C. Virgi. R. I. that if they erected batteries, they must establish men for them, would come on us for this too. He did not think the Executive had a power to establish permanent guards he had never looked to anything permanent when the orders were given to the governors, but only an occasional call on small parties of militia in the moments requirg it. These sentiments were so entirely my own, that I did little more than combat on the same grounds the opns of H. K. The latter said he would be ready to lend an equal number to every govmt to carry into effect orders of such importance: H. that he would be ready to lend them in cases where they happened to be as near the place where they were to be mounted.
Hamilton submitted the purchase of a large quantity of salt petre, which would outrun the funds destined to objects of that class by Congress. We were unanimous we ought to venture on it, and to the procuring supplies of military stores in the present circumstances, and take on us the responsibility to Congress, before whom it should be laid. The President was fully of the same opn.
In the above case of the cannon, the President gave no final order while I remained but I saw that he was so impressed with the disagreeableness of taking them out of the boat again, that he would yield. He spoke sharply to Knox for having put them in that position without consulting him, declared that, but for that circumstance he would not have hesitated one moment to refuse them.
July 18. 93 . At a meetg. at the Presid.’s genl. Knox tells us Govr. Blount (now in town) has informed him that when Mt. florence ws. in France, certn. members of ye execve Council enquird of him what were the disposns of Cumbld. settlemt c. towds. Spain? Mt. florce. told them unfriendly. They then offd. him a commissn. to embody troops there, to give him a quantity of blank commns to be filled up by him making officers of the republic of France those who shd. command, undertake to pay the expences. Mt. florce. desird. his name mt. nt. be used. Blount added that Mt. florce. while in France pretendd. to be a great friend to their revoln tho an enemy to it in his heart.
Eod. die. Lear calls on me. I told him that Irving, an Irishman, a writer in the Treasury, 1 who on a former occn hd. given the most decisive proofs of his devotion to his principal, was the author of the pieces signed Veritas: I wished he could get at some of Irving’s acquaintances and inform himself of the fact, as the person who told me of it would not permit the name of his informer to be mend. [Note Beckley told me of it, he had it from Swaine the printer to whom the pieces were delivd.] that I had long before suspected this excessive foul play in that party, of writing themselves in the character of the most exaggerated democrats, incorporating with it a great deal of abuse on the President to make him believe it was that party who were his enemies, so throw him entirely into the scale of the monocrats. Lear said he no longer ago than yesterday expressed to the President his suspicions of the artifices of that party to work on him. He mentd. the following fact as a proof of their writing in the character of their adversaries. To wit. the day after the little incident of Richet’s toasting “the man of the people” (see the gazettes) Mrs. Washington was at Mrs. Powel’s, who mentd. to her that when the toast was given there was a good deal of disapprobation appeared in the audience, that many put on their hats and went out: on inquiry he had not found the fact true, and yet it was put into —’s paper, written under the character of a republican, tho’ he is satisfied it is altogether a slander of the monocrats. He mentd. this to the Presidt. but he dd. nt. mentn. to him the following fact, which he knows, that in N. York the last summer when the parties of Jay and Clinton were running so high, it was an agreed point with the former, that if any circumstances should ever bring it to a question whether to drop Hamilton or the President they had decided to drop the Presidt. He said that lately one of the loudest pretended friends to the govmt. damned it, said it was good for nothing that it could not support itself, it was time to put it down set up a better, yet the same person in speakg to the Presidt. puffed of that party as the only friends to the govmt. He said he really feared that by their artifices industry they would aggravate the Presidt. so much agt. the Republicans as to separate him from the body of the people. I told him wt the same cabals hd decided to do, if the Presidt. hd refused his assent to the bk bill, also wt. Brockhurst Livingston 1 sd to —that Hamilton’s life was much more precious to the community than the Presid’s.
July 21. 93 . At Dr. Logan’s to-day Genet told us that Colo. Hamilton had never in a single instance addressed a letter to him as the Minister of the republic of France, but always as the Minister of France.
July 23. 1793 . A meeting at the Pr’s of the 3 heads of depmts E. R.
Genet had told me about a fortnight ago that he had come here with instructions to let all his contracts to the lowest bidder of sufficient ability, that he had been privately admonished however at the same time by some individuals who had been in America that, if he meant to succeed, he must put his contracts into the hands of Rob. Morris c. who were all-powerful in the government. That he pd little regard to this, and pursuing vigorously the plan of his instns he had failed, as I knew, meeting to every proposition for obtaining money, the decided opposn of the Secy. of the Treasury.—Knowing as I did how decidedly the Sy. of the Tr. hd. been agt. every the smallest advance beyond what was actually exigible, even for a day, I was attentive to him. He continued, that he had now found out that if he would put the contract into the hands of Mr Hamilton’s friends he could get money. 1 That he had already been in treaty with Cuningham Nesbit, had agreed with them on terms mutually acceptable tho’ not as good as in the way pointed out in his instrns, that Mr. Hamilton had also agreed, tho’ it was not yet in writing. I could not help saying “are you sure Colo. H. is agreed. I think it impossible.” I am sure says he, and you shall see. Accordingly at this meeting Colo. H. proposes to agree to pay the orders of Mr. Genet to the amount of the instalments of this year that is to day, to note at the treasury those orders as presented, and to say to the persons that such a sum will be pd at the day of the instemt. he presented a lre ready cut and dry for the purpose. The Presidt. came into it at once, on acct. of the distresses of the refugees from St. Domingo, for whom some of it was to be used. Knox asked no other question than whether it was convent. to the treasy. I agreed to it on my old ground, that I had no objection to an advance. E. R. alone was afraid, insisted the Secy. of the Try. shd. present a written paper to each holder of a bill letting them see that we would pay for the govmt of France on such a day such a sum, so that if a counter-rvlution shd. take place between this the day (to wit, some day in Sep. another in Nov.) in time to be known here, we shd. not be held to pay to the holder but to the new govmt. Hamilt. agreed to arrange this with E. R. which in private he will easily do:
At this meeting (E. R. being called away on business) I proposed an answer to Genet’s lre of July 9. on French property taken by the English in American bottoms, which was agreed to in toto.—Also an answer to his letter of June 14. covering protests of consuls about Admiralty courts arresting their prizes. To this it was thought some addns were necessary, particly. Knox proposed some notice shd. be taken of the expressions towards the Presidt. personally. So it was referred to another day. The Presidt. mentiond. that we must shortly determine what was to be done with Mr. Genet, that in his own opn his whole correspdce shd. be sent to G. Mor’ with a temporate but strong representation of his conduct, drawg. a clear line between him his nation, expressg. our frdship to the latter, but insistg. on the recall of Genet, and in the mean time that we should desire him either to withdraw or cease his functions. Hamilton hereon made a long speech exhorting the Presidt. to firmness, representing that we were now in a crisis whereon the continuance of the govmt or it’s overthrow by a faction depended, that we were still in time to give the tone to the public mind by laying the whole proceedings before them, that this shd. be done in addition to what he had proposed: that as yet the great body of the people cd. be kept on the right side by proper explanations, but that if we let the incendiaries go on, they would soon have taken side with them.—Knox told some little stories to aggrevate the Pr. to wit, that Mr. King had told him, that a lady had told him, that she had heard a gentleman say that the Pr. was as great a tyrant as any of them, that it would soon be time to chase him out of the city.—That Mr. Stagg lately from N. York had told him that the St. Tammany society now had meetings to the number of 500. persons, that Consul Hauterive appeared to be very intimate with them.
The President also desired us to reflect on the question of calling Congress.
Hamilton Knox told the President they had extorted from Beach 1 a confession that Pascal (one of the Secretaries of Genet) sent him the queries inserted in his paper 2 or 3 days ago to one of which the Visct. Noailles gave the lie in the paper of to-day. He said Talon 2 had never been but twice to his house, which was to public dinners, that he had dined once with Talon, in a large company.
Mr. Genet’s declaration to the President at his reception, that France did not wish to engage the U S in the present war by the clause of guarantee but left her free to pursue her own happiness in peace, has been repeated to myself in conversation, to others, and even in a public answer, so as to place it beyond question.
Some days after the reception of Mr. Genet (which was May 17.) I went to his house on business. The Atty Genl went with me to pay his first visit. After he withdrew, Mr. Genet told me Mr. Ternant had delivered him my letter of May 15. on the 4. memorials of Mr. Hammond: He said something first of the case of the Grange, and then of the vessels armed at Charleston. He said that on his arrival there he was surrounded suddenly by Frenchmen full of zeal for their country, pressing for authority to arm with their own means for it’s assistance, that they would fit out their own vessels, provide everything, man them, and only ask a commission from him: that he asked the opinion of Govr Moultrie on the subject, who said he knew no law to the contrary, but begged that whatever was to be done, might be done without consulting him, that he must know nothing of it c. That hereupon he gave commission to the vessels: that he was of opinion that he was justified not only by the opinions at Charleston but by our treaties. I told him the President had taken full advice on the subject, had very maturely considered it, and had come to the decision expressed in my letter. He said he hoped the President had not so absolutely decided it, but that he would hear what was to be said against it. I told him I had no doubt but that the President, out of respect to him his country, would receive whatever he should have to urge on the subject, and would reconsider it with candour. He said he would make it his business to write me a letter on the subject, that he thought the arming the privateers was justifiable, but that if the President should finally decide otherwise tho’ he could not think it would be right, yet he must submit: for that assuredly his instructions were to do whatever would be agreeable to us. He shewed indeed by his countenance, his manner words that such an acquiescence would be with reluctance; but I was am persuaded he then meant it.
Mr. Genet called at my office on Tuesday sennight or fortnight (say July 16 or 9) but I think it was Tuesday sennight, know it was on a Tuesday because he went from thence to the President’s. He was summing up to me the strength of the French naval force now arrived. I took that occasion to observe to him that having such great means in his hands, I thought he ought not to hesitate in abandoning to the orders of the government the little pickeroons which had been armed here unauthorized by them, which occasioned so much embarrassment uneasiness, that certainly their good dispositions must be worth more than the trifling services these little vessels could render. He immediately declared that having such a force in his hands he had abandoned every idea of further armament in our ports, that these small objects were now beneath his notice he had accordingly written to the consuls to stop everything further of that kind: but that as to those which had been fitted out before, their honour would not permit them to give them up, but he wished an oblivion of everything which had passed, and that in future the measure so disagreeable to the government should not be pursued, tho’ he thought it clearly justifiable by the treaty. I told him the government was of a different opinion, that both parties indeed had equal right to construe the treaty, that consequently he had done his duty in remonstrating against our construction, but that since the government remained finally persuaded of the solidity of it’s own construction, had a right to act accordingly within their own limits, it was now his duty as a diplomatic man to state the matter to his government, to ask await their orders, in the meantime to acquiesce, by no means to proceed in opposition within our limits. It was at the same time he informed me that he had sent out the Little Democrat July 26 1793 to obtain intelligence of the state of the coast, whether it was safe for the fleet to proceed round from Norfolk to New York.
July 29. 1793 . At a meeting at the President’s on acct. of the British letter of marque ship Jane, said to have put up waste boards, to have pierced 2 port holes mounted 2 cannon (which she brought in) on new carriages which she did not bring in, consequently having 16. instead of 14. guns mounted, it was agreed that a letter of marque, or vessel armé en guerre en marchandise is not a privateer, therefore not to be ordered out of our ports. It was agreed by Ham. Kn. myself that the case of such a vessel does not depend on the treaties, but on the law of nations. E. R. thought as she had a mixed character of merchant vessel privateer she might be considered under the treaty, but this being overruled the following paper was written.
Rules proposed by Attorney General.
1. That all equipments purely for the accommodation of vessels, as merchantmen, be admitted.
2. That all equipments, doubtful in their nature, applicable equally to commerce or war, be admitted, as producg too many minutiæ.
3. That all equipments, solely adapted to military objects be prohibited.
Rules proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
1. That the original arming equiping of vessels for military service offensive or defensive in the ports of the U. S. be considered as prohibited to all.
2. That vessels which were armed before their coming into our port shall not be permitted to augment these military equipments in the ports of the U. S., but may repair or replace any military equipments which they had when they began their voyage for the U. S., that this however shall be with the exception of privateers of the parties opposed to France, who shall not refit or repair.
3. That for convenience vessels armed and commissioned before they came into our ports may engage their own citizens, not being inhabitants of the U. S. 1
I subjoined the following
I concur in the rules proposed by the Atty genl. as far as respects materials or means of annoyance furnished by us, and I should be for an additional rule that as to means or materials brought into this country belonging to themselves they are free to use them. [Knox agreed to the A. Genl. in toto, consequently, they were establd. by the vote of three. Ham. proposed to put questions on all the proposns separately, he took the paper and put questions on the 3. of the Atty Genl. which were agreed. He was going on with questions on his own proposns without askg. us distinctly but by a sort of a look a nod, and noting in the margin. I observed I did not understand that opion, that we had agreed to the Atty Genl., proposns, he said it was to take a question on each distinctly. Knox observed that as we understood these rules to extend only to cases out of the treaty we had better express it. I agreed proposed to add some such words as these “excepting always where the treaties shall have otherwise provided.” Hamilton broke loose at this pretended it was meant they should go to all cases. All of us bore testimony agt. this that he himself had shewn that the present case was out of the treaties. He said he would rather specify the exceptions expressly, than leave them on the general terms I proposed; so it was agreed to take till to-morrow to examine the treaties specify the exceptions if it could be done. While this was passing E. R. took the paper in his hand read Ham’s original notes as above, and seeing that he had written “agreed” opposite to his own (Ham’s) 1st. proposn, he observed to Knox so that I overheard him, that that had not been agreed, which was the truth. To his 3d. proposn we had all agreed in conversn, but it had not been agreed to add it to the rules.—It was pretty evident from Ham’s warmth, embarrasmt. eagerness, that he wanted to slip in some thing which might cover cases we had not in contemplation.] 1 A question then arose whether we should expressly say that these articles were meant to extend to cases out of the treaty—it was referred to the next day.
July 30 . Met at my office. I proposed to add to the rules a proviso that they should not be understood to contravene, as of right they could not, the provisions of the art. of our treaty with France, the of that with the U. N. or the of that with Prussia. Before Ham. Kn. came into the room E. R. declared himself for a general reference, or a verbal quotn of the words of the treaties, against all comments or substitution of new words. When they arrived, Ham. proposed a reference to the articles of the treaty by a description of the cases in shorter terms, which he proposed as equivalent to those of the treaty. E. R. said plumply without one word of preface that he had been for a general reference to the treaties, but if the special descriptions would give more satisfaction, he would agree to it. So he Hamilton drew their chairs together and made up the form: but it was agreed to be put off for more mature digestion.
Aug. 1 . Met at the President’s to consider what was to be done with Mr. Genet. All his correspondence with me was read over. The following proposns were made. 1. That a full statement of Mr. Genet’s conduct be made in a letter to G. Morris, be sent with his correspondence, to be communicated to the Exec. Council of France, the letter to be so prepared as to serve for the form of communication to the council. Agreed unan. 2. That in that letter his recall be required. Agreed by all, tho’ I expressed a preference of expressing that desire with great delicacy, the others were for peremptory terms. 3. To send him off. This was proposed by Knox, but rejected by every other. 4. To write a letter to to Mr. Genet, the same in substance with that written to G. M. and let him know we had applied for his recall. I was against this, because I thot it would render him extremely active in his plans, and endanger confusion. But I was overruled by the other three gent. the Presidt. 5. That a publication of the whole correspondence, and statement of the proceedgs should be made by way of appeal to the people. Hamilton made a jury speech of ¾ of an hour as inflammatory declamatory as if he had been speaking to a jury. E. R. opposed it. I chose to leave the contest between them. Adjourned to next day.
Aug 2 . Met again. Hamilton spoke again ¾ of an hour. I answered on these topics. Object of the appeal.—The Democratic society—this the great circumstance of alarm; afrd it wd extd. its connections over the continent, chiefly meant for the local object of the ensuing election of governor. If left alone wd die after that is over. If opposed, if proscribed, wd give it importce vigor, wd give it a new object, and multitudes wd join it merely to assert the right of voluntary associations. That the measure was calculated to make the Pres. assume the station of the head of a party instead of the head of the nation. Plan of the appeal.—To consist of facts and the decisions of the Pres. As to facts we are agreed. But as to the decisions there has been great differences of opn among us. Sometimes as many opns as persons. This proves there will be ground to attack the decisions. Genet will appeal also, it will become contest between the Pres. Genet.—Annonymous writers.—Will be same difference of opn in Public, as in our Cabinet.—Will be same difference in Congress, for it must be laid before them—would therefore work very unpleasantly at Home. How would it work abroad? —France.—Unkind.—After such proofs of her frdshp, shd rely on that frdshp her justice. Why appeal to the world? Frdly nations always negotiate little differences in private.—Never appeal to the world, but when they appeal to the sword. Confedcy of Pilnitz was to overthrow the govmt of France. The interference of France to disturb other govmts excite insurrections was a measure of reprisal. Yet these princes have been able to make it believed to be the system of France. Col. Ham supposes Mr. Genet’s proceedgs here are in pursuance of that system, and we are so to declare it to the world to add our testimony to this base calumny of the princes. What a triumph to them to be backed by our testimy. What a fatal stroke at the cause of liberty.— et tu Brute. We indispose the Fr. govmt, and they will retract their offer of the treaty of commerce. The President manifestly inclined to the appeal to the people. 1 Knox in a foolish incoherent sort of a speech introduced the Pasquinade lately printed, called the funeral of George W—n, and James W—n 2 ; King judge c. where the President was placed on a guillotine. The Presidt was much inflamed, got into one of those passions when he cannot command himself, ran on much on the personal abuse which had been bestowed on him, defied any man on earth to produce one single act of his since he had been in the govmt which was not done on the purest motives, that he had never repented but once the having slipped the moment of resigning his office, that was every moment since, that by god he had rather be in his grave than in his present situation. That he had rather be on his farm than to be made emperor of the world and yet that they were charging him with wanting to be a king. That that rascal Freneau sent him 3 of his papers every day, as if he thought he would become the distributor of his papers, that he could see in this nothing but an impudent design to insult him. He ended in this high tone. There was a pause. Some difficulty in resumg our question—it was however after a little while presented again, he said there seemed to be no necessity for deciding it now: the propsns before agreed on might be put into a train of execution, perhaps events would show whether the appeal would be necessary or not. He desired we would meet at my office the next day to consider what should be done with the vessels armed in our ports by Mr. Genet their prizes.
Aug. 3 . We met. The rules being now reduced on one paper I considered them, and not finding any thing against the treaties as far as I could see, they were agreed to signed by us all.—We proceeded to consider what should be done as to the French privateers arrived in our ports, their prizes taken since they were ordered away. Randolph recapitulated his old opinion. Hamilton proposed to suppress the privateers by military coercion deliver the prizes to their owners. I proposed to require from Mr. Genet a delivery of the prizes to their owners, otherwise that, in consequence of the assurances we had given the British Minister, we should be bound to pay for them must take credit for it with France, and to inform him that we would allow no further asylum in our ports to the sd privateers: [These were the Citoyen Genet, Sans Culottes, Vainqueur de la Bastille Petite Democrate. The two last had been armed subsequent to the prohibition.] My proposn was agreed to with an addition that the governors should be notified that the privateers were no longer permitted to stay in our ports.
The President wrote to take our ops whether Congress should be called. Knox pronounced at once agt it. Randolph was against it. Hamilton said his judgment was against it, but that if any two were for it or against it, he would join them to make a majority. I was for it. We agreed to give separate ops to the Presidt. Knox sd we shd have had fine work if Congress had been sitting these two last months. The fool thus let out the secret. Hamilton endeavored to patch up the indiscretion of this blabber, by saying “he did not know; he rather thought they would have strengthened the Executive arm.” It is evident they do not wish to lengthen the session of the next Congress, and probably they particularly wish it should not meet till Genet is gone.—At this meeting I received a lre from Mr. Remson at N. Y. informg me of the event of the combat between the Ambuscade the Boston. Knox broke out into the most unqualified abuse of Capt. Courtany. Hamilton, with less fury, but with the deepest vexation, loaded him with censures. Both shewed the most unequivocal mortification at the event.
Aug. 6 . The President concurs with Ham. Kn. in notifying Mr. Hammond what we propose to do as to restitution of the prizes made by the Citoyen Genet c. or compensation, because says he if you notify it to the party to whom it will give displeasure, we should do it to that also which will feel satisfaction from it.
He said he should have been for calling Congress himself, but he found the other gentlemen were against it.
Aug 6. 1793 . The President calls on me at my house in the country, and introduces my letter of July 31. announcing that I should resign at the close of the next month. He again expressed his repentance at not having resigned himself, and how much it was increased by seeing that he was to be deserted by those on whose aid he had counted: that he did not know where he should look to find characters to fill up the offices, that mere talents did not suffice for the departmt of state, but it required a person conversant in foreign affairs, perhaps acquainted with foreign courts, that without this the best talents would be awkward at a loss. He told me that Colo. Hamilton had 3. or 4. weeks ago written to him, informg him that private as well as public reasons had brought him to the determination to retire, that he should do it towards the close of the next session. He said he had often before intimated dispositions to resign, but never as decisively before: that he supposed he had fixed on the latter part of next session to give an opportunity to Congress to examine into his conduct; that our going out at times so different increased his difficulty, for if he had both places to fill at one he might consult both the particular talents geographical situation of our successors. He expressed great apprehensions at the fermentation which seemed to be working in the mind of the public, that many descriptions of persons, actuated by different causes appeared to be uniting, what it would end in he knew not, a new Congress was to assemble, more numerous, perhaps of a different spirit; the first expressions of their sentiments would be important: if I would only stay to the end of that it would relieve him considerably.
I expressed to him my excessive repugnance to public life, the particular uneasiness of my situation in this place where the laws of society oblige me always to move exactly in the circle which I know to bear me peculiar hatred, that is to say the wealthy aristocrats, the merchants connected closely with England, the new created paper fortunes; that thus surrounded, my words were caught, multiplied, misconstrued, even fabricated spread abroad to my injury, that he saw also that there was such an opposition of views between myself another part of the admn as to render it peculiarly unpleasing, and to destroy the necessary harmony. Without knowg the views of what is called the Republican party here, or havg any communication with them, I could undertake to assure him from my intimacy with that party in the late Congress, that there was not a view in the Republican party as spread over the U S. which went to the frame of the government, that I believed the next Congress would attempt nothing material but to render their own body independant, that that party were firm in their dispositions to support the government: that the manœuvres of Mr. Genet might produce some little embarrassment, but that he would be abandoned by the Republicans the moment they knew the nature of his conduct, and on the whole no crisis existed which threatened anything.
He said he believed the views of the Republican party were perfectly pure, but when men put a machine in to motion it is impossible for themto stop it exactly where they would chuse or to say where it will stop. That the constn we have is an excellent one if we can keep it where it is, that it was indeed supposed there was a party disposed to change it into a monarchical form, but that he could conscientiously declare there was not a man in the U S. who would set his face more decidedly against it than himself. Here I interrupted him by saying “no rational man in the U S. suspects you of any other disposn, but there does not pass a week in which we cannot prove declns dropping from the monarchical party that our governmt is good for nothing, it is a milk water thing which cannot support itself, we must knock it down set up something of more energy.—He said if that was the case he thought it a proof of their insanity, for that the republican spirit of the Union was so manifest and so solid that it was astonishg how any one could expect to move them.
He returned to the difficulty of naming my successor, he said Mr. Madison would be his first choice, but that he had always expressed to him such a decision against public office that he could not expect he would undertake it. Mr. Jay would prefer his present office. He sd that Mr. Jay had a great opinion of the talents of Mr. King, that there was also Mr. Smith of S. Carola: E. Rutledge c. but he observed that name whom he would some objections would be made, some would be called speculators, some one thing, some another, and he asked me to mention any characters occurrg to me. I asked him if Govr. Johnson of Maryld. had occurred to him? He said he had, that he was a man of great good sense, an honest man, he believed clear of speculations, but this says he is an instance of what I was observing, with all these qualifications Govr. Johnson, from a want of familiarity with foreign affairs, would be in them like a fish out of water, everything would be new to him, he awkward in everything. I confessed to him that I had considered Johnson rather as fit for the Treasury department. Yes, says he, for that he would be the fittest appointment that could be made; he is a man acquainted with figures, having as good a knowledge of the resources of this country as any man. I asked him if Chancr. Livingston had occurred to him? He said yes, but he was from N. York, to appoint him while Hamilton was in before it should be known he was going out, would excite a newspaper conflagration, as the ultimate arrangement would not be known. He said McLurg had occurred to him as a man of first rate abilities, but it is said that he is a speculator. He asked me what sort of a man Wolcott was. I told him I knew nothing of him myself; I had heard him characterized as a cunning man. I asked him whether some person could not take my office par interim, till he should make an apptment? as Mr. Randolph for instance. Yes, says he, but there you would raise the expectation of keeping it, and I do not know that he is fit for it nor what is thought of Mr. Randolph. I avoided noticing the last observation, he put the question to me directly. I then told him that I went into society so little as to be unable to answer it: I knew that the embarrassments in his private affairs had obliged him to use expedts which had injured him with the merchts shopkeepers affected his character of independance; that these embarrassments were serious, not likely to cease soon. He said if I would only stay in till the end of another quarter (the last of Dec.) it would get us through the difficulties of this year, and he was satisfied that the affairs of Europe would be settled with this campaign; for that either France would be overwhelmed by it, or the confederacy would give up the contest. By that time too Congress will have manifested it’s character view. I told him that I had set my private affairs in motion in a line which had powerfully called for my presence the last spring, that they had suffered immensely from my not going home; that I had now calculated them to my return in the fall, and to fail in going then would be the loss of another year, prejudicial beyond measure. I asked him whether he could not name Govr. Johnson to my office, under an express arrangement that at the close of the session he should take that of the treasury. He said that men never chose to descend: that being once in a higher department he would not like to go into a lower one. 1 And he concluded by desiring that I would take 2. or 3. days to consider whether I could not stay in till the end of another quarter, for that like a man going to the gallows, he was willing to put it off as long as he could: but if I persisted, he must then look about him make up his mind to do the best he could: so he took leave.
Aug. 20 . We met at the President’s to examine by paragraphs the draught of a letter I had prepared to Gouverneur Morris, on the conduct of Mr. Genet. There was no difference of opinion on any part of it, except on this expression. “An attempt to embroil both, to add still another nation to the enemies of his country, to draw on both a reproach, which it is hoped will never stain the history of either, that of liberty warring on herself. ” H. moved to strike out these words “that of liberty warring on herself.” He urged generally that it would give offence to the combined powers, that it amounted to a declaration that they were warring on liberty, that we were not called on to declare that the cause of France was that of liberty, that he had at first been with them with all his heart, but that he had long since left them, and was not for encouraging the idea here that the cause of France was the cause of liberty in general, or could have either connection or influence in our affairs. Knox accordg to custom jumped plump into all his opinions. The Pr. with a good deal of positiveness declared in favor of the expression, that he considered the pursuit of France to be that of liberty, however they might sometimes fail of the best means of obtaining it, that he had never at any time entertained a doubt of their ultimate success, if they hung well together, that as to their dissensions there were such contradictory accts. given that no one could tell what to believe. I observed that it had been supposed among us all along that the present letter might become public; that we had therefore 3. parties to attend to,—1. France, 2. her enemies, 3. the people of the U S. That as to the enemies of France it ought not to offend them, because the passage objected to only spoke of an attempt to make the U S. a free nation, war on France, a free nation, which would be liberty warring on herself, and therefore a true fact. That as to France, we were taking so harsh a measure (desiring her to recall her minister) that a precedent for it could scarcely be found, that we knew that minister would represent to his government that our Executive was hostile to liberty, leaning to monarchy would endeavor to parry the charges on himself, by rendering suspicions the source from which they flowed. That therefore it was essential to satisfy France not only of our friendship to her, but our attachment to the general cause of liberty, to hers in particular. That as to the people of the U S. we knew there were suspicions abroad that the Executive in some of it’s parts was tainted with a hankering after monarchy, an indisposition towards liberty towards the French cause; that it was important by an explicit declaration to remove these suspicions restore the confidence of the people in their govmt. R. opposed the passage on nearly the same ground with H. He added that he thought it had been agreed that this correspondence should contain no expressions which could give offence to either party. I replied that it had been my opinion in the beginng of the correspondence that while we were censuring the conduct of the French minister, we should make the most cordial declarations of friendship to them: that in the first letter or two of the correspondence I had inserted expressions of that kind, but that himself the other two gentlemen had struck them out; that I thereupon conformed to their opinions in my subseqt. letters, and had carefully avoided the insertion of a single term of friendship to the French nation, and the letters were as dry husky as if written between the generals of two enemy nations. That on the present occasion how ever it had been agreed that such expressions ought to be inserted in the letter now under considn, I had accordly charged it pretty well with them. That I had further thought it essential to satisfy the French our own citizens of the light in which we viewed their cause, and of our fellow feeling for the general cause of liberty, and had ventured only four words on the subject, that there was not from beginning to end of the letter one other expression or word in favor of liberty, I should think it singular at least if the single passage of that character should be struck out.—The President again spoke. He came into the idea that attention was due to the two parties who had been mentd. France the U S. That as to the former, thinking it certain their affairs would issue in a government of some sort, of considerable freedom, it was the only nation with whom our relations could be counted on: that as to the U S. there could be no doubt of their universal attachmt to the cause of France, and of the solidity of their republicanism. He declared his strong attachment to the expression, but finally left it to us to accommodate. It was struck out, of course, and the expressions of affection in the context were a good deal taken down.
Aug. 23. 93 . In consequence of my note of yesterday to the Presidt. a meeting was called this day at his house to determine what should be done with the proposn of France to treat. The importance of the matter was admitted, and being of so old a date as May 22d. we might be accused of neglecting the interests of the U S. to have left it so long unanswered, it could not be doubted Mr. Genet would avail himself of this inattention. The Presidt. declared it had not been inattention, that it had been the subject of conversation often at our meetings, and the delay had proceeded from the difficulty of the thing. If the struggles of France should end in the old despotism the formation of such a treaty with the present governmt. would be a matter of offence: if it should end in any kind of free governmt. he should be very unwilling by inattention to their advances to give offence lose the opportunity of procuring terms so advantageous to our country. He was therefore for writing to Mr. Morris to get the powers of Mr. Genet renewed to his successor. [As he had expressed this opn to me the afternoon before I had prepared the draught of a letter accordly.] But how to explain the delay? The Secy. of the Treasury observed on the letter of the Natl. Convention, that as it did not seem to require an answer, and the matters it contained would occasion embarrassmt. if ansd he should be agt answering it. That he shd. be for writing to Mr. Morris mentioning our readiness to treat with them suggesting a renewal of Mr. Genet’s powers to his successor, but not in as strong terms as I had done in my draft of the letter, not as a thing anxiously wished for by us, lest it should suggest to them the asking a price; he was for my writing to Mr. Genet now an answer to his letter of May 22. referring to the meeting of the Senate the enterg on the treaty. Knox concurred with him. The Attorney Genl. also, except that he was against suggesting the renewal of Mr. Genet’s powers, because that would amount to a declaration that we would treat with that government, would commit us to lay the subject before the Senate, his principle had ever been to do no act, not unavoidably necessary, which in the event of a counter revolution might offend the future governing powers of that country;—I stated to them that having observed from our conversns that the proposns to treat might not be acceded to immedty. I had endeavord to prepare Mr. Genet for it by taking occasion in conversns to apprize him of the controul over treaties which our consn had given to the Senate, that tho’ this was indirectly done (because not having been authorized to say anything official on the subject, I did not venture to commit myself directly) yet on some subsequent conversn, I found it had struck him exactly as I had wished, for speaking on some other matter, he mentd. incidentally his propositions to treat, and said ‘however as I know now that you cannot take up that subject till the meeting of the Senate, I shall say no more about it now,’ and so proceeded with his other subject, which I do not now recollect. I said I thought it possible by recalling the substance of these conversations to Mr. Genet in a letter to be written now I might add that the Executive had at length come to a conclusion that on acct. of the importce of the matter, they would await the meeting of the Senate. But I pressed strongly the urging Mr. Morris to procure a renewal of Genet’s powers that we might not lose the chance of obtaing so advantageous a treaty. E. R. had argued agt. our acceding to it because it was too advantageous, so much so that they would certainly break it, it might become the cause of war. I answd that it would be easy in the course of the negociations to cure it of it’s inequality by giving some compensation: but I had no fear of their revoking it, that the islanders themselves were too much interested in the concessions ever to suffer them to be revoked, that the best thinkers in France had long been of opn that it would be for the intt. of the mother country to let the colonies obtain subsistence wherever they could cheapest, that I was confident the present struggles in France would end in a free govmt of some sort, that such a govmt would consider itself as growing out of the present one respect it’s treaties. The Presidt, recurred to the awkwardness of writing a letter now to Mr. Genet in answer to his of May 22. That it would certainly be construed as merely done with a design of exculpation of ourselves, he would thence inculpate us. The more we reflected on this the more the justice of this observon struck us. H. myself came into it. Knox still for the letter. R. half for it, half against it, according to custom. It was at length agreed I should state the substance of my verbal observns to Mr. Genet, in a letter to Mr. Morris, and let them be considered as the answer intended, for being from the Secy. of state they might be considd. as official tho’ not in writing.
It is evident that taking this ground for their future justification to France to the U S. they were sensible they had censurably neglected these overtures of treaty. For not only what I had said to Mr. Genet was without authority for them, but was never communicated to them till this day. To rest the justification of delay on answers given it is true in time, but of which they had no knolege till now, is an ostensible justification only.
Sep. 4. 1793 . At a meeting held some days ago, some lres from the Govr. of Georgia, 1 were read, with a consultation of officers, a considble expedn agt the Creeks was proposed. 2 We were all of opon no such expedn. should be undertaken. My reasons were that such a war mt. bring on a Span. and even an English war that for this reason the aggressions of the Creeks had been laid before the last Congress they had not chosen to declare war, that therefore the Executive shd. not take on itself to do it, and that accdg to the opns of Pickens Blount it was too late in the season.
I thought however that a temperate and conciliatory lre should be written to the govr. in order that we might retain the disposn of the people of the state to assist in an expedn when undertaken. The other gentlemen thought a strong letter of disapprobation shd. be written. Such a one was this day produced, strong reprehendatory enough, in which I thought were visible the personal enmities of Kn. Ham. agt. Telfair, Gun Jackson, the two last having been of the council of officers. The letter passed without objection, being of the complexion before determd.
Wayne’s letter was read, porposg that 600. militia should set out from Fort Pitt to attack certain Miami towns, while he marched agt. the principal towns. The Presidt. disapproved it because of the difficulty of concerted movements at 600. miles distance, because these 600. men might probably would have the whole force of the Indns. to contend with, because the object was not worth the risking such a number of men. We all concurred. It appeared to me further that to begin an expedn now from Fort Pitt, the very 1st. order for which is to be given now when we have reason to believe Wayne advanced as far as Fort Jefferson would be either too late for his movements or would retard them very injuriously.— Note. The letters from the Commrs. were now read, announcing the refusal of the Indns. to treat unless the Ohio were made the boundary that they were on their return.
A lre from Govr. Clinton read, informg of his issuing a warrant to arrest Govr. Galbaud, 1 at the request of the French Consul, that he was led to interfere because the judge of the district lived at Albany. It was proposed to write to the judge of the district that the place of his residence was not adapted to his duties, to Clinton that Galbaud was not liable to arrest. Ham. said that by the laws of N. Y. the Govr. has the powers of a justice of peace, had issued the warrant as such. I was against writing lres to judiciary officers. I thought them independt. of the Executive, not subject to its coercion, therefore not obliged to attend to its admonitions. The other three were for writing the lres. They thot it the duty of the President to see that the laws were exd, if he found a failure in so important an officer, to communicate it to the legislature for impeachmt. E. R. undertook to write the lres I am to sign them as if mine.
The Presidt. brot forward the subject of the posts, and thought a new demand of answer should be made to Mr. Hammond. As we had not Mr. Hammond’s last answer (of June 20.) on that subject, agreed to let it lie over to Monday.
Ham. proposed that on Monday we shd. take into consideration the fortification of the rivers ports of the U S. and that tho’ the Exec. cd. not undertake to do it, preparatory surveys shd be made to be laid before Congr.—to be considd. on Monday.
The lres to Genet coverg a copy of mine to Gov. Mor. [of —] to the Fr. consuls threateng the revvocn of their Exequaturs to Mr. Pinckney on the addnl instrns of Gr. Br. to their navy for shipping our corn, flour, c. to Govr. Mor. on the similar ord. of the French Natl. assembly, are to be ready for Monday.
My lre to Mr. Hammond in ansr. to his of Aug. 30. was read approved. Ham. wished not to narrow the ground of compensation so much as to cases after Aug. 7. Knox joined him, and by several observns showed he did not know what the question was. He could not comprehend that the lre of Aug. 7. which promised compensn (because we had not used all the means in our power for restr) would not be contradicted by a refusal to compensate in cases after Aug. 7. where we should naturally use all the means in our power for restr, these means should be insufficient. The letter was agreed to on R.’s opon mine, Ham. acquiescing, Knox opposing.
Nov. 8. 93 . At a conference at the President’s where I read several letters of Mr. Genet, on finishing one of them, I asked what should be the answer? The Presidt thereupon took occasion to observe that Mr. Genet’s conduct contind to be of so extraordy. a nature that he meant to propose to our serious considn Whether he should not have his functions discontd be ordd. away? He went lengthily into observns on his conduct, to raise against the Executive 1. the people, 2. the state govmts, 3. the Congress. He showed he felt the venom of Genet’s pen, but declared he would not chuse his insolence should be regarded any further than as might be thought to affect the honor of the country. Hamilton Knox readily zealously argued for dismissing Mr. Genet. Randolph opposed it with firmness, pretty lengthily. The Presidt. replied to him lengthily, concluded by saying he did not wish to have the thing hastily decided but that we should consider of it, and give our opinions on his return from Reading Lancaster. Accdly Nov. 18. we met at his house. Reed new volumes of Genet’s lres recd. since the President’s departure, then took up the discussion of the subjects of communicn to Congress. 1. The Proclmn. E. R. read the statemt he had prepared. Hamilton did not like it, said much about his own views, that the Presidt. had a right to declare his opn to our citizens foreign nations. That it was not the interest of this country to join in the war that we were under no oblign to join in it, that tho’ the declr would not legally bind Congress, yet the Presidt. had a right to give his opn of it, he was agt. any expln in the speech which should yield. That he did not intend that foreign nations shd consider it as a decln of neutrality future as well as present, that he understood it as meant to give them that sort of assurance satisfaction, to say otherwise now would be a deception on them. He was for the Pres’s using such expressions as should neither affirm his right to make such a decln to foreign nations, nor yield it. R. myself opposed the right of the Presidt. to declare anything future on the qu. shall there or shall there not be war? that no such thing was intended; that H.’s constrn of the effect of the proclmn would have been a determn of the question of the guarantee which we both denied to have intended, I had at the time declared the Executive incompetent to. R. said he meant that forn natns. should understand it as an intimation of the Pr.’s opn that neutrality would be our interest. I declared my meaning to have been that forn nations should understand no such thing, that on the contrary I would have chosen them to be doubtful to come bid for our neutrality. I admitted the Presidt. havg. recd. the natn. at the close of Congr. in a state of peace, was bound to preserve them in that state till Congr. shd. meet again, might proclaim anything which went no farther. The Pres. decld. he nevr. had an idea that he could bind Congress agt. declaring war, or that anything containd. in his proclmn could look beyd. the first day of their meeting. His main view was to keep our people in peace, he apologized for the use of the term neutrality in his answers, justifd. it by having submitted the first of them (that to the merchts wherein it was used) to our considn, we had not objected to the term. He concluded in the end that Colo. H. should prepare a paragraph on this subject for the speech, it should then be considered. 1 We were here called to dinner.
After dinner the renvoi of Genet was proposed by himself. I opposed it on these topics. France the only nation on earth sincerely our friend.—The measure so harsh a one that no precedt. is producd. where it has not been followed by war. Our messenger has now been gone 84. days, conseqly. we may hourly expect the return to be relieved by their revocation of him. Were it now resolved on, it would be 8. or 10. days before the matter on which the order shd. be founded could be selected, arranged, discussed, forwarded. This wd. bring us within 4 or 5. days of the meeting of Congress. Wd. it not be better to wait see how the pulse of that body, new as it is, would beat. They are with us now, probably but such a step as this may carry many over to Genet’s side. Genet will not obey the order, c., c. The Presidt. asked me what I would do if Genet sent the accusn to us to be communicd. to Congr. as he threatd. in the lre to Moultrie? I sd. I wd. not send it to Congr., but eithr. put it in the newsp. or send it back to him to be publd. if he pleased. Other questions answers were put returned in a quicker altercation than I ever before saw the President use. Hamilton was for the renvoi. Spoke much of the dignity of the nation, that they were now to form their character, that our conduct now would tempt or deter other forn. min. from treatg us in the same manner, touched on the Pr’s personal feelings— did not believe Fr. wd. make it a cause of war, if she did we ought to do what was right meet the consequences c. Knox on the same side, said he thot it very possible Mr. Genet would either declare us a departmt. of France, or levy troops here endeavor to reduce us to obedce. R. of my opn, argued chiefly on the resurrection of popularity to Genet which might be prodd. by this measure. That at present he was dead in the public opn if we would but leave him so. The Presidt. lamented there was not unanimity among us; that as it was we had left him exactly where we found him. so it ended.
Nov. 15. 1793 . E. R. tells me, that Ham. in conversn with him yesterday said “Sir, if all the people in America were now assembled, to call on me to say whether I am a friend to the French revolution, I would declare that I have it in abhorrence. ”
Nov. 21 . We met at the President’s. The manner of explaining to Congress the intentions of the Proclmn was the matter of debate. E. R. produced his way of stating it. This expressed it’s views to have been 1. to keep our citizens quiet. 2. to intimate to foreign nations that it was the Pr’s opn that the interests disposns of this country were for peace. Hamilton produced his statement in which he declared his intention to be to say nothing which could be laid hold of for any purpose, to leave the proclamation to explain itself. He entered pretty fully into all the argumentation of Pacificus, he justified the right of the Presidt to declare his opinion for a future neutrality, that there existed no circumstances to oblige the U. S. to enter into the war on account of the guarantee, and that in agreeing to the proclmn he meant it to be understood as conveying both those declarations, viz, neutrality, that the casus fœderis on the guarantee did not exist. Notwithstanding these declns of the Presidt. he admitted the Congress might declare war. In like manner they might declare war in the face of a treaty, in direct infraction of it. Among other positions laid down by him, this was with great positiveness, that the constn having given power to the Presidt. Senate to make treaties, they might make a treaty of neutrality which should take from Congress the right to declare war in that particular case, and that under the form of a treaty they might exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively given by the constn to the H. of representatives. R. opposed this position, seemed to think that where they undertook to do acts by treaty (as to settle a tariff of duties) which were exclusively given to the legislature, that an act of the legislature would be necessary to confirm them, as happens in England when a treaty interferes with duties establd by law.—I insisted that in givg to the Prest. Senate a power to make treaties, the constn meant only to authorize them to carry into effect by way of treaty any powers they might constitutionally exercise. I was sensible of the weak points in this position, but there were still weaker in the other hypotheses, and if it be impossible to discover a rational measure of authority to have been given by this clause, I would rather suppose that the cases which my hypothesis would leave unprovided, were not thought of by the Convention, or if thought of, could not be agreed on, or were thought on and deemed unnecessary to be invested in the government. Of this last description were treaties of neutrality, treaties of offensive defensive c. In every event I would rather construe so narrowly as to oblige the nation to amend and thus declare what powers they would agree to yield, than too broadly indeed so broadly as to enable the Executive and Senate to do things which the constn forbids. On the question Which form of explaining the principles of the proclmn should be adopted? I declared for R.’s, tho’ it gave to that instrumt. more objects than I had contemplated. K declared for H’s. The Presidt. said he had had but one object, the keeping our people quiet till Congress should meet, that nevertheless to declare he did not mean a decln of neutrality in the technical sense of the phrase might perhaps be crying peccavi before he was charged. However he did not decide between the two draughts.
Nov. 23 . At the President’s. Present K. R. Th: J. Subject, the heads of the speech. One was, a proposition to Congress to fortify the principal harbors. I opposed the expediency of the general government’s undertaking it, the expediency of the President’s proposing it. It was amended by substituting a proposition to adopt means for enforcg respect to the jurisdn of the U S. within its waters. It was proposed to recommend the establishmt of a military academy. I objected that none of the specified powers given by the constn to Congress would authorize this. It was therefore referred for further considn inquiry. K. was for both propositions. R. agt. the former, but said nothing as to the latter. The Presidt. acknold. he had doubted of the expedcy of undertakg the former, and as to the latter, tho’ it would be a good thing, he did not wish to bring on anything which might generate heat ill humor. It was agreed that Rand. should draw the speech the messages.
Nov. 28 . We met at the President’s.
I read over a list of the papers copying, to be communicated to Congress on the subject of Mr. Genet. It was agreed that Genet’s lre of Aug. 13. to the President, mine of Aug. 16. and Genet’s of Nov. to myself the atty genl. desiring a prosecution of Jay King 1 should not be sent to the legislature: on a general opn that the discussion of the fact certified by Jay King had better be left to the channel of the newspapers, in the private hands in which it now is than for the Presidt. to meddle in it, or give room to a discussion of it in Congress.
E. R. had prepared a draught of the speech. The clause recommending fortifications was left out, but that for a military academy was inserted. I opposed it, as unauthorized by the constitn. H. K. approved it without discussion. E. R. was for it, saying that the words of the constn authorizing Congress to lay taxes c. for the common defence, might comprehend it. The President said he would not chuse to recommend anything against the constn, but if it was doubtful, he was so impressed with the necessity of this measure, that he would refer it to Congress, let them decide for themselves whether the constn authorized it or not. It was therefore left in. I was happy to see that R. had, by accident, used the expression “our republic” in the speech. The President however made no objection to it, and so as much as it had disconcerted him on a former occasion with me, it was now put into his own mouth to be pronounced to the two houses of legislature.
No material alterations were proposed or made in any part of the draught.
After dinner, I produced the draught of messages on the subject of France England, proposing that that relative to Spain should be subsequent secret.
H. objected to the draught in toto. Said that the contrast drawn between the conduct of France England amounted to a decln of war. He denied that Fr. had ever done us favors, that it was mean for a nation to acknolege favors, that the dispositions of the people of this country towards France he considered as a serious calamity, that the Executive ought not by an echo of this language to nourish that disposn in the people. That the offers in commerce made us by France were the offspring of the moment, of circumstances which wd. not last, it was wrong to receive as permanent, things merely temporary. That he could demonstrate that Gr. Br. shewed us more favors than France. In complaisance to him I whittled down the expressions without opposition, struck out that of “favors antient recent” from France, softened some terms omitted some sentiments respecting Gr. Br. He still was against the whole, but insisted that at any rate it should be a secret communication, because the matters it stated were still depending. These were 1. the inexecution of the treaty, 2. the restraining our corn commerce to their own ports those of their friends. Knox joined Hamilton in everything. Randolph was for the communications, that the documents respecting the 1st, should be given in as public, but that those respecting the 2d. should not be given to the legislature at all but kept secret. I began to tremble now for the whole, lest all should be kept secret. I urged especially the duty now incumbent on the Presidt. to lay before the legislature the public what had passed on the inexecution of the treaty, since Mr. Hammond’s answer of this month might be considered as the last we should ever have; that therefore it could no longer be considered as a negotiation pending. I urged that the documents respecting the stopping our corn ought also to go, but insisted that if it should be thot better to withhold them, the restriction should not go to those respecting the treaty: that neither of these subjects was more in a state of pendency than the recall of Mr. Genet, on which nevertheless no scruples had been expressed. The Presidt. took up the subject with more vehemence than I have seen him shew, and decided without reserve that not only what had passed on the inexecution of the treaty should go in as public (in which H. K. had divided in opinion from R. myself) but also that those respecting the stopping our corn should go in as public (wherein H. K. Randolph had been against me) This was the first instance I had seen of his deciding on the opn of one against that of three others, which proved his own to have been very strong.
Dec. 1. 93 . Beckly tells me he had the following fact from Lear. Langdon, Cabot, some others of the Senate, standing in a knot before the fire after the Senate had adjourned, growling together about some measure which they had just lost, “Ah! said Cabot, things will never go right till you have a President for life and an hereditary Senate.” Langdon told this to Lear, who mentioned it to the President. The Presidt. seemed struck with it declared he had not supposed there was a man in the U S. who could have entertained such an idea. 1
March the 2d, 1797 . I arrived at Philadelphia to qualify as Vice-President, and called instantly on Mr. Adams, who lodged at Francis’s, in Fourth street. The next morning he returned my visit at Mr. Madison’s, where I lodged. He found me alone in my room, and shutting the door himself, he said he was glad to find me alone, for that he wished a free conversation with me. He entered immediately on an explanation of the situation of our affairs with France, and the danger of rupture with that nation, a rupture which would convulse the attachments of this country; that he was impressed with the necessity of an immediate mission to the Directory; that it would have been the first wish of his heart to have got me to go there, but that he supposed it was out of the question, as it did not seem justifiable for him to send away the person destined to take his place in case of accident to himself, nor decent to remove from competition one who was a rival in the public favor. That he had, therefore, concluded to send a mission, which, by its dignity, should satisfy France, and by its selection from the three great divisions of the continent, should satisfy all parts of the United States; in short, that he had determined to join Gerry and Madison to Pinckney, and he wished me to consult Mr. Madison for him. I told him that as to myself, I concurred in the opinion of the impropriety of my leaving the post assigned me, and that my inclinations, moreover, would never permit me to cross the Atlantic again; that I would, as he desired, consult Mr. Madison, but I feared it was desperate, as he had refused that mission on my leaving it, in General Washington’s time, though it was kept open a twelvemonth for him. He said that if Mr. Madison should refuse, he would still appoint him, and leave the responsibility on him. I consulted Mr. Madison, who declined as I expected. I think it was on Monday the 6th of March, Mr. Adams and myself met at dinner at General Washington’s, and we happened, in the evening, to rise from table and come away together As soon as we got into the street, I told him the event of my negotiation with Mr. Madison. He immediately said, that, on consultation, some objections to that nomination had been raised which he had not contemplated; and was going on with excuses which evidently embarrassed him, when we came to Fifth street, where our road separated, his being down Market street, mine off along Fifth, and we took leave; and he never after that said one word to me on the subject, or ever consulted me as to any measures of the government. The opinion I formed at the time on this transaction, was, that Mr. Adams, in the first moments of the enthusiasm of the occasion, (his inauguration,) forgot party sentiments, and as he never acted on any system, but was always governed by the feeling of the moment, he thought, for a moment, to steer impartially between the parties; that Monday, the 6th of March, being the first time he had met his cabinet, on expressing ideas of this kind, he had been at once diverted from them, and returned to his former party views.
July, 1797 . Murray is rewarded for his services by an appointment to Amsterdam; W. Smith of Charleston, to Lisbon.
August the 24th . About the time of the British treaty, Hamilton and Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, dined together, and Hamilton drank freely. Conversing on the treaty, Talleyrand says, “mais vraiment, Monsieur Hamilton, ce n’est pas bien honnete, after making the Senate ratify the treaty, to advise the President to reject it.” “The treaty,” says Hamilton, “is an execrable one, and Jay was an old woman for making it; but the whole credit of saving us from it must be given to the President.” After circumstances had led to a conclusion that the President also must ratify it, he said to the same Talleyrand, “though the treaty is a most execrable one, yet when once we have come to a determination on it, we must carry it through thick and thin, right or wrong.” Talleyrand told this to Volney, who told it to me.
There is a letter now appearing in the papers, from Pickering to Monroe, dated July the 24th, 1797, which I am satisfied is written by Hamilton. He was in Philadelphia at that time.
Oct. 13. 97 . Littlepage, who has been on one or two missions from Poland to Spain, told that when Gardoqui returned from America, he settled with his court an account of secret service money of 600,000 dollars. Ex relatione Colo. Munroe.
1797. Dec. 26 . Langdon tells me that at the 2d election of Pr. V. P. of U S. when there was a considble vote given to Clinton in opposn to Mr. Adams, he took occasion to remark it in conversn in the Senate chamber with Mr. A. who gritting his teeth said “Damn ’em Damn ’em Damn ’em you see that an elective govmt will not do.” He also tells me that Mr. A. in a late conversn said “Republicanism must be disgraced, Sir.” The Chevr. Yruho 1 called on him at Braintree, and conversing on French affairs, and Yruho expressing his belief of their stability, in opposn to Mr. Adams’s, the latter lifting up shaking his finger at him said “I ’ll tell you what, the French republic will not last 3. months.” This I had from Yruho.
Harper lately in a large company was saying that the best thing the friends of the French could do was to pray for the restoration of their monarch. Then says a bystander “the best thing we could do I suppose would be to pray for the establishmt of a monarch in the U S.” “Our people says Harper are not yet ripe for it, but it is the best thing we can come to we shall come to it.” Something like this was said in presence of Findlay. 1
27. Tenche Coxe tells me that a little before Hamilton went out of office, or just as he was going out, taking with him his last conversn, and among other things, on the subject of their differences, “for my part, says he, I avow myself a Monarchist; I have no objection to a trial being made of this thing of a republic, but c.
1798. Jan. 5 . I receive a very remarkable fact indeed in our history from Baldwin Skinner. Before the establishment of our present government a very extensive combination had taken place in N. York the Eastern states among that description of people who were partly monarchical in principle or frightened with Shay’s rebellion the impotence of the old Congress. Delegates in different places had actually had consultations on the subject of seizing on the powers of a government establishing them by force, had corresponded with one another, and had sent a deputy to Genl. Washington to solicit his co-operation. He calculated too well to join them. The new Convention was in the meantime proposed by Virginia appointed. These people believed it impossible the states should ever agree on a government, as this must include the impost and all the other powers which the states had a thousand times refused to the general authority. They therefore let the proposed convention go on, not doubting its failure, confiding that on its failure would be a still more favorable moment for their enterprise. They therefore wished it to fail, especially when Hamilton their leader brought forward his plan of govmt, failed entirely in carrying it retired in disgust from the Convention. His associates then took every method to prevent any form of govmt being agreed to. But the well intentioned never ceased trying first one thing then another till they could get something agreed to. The final passage adoption of the constitution completely defeated the views of the combination, and saved us from an attempt to establish a govmt over us by force. This fact throws a blaze of light on the conduct of several members from N. Y. the Eastern states in the Convention of Annapolis the grand convention. At that of Annapolis several Eastern members most vehemently opposed Madison’s proposition for a more general convention with more general powers. They wished things to get more more into confusion to justify the violent measure they proposed. The idea of establishing a govmt by reasoning agreemt they publicly ridiculed as an Utopian project, visionary unexampled.
One of the Secretaries [says?] that a resolution was formed to give no office to any person who did not approve of the proceedings of the Executive, and that it was determined to recall Monroe whose conduct was not consonant with the views of the Executive. Davy said they expressed very hostile dispositions towards France, and he wished Logan to apprise Adet of it, who he observed was a good kind of man, ought to know it, to put his government on their guard.
Feb. 6 . Mr. Baldwin tells me that in a conversn yesterday with Goodhue, on the state of our affairs, Goodhue said “I ’ll tell you what, I have made up my mind on this subject; I would rather the old ship should go down than not;” (meaning the union of the states.) Mr. Hillhouse coming up, well says Mr. Baldwin I ’ll tell my old friend Hillhouse what you say,” he told him “well, says Goodhue I repeat that I would rather the old ship should go down, if we are to be always kept pumping so.” “Mr. Hillhouse, says Baldwin, you remember when we were learning logic together at school, there was the case categorical the case hypothetical. Mr. Goodhue stated it to me first as the case categorical. I am glad to see that he now changes it to the case hypothetical, by adding ‘if we are always to be kept pumping so.’ Baldwin went on then to remind Goodhue what an advocate he had been for our tonnage duty (wanting to make it 1 Doll. instead of 50. cents,) and how impatiently he bore the delays of Congress in proceeding to retaliate on Gr. Br. before Mr. Madison’s proposns came on; Goodhue acknowledged that his opinions had changed since that.
Feb. 15. 98 . I dined this day with Mr. Adams, (the Presidt.) The company was large. After dinner I was sitting next to him, our conversn was first on the enormous price of labor, 1 house rent, other things. We both concurred in ascribing it chiefly to the floods of bank paper now afloat, and in condemning those institns. We then got on the constitn in the course of our conversn he said, that no republic could ever last which had not a Senate, a Senate deeply strongly rooted, strong enough to bear up against all popular storms passions. That he thought our Senate as well constituted as it could have been, being chosen by the legislatures, for if these could not support them he did not know That could do it, that perhaps it might have been as well for them to be chosen by the state at large, as that would insure a choice of distinguished men, since none but such could be known to a whole people; that the only fault in our Senate was that it was not durable enough, that hitherto it had behaved very well, however he was afraid they would give way in the end. That as to trusting to a popular assembly for the preservn of our liberties it was the merest chimera imaginable, they never had any rule of decision but their own will, that he would as lieve be again in the hands of our old committees of safety who made the law executed it at the same time, that it had been observed by some writer (I forget whom he named) that anarchy did more mischief in one night than tyranny in an age, and that in modern times we might say with truth that in France, anarchy had done more harm in one night than all the despotism of their kings had ever done in 20. or 30. years’. The point in which he views our Senate, as the Colossus of the constitn serves as a key to the politics of the Senate, who are two thirds of them in his sentiments, and accounts for the bold line of conduct they pursue.
Mar. 1 . Mr. Tazewell tells me that when the appropriations for the British treaty were on the carpet and very uncertain in the lower house, there being at that time a number of bills in the hands of Commees of the Senate, none reported, the Senate idle for want of them, he, in his place, called on the commees to report, and particularly on Mr. King, who was of most of them. King said that it was true the commes kept back their reports waiting the event of the question about appropriation: that if that was not carried, they considered legislation as at an end, that they might as well break up consider the Union as dissolved. Tazewell expressed his astonmt at these ideas called on King to know if he had misapprehended him. King rose again repeated the same words. The next day Cabot took an occasion in debate, so awkward a one as to shew it was a thing agreed to be done, to repeat the same sentiments in stronger terms, and carried further by declaring a determination on their side to break up and dissolve the govmt.
Mar. 11 . In conversn with Baldwin Brown of Kentucky, Brown says that in a private company once consisting of Hamilton, King, Madison, himself some one else making a fifth, speaking of the “ federal government ” “Oh! says Hamilton “say the federal monarchy; let us call things by their right names, for a monarchy it is.”
Baldwin mentions at table the following fact. When the bank bill was under discussion in the H. of R. judge Wilson came in, was standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him of the following fact which passed in the grand convention. Among the enumerated powers given to Congress was one to erect corpons. It was on debate struck out. Several particular powers were then proposed. Among others Rob. Morris proposed to give Congress a power to establish a National bank. Gouvernr. Morris opposed it, observing that it was extremely doubtful whether the constn they were framing could ever be passed at all by the people of America, that to give it its best chance however, they should make it as palatable as possible, put nothing into it not very essential which might raise up enemies. That his colleague (Rob. Morris) well knew that “a bank” was in their state (Pensve) the very watch word of party. That a bank had been the great bone of contention between the two parties of the state from the establmt of their constn, having been erected, put down erected again as either party preponderated; that therefore to insert this power, would instantly enlist against the whole instrument the whole of the anti-bank party in Pensve, where-upon it was rejected, as was every other special power except that of giving copy-rights to authors patents to inventors. the general power of incorporating being whittled down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact.
Mr. Hunter of S. Carola who lodges with Rutledge tells me that Rutledge (J. Rutledge junr.) was explaining to him the plan they proposed to pursue as to war measures when Otis came in. Rutledge addressed Otis. Now sir says he you must come forward with something liberal for the Southern states, fortify their harbours build gallies, in order to obtain their concurrence. Otis said we insist on convoys for our European trade, guarda costas, on which condn alone we will give them gallies fortificns. Rutledge observed that in the event of war McHenry Pickering must go out, Wolcott he thought might remain, but the others were incapable of conducting a war. Otis said the Eastern people would never abandon Pickering, he must be retained, McHenry might go. They considered together whether Genl. Pinckney wd. accept the office of Secy. of war. They apprehended he would not. It was agreed in this conversn that Sewall had more the ear of the President than any other person.
Mar. 12 . When the bill for appropriations was before the Senate, Anderson moved to strike out a clause recognizing (by way of appropriation) the appmt of a commee by the H. of R. to sit during their recess to collect evidence on Blount’s case, denying they had power, but by a law, to authorize a commee to sit during recess. Tracy advocated the motion said “we may as well speak out. The commee was appointed by the H. of R. to take care of the Brit. minister, to take care of the Span. min. to take care of the Sec. of state, in short to take care of the Pres. of the U S. They were afraid the Pres. Secy. of state wd. not perform the office of collecting evidence faithfully, that there would be collusion c. Therefore the House appointed a commee of their own. We shall have them next sending a commee to Europe to make a treaty c. Suppose that the H. of R. should resolve that after the adjmt of Congress they should continue to sit as a commee of the whole house during the whole recess.” This shows how the appointment of that committee has been viewed by the President’s friends.
Apr. 5 . Dr. Rush tells me he had it from Mrs. Adams that not a scrip of a pen has passed between the late present Presidt. since he came into office.
Apr. 13 . New instructions of the British govmt to their armed ships now appear which clearly infringe their treaty with us, by authorizing them to take our vessels carrying produce of the French colonies from those colonies to Europe, to take vessels bound to a blockaded port. See them in Brown’s paper, of Apr. 18. in due form.
The Presidt, has sent a govmt brig to France, probably to carry despatches. He has chosen as the bearer of these one Humphreys, the son of a ship carpenter ignorant under age, not speaking a word of French, most abusive of that nation whose only merit is the having mobbed beaten Bache on board the frigate built here, for which he was indicted punished by fine.
Apr. 25 . At a dinner given by the bar to the Federal judges, Chase Peters, present about 24. lawyers and Wm. Tilghman in the chair, this toast was given “Our King in old England.” Observe the double entendre on the word King. Du Ponceau who was one of the bar, present, told this to Tenche Coxe who told me in presence of H. Tazewell. Dallas was at the dinner; so was Colo. Charles Sims of Alexandria, who is here on a lawsuit v. genl. Irving.
May 3 . The Presidt. some time ago appd Steele of Virga a Commr. to the Indians, now Secretary of the Mississippi Territory. Steele was a Counsellor of Virga, and was voted out by the assembly because he turned tory. He then offered for Congress was rejected by the people. Then offered for the Senate of Virga was rejected. The Presidt. has also appd. Joseph Hopkinson Commr. to make a treaty with the Oneida Indns. He is a youth of about 22. or 23. and has no other merit than extreme toryism, the having made a poor song to the tune of the President’s March. 1
1799. Jan . In a conversation with Dr. Ewen, who told the Presidt. one of his sons was an aristocrat the other a Democrat. The P. asked if it was not the youngest who was the Democrat. “Yes, said Ewen. Well said the Presidt. a boy of 15. who is not a democrat is good for nothing, he is no better who is a democrat at 20. Ewen told Hurt, and Hurt told me.