SUBJECT: MIND CONTROL AND MENTAL TELEPATHY FILE: UFO3298 ========================================================================= Patrick A. Warden CompuServe address 73121,1417 Subject: mind control and mental telepathy August 1, 1993 In 1969 Mr. Warden scored in the 98th percentile in a standardized, high school intelligence test. He was a National Merit Finalist, and graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with honors. His background is in the liberal arts with an introduction to the physical sciences. He again scored in the 98th percentile in the verbal and mathematical sections of the Graduate Record Exam in 1977. For what he is about to relate, Mr. Warden was hospitalized twice on psychiatric wards for paranoid schizophrenia, first for ten days and then for two weeks, culminating in forced confinement to a state mental institution for eight months in 1986. Today he works as a public relations writer for a non-profit organization providing disability services in Los Angeles. Circa 1980 he was the subject of a recruitment attempt and an experiment involving mental telepathy, conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency. Shortly thereafter he was contacted by means of mental telepathy, operated by the governments of the United States and other major world powers, in particular, that of the former Soviet Union. The purpose of the contact was, first, to inform him of the true nature of the disembodied voices he had been hearing in his mind that by the medical profession had been ascribed to schizophrenia, and second, to recruit him as a public relations officer for the CIA and the Mental Telepathy System (MTS). The MTS is operational on the public and involves what might commonly be known as mind control. It is a system of technology that operates apparently by radio and microwaves, and that can broadcast voices and visual images, including somatic sensations, and affect the autonomic nervous system across distances. It is a hardware-based system that involves transmitters, antennas and amplifying devices. Though in its most primitive form the MTS mimics psychic phenomena, it involves man-made technology as distinct from whatever natural psychic phenomena may have occurred throughout time. Without their knowledge, many people are under the influence of the MTS, which due sometimes to foreign control, can manifest itself in the bizarre and disturbing psychopathic outbreaks that appear from time to time in the news media. The voices that the Son of Sam serial killer thought he heard from the dog in the backyard of the neighboring apartment building in the mid- to late 1970's probably resulted from the MTS. The foreign student at UC Berkeley who took hostages at the street cafe around 1991, claiming he was under the influence of government mind control experiments, also probably was affected by the MTS. Events such as David Koresh's control over the Branch Davidian cult in Waco, Texas during 1993 can also fully be accounted for by, and probably were the result of, his being unknowingly influenced by the worst aspects of the MTS. BACKGROUND The MTS goes back as far as the time of the Kennedy Administration and the outbreak of Beatlemania shortly after the President's assassination. It's actual origins are unclear, but may have had something to do with Nazi war experiments. In the early 1960's the Soviet Union had the advantage with this technology, and deployed it in western nations in the form of a mood altering broadcast wave that put people under its sway. Known a few years later as the Biofeedback Transponding Crowd Control System, the Soviet mind control technology was installed in places such as Berkeley, California, where it was used for subversive purposes to foment mass demonstrations, and also for international exchange and quasi-diplomatic efforts to promote understanding and sympathy for the Soviets among American people. Mental telepathy technology was the joint and evolving development of the intelligence forces of the United States, the CIA, and the Soviet KGB. Reflecting the international tensions between the two countries, it grew in a manner similar to the competition of the space race, with civilian and military implications. The Soviets, who had the upper hand on the mental telepathy technology, used it in the US for espionage and subversion, trying to gain access to the minds of scientists involved in government weapons research, and to foment civil unrest and pro socialist sympathy among the younger generation of Americans. Faced with the missile gap of the late 1970's, the advances by the Soviets with their particle beam accelerator, and similar national defense issues, the Reagan Administration came to power and began a concerted push, known as COINTELPRO- the CounterIntelligence Program. Through COINTELPRO, the defense buildup and the beginning of the space shuttle program, which was able quickly to put into orbit more of the intelligence and communications satellites that operate the MTS at its upper levels; the US was able to gain the upper hand in the MTS. Truth as we know it in the US won out over the disinformation propagated by the Soviet mental telepathy system, known informally as "Vodka." Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the mental telepathy wars conducted between telepaths, or mental telepathy operatives, of the CIA and the KGB have come to an end, although why psychopathological outbreaks continue among the population remains unclear. The American MTS, which was influenced and partially operated by the KGB in particular during the 1970's, politically fell under the observation and verification clauses of the SALT I and II treaties. When it became clear that the Soviets were gaining too much influence over the American public, SALT II drew increasing discontent among government leaders and was scuttled. Under the provisions of SALT, the Soviets were permitted to operate mental telepathy in diplomatic colony zones such as Berkeley, also known as "Pacifica." The US essentially was blackmailed into accepting the Soviet proposal of detente during the Brezhnev era and their mental telepathy operation in this country, due to their relative superiority in research and development in the field of artificial mental telepathy. COINTELPRO recruited a sufficient number of Americans, however, to develop the American MTS, and the intelligence satellites that play a primary role in propagating it across wide areas, to the point whe re it effectively could combat the Soviet Vodka telepathy. Present control of the MTS is improving, with better mental and psychological conditions for the telepaths who are affected by it, because the KGB is no longer intact to propagate its particular brand of psychological mischief and violence; but because the MTS still remains under wraps, the heirs of the Soviets, apparently the Russians and affiliated republics, probably still continue to foment the violence that periodically erupts in the form of serial killers with bizarre and demented notions, and other forms of psychopathology in the news media. The provisions of the Detente-era treaty governing the MTS and Vodka hold that Russian telepathy will continue in the US until the MTS is operated en pleine jour, or in broad daylight without government camouflage and denial, in the US-or elsewhere in the world for that matter. In other words, the Russians will continue to operate Vodka in the US, though at a more hospdŸ, until the government, or someone, "blows the cover" on mental telepathy, and this new technology becomes pthe national security; (3) foreign government information; (4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods; (5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States; (6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; (7) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (8) cryptology; (9) a confidential source; or (lO) other categories of information that are related to the national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the President or by agency heads or other officials who have been delegated original classification authority by the President Any determination made under this subsection shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. (b) Information that is determined to concern one or more of the categories in Section 1.3(a) shall be classified when an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. (c) Unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information, the identity of a confidential foreign source, or intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security. (d) Information classified in accordance with Section 1.3 shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or in advertent or unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of identical or similar information. Sec. 1.4 Duration of Classification (a) Information shall be classified as long as required by national security considerations. When it can be determined, a specific date or event for declassification shall be set by the original classification authority at the time the information is originally cli@well.sf.ca.us (Jack Sarfatti) Subject: Psychotronics Experiments [6] - The UFO Encyclopedia, pp 130-131, Edited by John Spencer, London: Headline Books, 1991. ISBN 0-7472-3494-9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- all be responsible for notifying holders of the information of such extensions. (c) Information classified under predecessor orders and marked for declassification review shall remain classified until reviewed for declassification under the provisions of this Order. Sec. 1.5 Identification and markings. (a) At the time of original classification, the following information shall be shown on the face of all classified documents, or clearly associated with other forms of classified information in a manner appropriate to the medium involved, unless this information itself would reveal a confidential source or relationship not otherwise evident in the document or information: (1) one of the three classification levels defined in Section 1.1; (2) the identity of the original classification authority if other than the person whose name appears as the approving or signing official; (3) the agency and office of origin; and (4) the date or event for declassification, or the notation "Originating Agency's Determination Required." (b) Each classified document shall, by marking or other means, indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, and which portions are not classified. Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and revoke waivers of this requirement for specified classes of documents or information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be notified of any waivers. (c) Marking designations implementing the provisions of this Order, including abbreviations, shall conform to the standards prescribed in implementing directives issued by the Information Security Oversight Office. (d) Foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a United States classification that shall insure a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. (e) Information assigned a level of classification under predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other required markings. Omitted markings may be inserted on a document by the officials specified in Section 3.l(b). SEC. 1.6 Limitations on Classification (a) In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organiz,atjon, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security. (b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified. (c) The President or an agency head or official designated under Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(b)(1), or 1.2(c)(1) may reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed if it is determined in writing that (1) the information requires protection in the interest of national security; and (2) the information may reasonably be recovered. These reclassification actions shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. (d) Information may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of this Order (Section 3.4) if such classification meets the requirements of this Order and is accomplished personally and on a document- by-document basis by the agency head, the deputy agency head, the senior agency official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1), or an official with original Top Secret classification authority PART 2 Derivative Classification SEC. 2.1 Use of Derivative Classification (a) Derivative classification is (1) the determination that information is in substance the same as information currently classified, and (2) the application of the same classification markings. Persons who only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who only apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide, need not possess original classification authority. (b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall: (1) observe and respect original classification decisions; and (2) carry forward to any newly created documents any assigned authorized markings. The declassification date or event that provides the longest period of classification shall be used for documents classified on the basis of multiple sources. SEC. 2.2 Classification Guides. (a) Agencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of information. (b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who: (1) has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official designated under Section 5.3(a); and (2) is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide. (c) Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and revoke waivers of the requirement to prepare classification guides for specified classes of documents or information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be notified of any waivers. PART 3 Declassification and Downgrading Sec. 3.1 Declassification Authority. (a) Information shall be declassified or downgraded as soon as national security considerations permit. Agencies shall coordinate their review of classified information with other agencies that have a direct interest in the subject matter. 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(d) The provisions of this Section shall also apply to agencies that, under the terms of this Order, do not have original classification authority, but that had such authority under predecessor orders. Sec. 3.2 Transferred Information. (a) In the case of classified information transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions, ant more positive in its implications than negative. Above all, one's greatest hope should be for freedom from external control and liberty to enjoy a restored privacy of the mind. =END= ********************************************************************* * -------->>> THE U.F.O. BBS - http://www.ufobbs.com/ufo <<<------- * *********************************************************************