In this article I defend that Floridi€™s Theory of Strongly
Semantic Information, TSSI, is correct while encompassing the
Veracity Thesis, which guides the semantic information definition as - p
is information if and only if p is constituted by meaningful, truth
well-formed data. I argue that the theory is not arbitrary because it
deals with important philosophical conundrums, mainly by avoiding
the Bar-Hillel and Carnap paradox (1953) generated from the classical
theory of semantic information. First, one of the classic theory€™s main
result is discussed: the production of sentences too much informative 
to be true. Then the motivations to elaborate the logic of being
informed are summarized and it is shown how the KTIL system is
built and modelled keeping the veracity axiom among its axioms, or A4. Finally the TSSI is examined and 
defended by showing that it aletically restricts the extension of the classic concept of information,
avoiding problems with tautologies and contradictions. The TSSI offers
an original solution by capturing our modal intuitions concerning
informativeness as a basic notion.

KEYWORDS Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox. Logic of being informed. Theory of strongly semantic information. Veracity 
thesis.

Bernardo Alonso // vomitols@gmail.com // ext@sdf.org  // lacuna.me