tadd aes and ecdsa sources - electrum - Electrum Bitcoin wallet (HTM) git clone https://git.parazyd.org/electrum (DIR) Log (DIR) Files (DIR) Refs (DIR) Submodules --- (DIR) commit df8874ed9385b468ebed7130493b0e566514bf7a (DIR) parent 589f73bf573cdc976f68b17f1e316f9c65094f4a (HTM) Author: ThomasV <thomasv@gitorious> Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 17:14:18 +0400 add aes and ecdsa sources Diffstat: A aes/__init__.py | 656 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/__init__.py | 16 ++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/curves.py | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/der.py | 190 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/ecdsa.py | 560 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/ellipticcurve.py | 290 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/keys.py | 252 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/numbertheory.py | 614 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/test_pyecdsa.py | 486 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A ecdsa/util.py | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 3320 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) --- (DIR) diff --git a/aes/__init__.py b/aes/__init__.py t@@ -0,0 +1,656 @@ +#!/usr/bin/python +# +# aes.py: implements AES - Advanced Encryption Standard +# from the SlowAES project, http://code.google.com/p/slowaes/ +# +# Copyright (c) 2008 Josh Davis ( http://www.josh-davis.org ), +# Alex Martelli ( http://www.aleax.it ) +# +# Ported from C code written by Laurent Haan ( http://www.progressive-coding.com ) +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/ +# +import os +import sys +import math + +def append_PKCS7_padding(s): + """return s padded to a multiple of 16-bytes by PKCS7 padding""" + numpads = 16 - (len(s)%16) + return s + numpads*chr(numpads) + +def strip_PKCS7_padding(s): + """return s stripped of PKCS7 padding""" + if len(s)%16 or not s: + raise ValueError("String of len %d can't be PCKS7-padded" % len(s)) + numpads = ord(s[-1]) + if numpads > 16: + raise ValueError("String ending with %r can't be PCKS7-padded" % s[-1]) + return s[:-numpads] + +class AES(object): + # valid key sizes + keySize = dict(SIZE_128=16, SIZE_192=24, SIZE_256=32) + + # Rijndael S-box + sbox = [0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, + 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, + 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, + 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, + 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, + 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, + 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, + 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, + 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, + 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, + 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, + 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, + 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, + 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, + 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, + 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, + 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, + 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, + 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, 0x70, + 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, + 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, + 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, + 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, + 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16] + + # Rijndael Inverted S-box + rsbox = [0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38, 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, + 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb , 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, + 0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb , 0x54, + 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, + 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e , 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, + 0xb2, 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 , 0x72, 0xf8, + 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, + 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 , 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda, + 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 , 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, + 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, + 0x45, 0x06 , 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02, 0xc1, + 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b , 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, + 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, + 0x73 , 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85, 0xe2, 0xf9, + 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e , 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, + 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b , + 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, + 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 , 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, + 0xc7, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f , 0x60, + 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, + 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef , 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, + 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 , 0x17, 0x2b, + 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26, 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, + 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d] + + def getSBoxValue(self,num): + """Retrieves a given S-Box Value""" + return self.sbox[num] + + def getSBoxInvert(self,num): + """Retrieves a given Inverted S-Box Value""" + return self.rsbox[num] + + def rotate(self, word): + """ Rijndael's key schedule rotate operation. + + Rotate a word eight bits to the left: eg, rotate(1d2c3a4f) == 2c3a4f1d + Word is an char list of size 4 (32 bits overall). + """ + return word[1:] + word[:1] + + # Rijndael Rcon + Rcon = [0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, + 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, + 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, + 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, + 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, + 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, + 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, + 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, + 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, + 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, + 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, + 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, + 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, + 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, + 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, + 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, + 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, + 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, + 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, 0xe8, 0xcb, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, + 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x6c, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x4d, 0x9a, + 0x2f, 0x5e, 0xbc, 0x63, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x35, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x7d, + 0xfa, 0xef, 0xc5, 0x91, 0x39, 0x72, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0x61, 0xc2, + 0x9f, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x94, 0x33, 0x66, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0x74, + 0xe8, 0xcb ] + + def getRconValue(self, num): + """Retrieves a given Rcon Value""" + return self.Rcon[num] + + def core(self, word, iteration): + """Key schedule core.""" + # rotate the 32-bit word 8 bits to the left + word = self.rotate(word) + # apply S-Box substitution on all 4 parts of the 32-bit word + for i in range(4): + word[i] = self.getSBoxValue(word[i]) + # XOR the output of the rcon operation with i to the first part + # (leftmost) only + word[0] = word[0] ^ self.getRconValue(iteration) + return word + + def expandKey(self, key, size, expandedKeySize): + """Rijndael's key expansion. + + Expands an 128,192,256 key into an 176,208,240 bytes key + + expandedKey is a char list of large enough size, + key is the non-expanded key. + """ + # current expanded keySize, in bytes + currentSize = 0 + rconIteration = 1 + expandedKey = [0] * expandedKeySize + + # set the 16, 24, 32 bytes of the expanded key to the input key + for j in range(size): + expandedKey[j] = key[j] + currentSize += size + + while currentSize < expandedKeySize: + # assign the previous 4 bytes to the temporary value t + t = expandedKey[currentSize-4:currentSize] + + # every 16,24,32 bytes we apply the core schedule to t + # and increment rconIteration afterwards + if currentSize % size == 0: + t = self.core(t, rconIteration) + rconIteration += 1 + # For 256-bit keys, we add an extra sbox to the calculation + if size == self.keySize["SIZE_256"] and ((currentSize % size) == 16): + for l in range(4): t[l] = self.getSBoxValue(t[l]) + + # We XOR t with the four-byte block 16,24,32 bytes before the new + # expanded key. This becomes the next four bytes in the expanded + # key. + for m in range(4): + expandedKey[currentSize] = expandedKey[currentSize - size] ^ \ + t[m] + currentSize += 1 + + return expandedKey + + def addRoundKey(self, state, roundKey): + """Adds (XORs) the round key to the state.""" + for i in range(16): + state[i] ^= roundKey[i] + return state + + def createRoundKey(self, expandedKey, roundKeyPointer): + """Create a round key. + Creates a round key from the given expanded key and the + position within the expanded key. + """ + roundKey = [0] * 16 + for i in range(4): + for j in range(4): + roundKey[j*4+i] = expandedKey[roundKeyPointer + i*4 + j] + return roundKey + + def galois_multiplication(self, a, b): + """Galois multiplication of 8 bit characters a and b.""" + p = 0 + for counter in range(8): + if b & 1: p ^= a + hi_bit_set = a & 0x80 + a <<= 1 + # keep a 8 bit + a &= 0xFF + if hi_bit_set: + a ^= 0x1b + b >>= 1 + return p + + # + # substitute all the values from the state with the value in the SBox + # using the state value as index for the SBox + # + def subBytes(self, state, isInv): + if isInv: getter = self.getSBoxInvert + else: getter = self.getSBoxValue + for i in range(16): state[i] = getter(state[i]) + return state + + # iterate over the 4 rows and call shiftRow() with that row + def shiftRows(self, state, isInv): + for i in range(4): + state = self.shiftRow(state, i*4, i, isInv) + return state + + # each iteration shifts the row to the left by 1 + def shiftRow(self, state, statePointer, nbr, isInv): + for i in range(nbr): + if isInv: + state[statePointer:statePointer+4] = \ + state[statePointer+3:statePointer+4] + \ + state[statePointer:statePointer+3] + else: + state[statePointer:statePointer+4] = \ + state[statePointer+1:statePointer+4] + \ + state[statePointer:statePointer+1] + return state + + # galois multiplication of the 4x4 matrix + def mixColumns(self, state, isInv): + # iterate over the 4 columns + for i in range(4): + # construct one column by slicing over the 4 rows + column = state[i:i+16:4] + # apply the mixColumn on one column + column = self.mixColumn(column, isInv) + # put the values back into the state + state[i:i+16:4] = column + + return state + + # galois multiplication of 1 column of the 4x4 matrix + def mixColumn(self, column, isInv): + if isInv: mult = [14, 9, 13, 11] + else: mult = [2, 1, 1, 3] + cpy = list(column) + g = self.galois_multiplication + + column[0] = g(cpy[0], mult[0]) ^ g(cpy[3], mult[1]) ^ \ + g(cpy[2], mult[2]) ^ g(cpy[1], mult[3]) + column[1] = g(cpy[1], mult[0]) ^ g(cpy[0], mult[1]) ^ \ + g(cpy[3], mult[2]) ^ g(cpy[2], mult[3]) + column[2] = g(cpy[2], mult[0]) ^ g(cpy[1], mult[1]) ^ \ + g(cpy[0], mult[2]) ^ g(cpy[3], mult[3]) + column[3] = g(cpy[3], mult[0]) ^ g(cpy[2], mult[1]) ^ \ + g(cpy[1], mult[2]) ^ g(cpy[0], mult[3]) + return column + + # applies the 4 operations of the forward round in sequence + def aes_round(self, state, roundKey): + state = self.subBytes(state, False) + state = self.shiftRows(state, False) + state = self.mixColumns(state, False) + state = self.addRoundKey(state, roundKey) + return state + + # applies the 4 operations of the inverse round in sequence + def aes_invRound(self, state, roundKey): + state = self.shiftRows(state, True) + state = self.subBytes(state, True) + state = self.addRoundKey(state, roundKey) + state = self.mixColumns(state, True) + return state + + # Perform the initial operations, the standard round, and the final + # operations of the forward aes, creating a round key for each round + def aes_main(self, state, expandedKey, nbrRounds): + state = self.addRoundKey(state, self.createRoundKey(expandedKey, 0)) + i = 1 + while i < nbrRounds: + state = self.aes_round(state, + self.createRoundKey(expandedKey, 16*i)) + i += 1 + state = self.subBytes(state, False) + state = self.shiftRows(state, False) + state = self.addRoundKey(state, + self.createRoundKey(expandedKey, 16*nbrRounds)) + return state + + # Perform the initial operations, the standard round, and the final + # operations of the inverse aes, creating a round key for each round + def aes_invMain(self, state, expandedKey, nbrRounds): + state = self.addRoundKey(state, + self.createRoundKey(expandedKey, 16*nbrRounds)) + i = nbrRounds - 1 + while i > 0: + state = self.aes_invRound(state, + self.createRoundKey(expandedKey, 16*i)) + i -= 1 + state = self.shiftRows(state, True) + state = self.subBytes(state, True) + state = self.addRoundKey(state, self.createRoundKey(expandedKey, 0)) + return state + + # encrypts a 128 bit input block against the given key of size specified + def encrypt(self, iput, key, size): + output = [0] * 16 + # the number of rounds + nbrRounds = 0 + # the 128 bit block to encode + block = [0] * 16 + # set the number of rounds + if size == self.keySize["SIZE_128"]: nbrRounds = 10 + elif size == self.keySize["SIZE_192"]: nbrRounds = 12 + elif size == self.keySize["SIZE_256"]: nbrRounds = 14 + else: return None + + # the expanded keySize + expandedKeySize = 16*(nbrRounds+1) + + # Set the block values, for the block: + # a0,0 a0,1 a0,2 a0,3 + # a1,0 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 + # a2,0 a2,1 a2,2 a2,3 + # a3,0 a3,1 a3,2 a3,3 + # the mapping order is a0,0 a1,0 a2,0 a3,0 a0,1 a1,1 ... a2,3 a3,3 + # + # iterate over the columns + for i in range(4): + # iterate over the rows + for j in range(4): + block[(i+(j*4))] = iput[(i*4)+j] + + # expand the key into an 176, 208, 240 bytes key + # the expanded key + expandedKey = self.expandKey(key, size, expandedKeySize) + + # encrypt the block using the expandedKey + block = self.aes_main(block, expandedKey, nbrRounds) + + # unmap the block again into the output + for k in range(4): + # iterate over the rows + for l in range(4): + output[(k*4)+l] = block[(k+(l*4))] + return output + + # decrypts a 128 bit input block against the given key of size specified + def decrypt(self, iput, key, size): + output = [0] * 16 + # the number of rounds + nbrRounds = 0 + # the 128 bit block to decode + block = [0] * 16 + # set the number of rounds + if size == self.keySize["SIZE_128"]: nbrRounds = 10 + elif size == self.keySize["SIZE_192"]: nbrRounds = 12 + elif size == self.keySize["SIZE_256"]: nbrRounds = 14 + else: return None + + # the expanded keySize + expandedKeySize = 16*(nbrRounds+1) + + # Set the block values, for the block: + # a0,0 a0,1 a0,2 a0,3 + # a1,0 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 + # a2,0 a2,1 a2,2 a2,3 + # a3,0 a3,1 a3,2 a3,3 + # the mapping order is a0,0 a1,0 a2,0 a3,0 a0,1 a1,1 ... a2,3 a3,3 + + # iterate over the columns + for i in range(4): + # iterate over the rows + for j in range(4): + block[(i+(j*4))] = iput[(i*4)+j] + # expand the key into an 176, 208, 240 bytes key + expandedKey = self.expandKey(key, size, expandedKeySize) + # decrypt the block using the expandedKey + block = self.aes_invMain(block, expandedKey, nbrRounds) + # unmap the block again into the output + for k in range(4): + # iterate over the rows + for l in range(4): + output[(k*4)+l] = block[(k+(l*4))] + return output + + +class AESModeOfOperation(object): + + aes = AES() + + # structure of supported modes of operation + modeOfOperation = dict(OFB=0, CFB=1, CBC=2) + + # converts a 16 character string into a number array + def convertString(self, string, start, end, mode): + if end - start > 16: end = start + 16 + if mode == self.modeOfOperation["CBC"]: ar = [0] * 16 + else: ar = [] + + i = start + j = 0 + while len(ar) < end - start: + ar.append(0) + while i < end: + ar[j] = ord(string[i]) + j += 1 + i += 1 + return ar + + # Mode of Operation Encryption + # stringIn - Input String + # mode - mode of type modeOfOperation + # hexKey - a hex key of the bit length size + # size - the bit length of the key + # hexIV - the 128 bit hex Initilization Vector + def encrypt(self, stringIn, mode, key, size, IV): + if len(key) % size: + return None + if len(IV) % 16: + return None + # the AES input/output + plaintext = [] + iput = [0] * 16 + output = [] + ciphertext = [0] * 16 + # the output cipher string + cipherOut = [] + # char firstRound + firstRound = True + if stringIn != None: + for j in range(int(math.ceil(float(len(stringIn))/16))): + start = j*16 + end = j*16+16 + if end > len(stringIn): + end = len(stringIn) + plaintext = self.convertString(stringIn, start, end, mode) + # print 'PT@%s:%s' % (j, plaintext) + if mode == self.modeOfOperation["CFB"]: + if firstRound: + output = self.aes.encrypt(IV, key, size) + firstRound = False + else: + output = self.aes.encrypt(iput, key, size) + for i in range(16): + if len(plaintext)-1 < i: + ciphertext[i] = 0 ^ output[i] + elif len(output)-1 < i: + ciphertext[i] = plaintext[i] ^ 0 + elif len(plaintext)-1 < i and len(output) < i: + ciphertext[i] = 0 ^ 0 + else: + ciphertext[i] = plaintext[i] ^ output[i] + for k in range(end-start): + cipherOut.append(ciphertext[k]) + iput = ciphertext + elif mode == self.modeOfOperation["OFB"]: + if firstRound: + output = self.aes.encrypt(IV, key, size) + firstRound = False + else: + output = self.aes.encrypt(iput, key, size) + for i in range(16): + if len(plaintext)-1 < i: + ciphertext[i] = 0 ^ output[i] + elif len(output)-1 < i: + ciphertext[i] = plaintext[i] ^ 0 + elif len(plaintext)-1 < i and len(output) < i: + ciphertext[i] = 0 ^ 0 + else: + ciphertext[i] = plaintext[i] ^ output[i] + for k in range(end-start): + cipherOut.append(ciphertext[k]) + iput = output + elif mode == self.modeOfOperation["CBC"]: + for i in range(16): + if firstRound: + iput[i] = plaintext[i] ^ IV[i] + else: + iput[i] = plaintext[i] ^ ciphertext[i] + # print 'IP@%s:%s' % (j, iput) + firstRound = False + ciphertext = self.aes.encrypt(iput, key, size) + # always 16 bytes because of the padding for CBC + for k in range(16): + cipherOut.append(ciphertext[k]) + return mode, len(stringIn), cipherOut + + # Mode of Operation Decryption + # cipherIn - Encrypted String + # originalsize - The unencrypted string length - required for CBC + # mode - mode of type modeOfOperation + # key - a number array of the bit length size + # size - the bit length of the key + # IV - the 128 bit number array Initilization Vector + def decrypt(self, cipherIn, originalsize, mode, key, size, IV): + # cipherIn = unescCtrlChars(cipherIn) + if len(key) % size: + return None + if len(IV) % 16: + return None + # the AES input/output + ciphertext = [] + iput = [] + output = [] + plaintext = [0] * 16 + # the output plain text string + stringOut = '' + # char firstRound + firstRound = True + if cipherIn != None: + for j in range(int(math.ceil(float(len(cipherIn))/16))): + start = j*16 + end = j*16+16 + if j*16+16 > len(cipherIn): + end = len(cipherIn) + ciphertext = cipherIn[start:end] + if mode == self.modeOfOperation["CFB"]: + if firstRound: + output = self.aes.encrypt(IV, key, size) + firstRound = False + else: + output = self.aes.encrypt(iput, key, size) + for i in range(16): + if len(output)-1 < i: + plaintext[i] = 0 ^ ciphertext[i] + elif len(ciphertext)-1 < i: + plaintext[i] = output[i] ^ 0 + elif len(output)-1 < i and len(ciphertext) < i: + plaintext[i] = 0 ^ 0 + else: + plaintext[i] = output[i] ^ ciphertext[i] + for k in range(end-start): + stringOut += chr(plaintext[k]) + iput = ciphertext + elif mode == self.modeOfOperation["OFB"]: + if firstRound: + output = self.aes.encrypt(IV, key, size) + firstRound = False + else: + output = self.aes.encrypt(iput, key, size) + for i in range(16): + if len(output)-1 < i: + plaintext[i] = 0 ^ ciphertext[i] + elif len(ciphertext)-1 < i: + plaintext[i] = output[i] ^ 0 + elif len(output)-1 < i and len(ciphertext) < i: + plaintext[i] = 0 ^ 0 + else: + plaintext[i] = output[i] ^ ciphertext[i] + for k in range(end-start): + stringOut += chr(plaintext[k]) + iput = output + elif mode == self.modeOfOperation["CBC"]: + output = self.aes.decrypt(ciphertext, key, size) + for i in range(16): + if firstRound: + plaintext[i] = IV[i] ^ output[i] + else: + plaintext[i] = iput[i] ^ output[i] + firstRound = False + if originalsize is not None and originalsize < end: + for k in range(originalsize-start): + stringOut += chr(plaintext[k]) + else: + for k in range(end-start): + stringOut += chr(plaintext[k]) + iput = ciphertext + return stringOut + + +def encryptData(key, data, mode=AESModeOfOperation.modeOfOperation["CBC"]): + """encrypt `data` using `key` + + `key` should be a string of bytes. + + returned cipher is a string of bytes prepended with the initialization + vector. + + """ + key = map(ord, key) + if mode == AESModeOfOperation.modeOfOperation["CBC"]: + data = append_PKCS7_padding(data) + keysize = len(key) + assert keysize in AES.keySize.values(), 'invalid key size: %s' % keysize + # create a new iv using random data + iv = [ord(i) for i in os.urandom(16)] + moo = AESModeOfOperation() + (mode, length, ciph) = moo.encrypt(data, mode, key, keysize, iv) + # With padding, the original length does not need to be known. It's a bad + # idea to store the original message length. + # prepend the iv. + return ''.join(map(chr, iv)) + ''.join(map(chr, ciph)) + +def decryptData(key, data, mode=AESModeOfOperation.modeOfOperation["CBC"]): + """decrypt `data` using `key` + + `key` should be a string of bytes. + + `data` should have the initialization vector prepended as a string of + ordinal values. + + """ + + key = map(ord, key) + keysize = len(key) + assert keysize in AES.keySize.values(), 'invalid key size: %s' % keysize + # iv is first 16 bytes + iv = map(ord, data[:16]) + data = map(ord, data[16:]) + moo = AESModeOfOperation() + decr = moo.decrypt(data, None, mode, key, keysize, iv) + if mode == AESModeOfOperation.modeOfOperation["CBC"]: + decr = strip_PKCS7_padding(decr) + return decr + +def generateRandomKey(keysize): + """Generates a key from random data of length `keysize`. + + The returned key is a string of bytes. + + """ + if keysize not in (16, 24, 32): + emsg = 'Invalid keysize, %s. Should be one of (16, 24, 32).' + raise ValueError, emsg % keysize + return os.urandom(keysize) + +if __name__ == "__main__": + moo = AESModeOfOperation() + cleartext = "This is a test!" + cypherkey = [143,194,34,208,145,203,230,143,177,246,97,206,145,92,255,84] + iv = [103,35,148,239,76,213,47,118,255,222,123,176,106,134,98,92] + mode, orig_len, ciph = moo.encrypt(cleartext, moo.modeOfOperation["CBC"], + cypherkey, moo.aes.keySize["SIZE_128"], iv) + print 'm=%s, ol=%s (%s), ciph=%s' % (mode, orig_len, len(cleartext), ciph) + decr = moo.decrypt(ciph, orig_len, mode, cypherkey, + moo.aes.keySize["SIZE_128"], iv) + print decr (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/__init__.py b/ecdsa/__init__.py t@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ + +from keys import SigningKey, VerifyingKey, BadSignatureError, BadDigestError +from curves import NIST192p, NIST224p, NIST256p, NIST384p, NIST521p + +_hush_pyflakes = [SigningKey, VerifyingKey, BadSignatureError, BadDigestError, + NIST192p, NIST224p, NIST256p, NIST384p, NIST521p] +del _hush_pyflakes + +# This code comes from http://github.com/warner/python-ecdsa + +try: + from _version import __version__ as v + __version__ = v + del v +except ImportError: + __version__ = "UNKNOWN" (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/curves.py b/ecdsa/curves.py t@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +import der, ecdsa + +class UnknownCurveError(Exception): + pass + +def orderlen(order): + return (1+len("%x"%order))//2 # bytes + +# the NIST curves +class Curve: + def __init__(self, name, curve, generator, oid): + self.name = name + self.curve = curve + self.generator = generator + self.order = generator.order() + self.baselen = orderlen(self.order) + self.verifying_key_length = 2*self.baselen + self.signature_length = 2*self.baselen + self.oid = oid + self.encoded_oid = der.encode_oid(*oid) + +NIST192p = Curve("NIST192p", ecdsa.curve_192, ecdsa.generator_192, + (1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 1)) +NIST224p = Curve("NIST224p", ecdsa.curve_224, ecdsa.generator_224, + (1, 3, 132, 0, 33)) +NIST256p = Curve("NIST256p", ecdsa.curve_256, ecdsa.generator_256, + (1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7)) +NIST384p = Curve("NIST384p", ecdsa.curve_384, ecdsa.generator_384, + (1, 3, 132, 0, 34)) +NIST521p = Curve("NIST521p", ecdsa.curve_521, ecdsa.generator_521, + (1, 3, 132, 0, 35)) + +curves = [NIST192p, NIST224p, NIST256p, NIST384p, NIST521p] + +def find_curve(oid_curve): + for c in curves: + if c.oid == oid_curve: + return c + raise UnknownCurveError("I don't know about the curve with oid %s." + "I only know about these: %s" % + (oid_curve, [c.name for c in curves])) (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/der.py b/ecdsa/der.py t@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +import binascii +import base64 + +class UnexpectedDER(Exception): + pass + +def encode_constructed(tag, value): + return chr(0xa0+tag) + encode_length(len(value)) + value +def encode_integer(r): + assert r >= 0 # can't support negative numbers yet + h = "%x" % r + if len(h)%2: + h = "0" + h + s = binascii.unhexlify(h) + if ord(s[0]) <= 0x7f: + return "\x02" + chr(len(s)) + s + else: + # DER integers are two's complement, so if the first byte is + # 0x80-0xff then we need an extra 0x00 byte to prevent it from + # looking negative. + return "\x02" + chr(len(s)+1) + "\x00" + s + +def encode_bitstring(s): + return "\x03" + encode_length(len(s)) + s +def encode_octet_string(s): + return "\x04" + encode_length(len(s)) + s +def encode_oid(first, second, *pieces): + assert first <= 2 + assert second <= 39 + encoded_pieces = [chr(40*first+second)] + [encode_number(p) + for p in pieces] + body = "".join(encoded_pieces) + return "\x06" + encode_length(len(body)) + body +def encode_sequence(*encoded_pieces): + total_len = sum([len(p) for p in encoded_pieces]) + return "\x30" + encode_length(total_len) + "".join(encoded_pieces) +def encode_number(n): + b128_digits = [] + while n: + b128_digits.insert(0, (n & 0x7f) | 0x80) + n = n >> 7 + if not b128_digits: + b128_digits.append(0) + b128_digits[-1] &= 0x7f + return "".join([chr(d) for d in b128_digits]) + +def remove_constructed(string): + s0 = ord(string[0]) + if (s0 & 0xe0) != 0xa0: + raise UnexpectedDER("wanted constructed tag (0xa0-0xbf), got 0x%02x" + % s0) + tag = s0 & 0x1f + length, llen = read_length(string[1:]) + body = string[1+llen:1+llen+length] + rest = string[1+llen+length:] + return tag, body, rest + +def remove_sequence(string): + if not string.startswith("\x30"): + raise UnexpectedDER("wanted sequence (0x30), got 0x%02x" % + ord(string[0])) + length, lengthlength = read_length(string[1:]) + endseq = 1+lengthlength+length + return string[1+lengthlength:endseq], string[endseq:] + +def remove_octet_string(string): + if not string.startswith("\x04"): + raise UnexpectedDER("wanted octetstring (0x04), got 0x%02x" % + ord(string[0])) + length, llen = read_length(string[1:]) + body = string[1+llen:1+llen+length] + rest = string[1+llen+length:] + return body, rest + +def remove_object(string): + if not string.startswith("\x06"): + raise UnexpectedDER("wanted object (0x06), got 0x%02x" % + ord(string[0])) + length, lengthlength = read_length(string[1:]) + body = string[1+lengthlength:1+lengthlength+length] + rest = string[1+lengthlength+length:] + numbers = [] + while body: + n, ll = read_number(body) + numbers.append(n) + body = body[ll:] + n0 = numbers.pop(0) + first = n0//40 + second = n0-(40*first) + numbers.insert(0, first) + numbers.insert(1, second) + return tuple(numbers), rest + +def remove_integer(string): + if not string.startswith("\x02"): + raise UnexpectedDER("wanted integer (0x02), got 0x%02x" % + ord(string[0])) + length, llen = read_length(string[1:]) + numberbytes = string[1+llen:1+llen+length] + rest = string[1+llen+length:] + assert ord(numberbytes[0]) < 0x80 # can't support negative numbers yet + return int(binascii.hexlify(numberbytes), 16), rest + +def read_number(string): + number = 0 + llen = 0 + # base-128 big endian, with b7 set in all but the last byte + while True: + if llen > len(string): + raise UnexpectedDER("ran out of length bytes") + number = number << 7 + d = ord(string[llen]) + number += (d & 0x7f) + llen += 1 + if not d & 0x80: + break + return number, llen + +def encode_length(l): + assert l >= 0 + if l < 0x80: + return chr(l) + s = "%x" % l + if len(s)%2: + s = "0"+s + s = binascii.unhexlify(s) + llen = len(s) + return chr(0x80|llen) + s + +def read_length(string): + if not (ord(string[0]) & 0x80): + # short form + return (ord(string[0]) & 0x7f), 1 + # else long-form: b0&0x7f is number of additional base256 length bytes, + # big-endian + llen = ord(string[0]) & 0x7f + if llen > len(string)-1: + raise UnexpectedDER("ran out of length bytes") + return int(binascii.hexlify(string[1:1+llen]), 16), 1+llen + +def remove_bitstring(string): + if not string.startswith("\x03"): + raise UnexpectedDER("wanted bitstring (0x03), got 0x%02x" % + ord(string[0])) + length, llen = read_length(string[1:]) + body = string[1+llen:1+llen+length] + rest = string[1+llen+length:] + return body, rest + +# SEQUENCE([1, STRING(secexp), cont[0], OBJECT(curvename), cont[1], BINTSTRING) + + +# signatures: (from RFC3279) +# ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +# iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 } +# +# id-ecSigType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +# ansi-X9-62 signatures(4) } +# ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +# id-ecSigType 1 } +## so 1,2,840,10045,4,1 +## so 0x42, .. .. + +# Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { +# r INTEGER, +# s INTEGER } + +# id-public-key-type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-X9.62 2 } +# +# id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-publicKeyType 1 } + +# I think the secp224r1 identifier is (t=06,l=05,v=2b81040021) +# secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +# iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } +# and the secp384r1 is (t=06,l=05,v=2b81040022) +# secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +# iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } + +def unpem(pem): + d = "".join([l.strip() for l in pem.split("\n") + if l and not l.startswith("-----")]) + return base64.b64decode(d) +def topem(der, name): + b64 = base64.b64encode(der) + lines = ["-----BEGIN %s-----\n" % name] + lines.extend([b64[start:start+64]+"\n" + for start in range(0, len(b64), 64)]) + lines.append("-----END %s-----\n" % name) + return "".join(lines) + (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/ecdsa.py b/ecdsa/ecdsa.py t@@ -0,0 +1,560 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env python +""" +Implementation of Elliptic-Curve Digital Signatures. + +Classes and methods for elliptic-curve signatures: +private keys, public keys, signatures, +NIST prime-modulus curves with modulus lengths of +192, 224, 256, 384, and 521 bits. + +Example: + + # (In real-life applications, you would probably want to + # protect against defects in SystemRandom.) + from random import SystemRandom + randrange = SystemRandom().randrange + + # Generate a public/private key pair using the NIST Curve P-192: + + g = generator_192 + n = g.order() + secret = randrange( 1, n ) + pubkey = Public_key( g, g * secret ) + privkey = Private_key( pubkey, secret ) + + # Signing a hash value: + + hash = randrange( 1, n ) + signature = privkey.sign( hash, randrange( 1, n ) ) + + # Verifying a signature for a hash value: + + if pubkey.verifies( hash, signature ): + print "Demo verification succeeded." + else: + print "*** Demo verification failed." + + # Verification fails if the hash value is modified: + + if pubkey.verifies( hash-1, signature ): + print "**** Demo verification failed to reject tampered hash." + else: + print "Demo verification correctly rejected tampered hash." + +Version of 2009.05.16. + +Revision history: + 2005.12.31 - Initial version. + 2008.11.25 - Substantial revisions introducing new classes. + 2009.05.16 - Warn against using random.randrange in real applications. + 2009.05.17 - Use random.SystemRandom by default. + +Written in 2005 by Peter Pearson and placed in the public domain. +""" + + +import ellipticcurve +import numbertheory +import random + + + +class Signature( object ): + """ECDSA signature. + """ + def __init__( self, r, s ): + self.r = r + self.s = s + + + +class Public_key( object ): + """Public key for ECDSA. + """ + + def __init__( self, generator, point ): + """generator is the Point that generates the group, + point is the Point that defines the public key. + """ + + self.curve = generator.curve() + self.generator = generator + self.point = point + n = generator.order() + if not n: + raise RuntimeError, "Generator point must have order." + if not n * point == ellipticcurve.INFINITY: + raise RuntimeError, "Generator point order is bad." + if point.x() < 0 or n <= point.x() or point.y() < 0 or n <= point.y(): + raise RuntimeError, "Generator point has x or y out of range." + + + def verifies( self, hash, signature ): + """Verify that signature is a valid signature of hash. + Return True if the signature is valid. + """ + + # From X9.62 J.3.1. + + G = self.generator + n = G.order() + r = signature.r + s = signature.s + if r < 1 or r > n-1: return False + if s < 1 or s > n-1: return False + c = numbertheory.inverse_mod( s, n ) + u1 = ( hash * c ) % n + u2 = ( r * c ) % n + xy = u1 * G + u2 * self.point + v = xy.x() % n + return v == r + + + +class Private_key( object ): + """Private key for ECDSA. + """ + + def __init__( self, public_key, secret_multiplier ): + """public_key is of class Public_key; + secret_multiplier is a large integer. + """ + + self.public_key = public_key + self.secret_multiplier = secret_multiplier + + def sign( self, hash, random_k ): + """Return a signature for the provided hash, using the provided + random nonce. It is absolutely vital that random_k be an unpredictable + number in the range [1, self.public_key.point.order()-1]. If + an attacker can guess random_k, he can compute our private key from a + single signature. Also, if an attacker knows a few high-order + bits (or a few low-order bits) of random_k, he can compute our private + key from many signatures. The generation of nonces with adequate + cryptographic strength is very difficult and far beyond the scope + of this comment. + + May raise RuntimeError, in which case retrying with a new + random value k is in order. + """ + + G = self.public_key.generator + n = G.order() + k = random_k % n + p1 = k * G + r = p1.x() + if r == 0: raise RuntimeError, "amazingly unlucky random number r" + s = ( numbertheory.inverse_mod( k, n ) * \ + ( hash + ( self.secret_multiplier * r ) % n ) ) % n + if s == 0: raise RuntimeError, "amazingly unlucky random number s" + return Signature( r, s ) + + + +def int_to_string( x ): + """Convert integer x into a string of bytes, as per X9.62.""" + assert x >= 0 + if x == 0: return chr(0) + result = "" + while x > 0: + q, r = divmod( x, 256 ) + result = chr( r ) + result + x = q + return result + + +def string_to_int( s ): + """Convert a string of bytes into an integer, as per X9.62.""" + result = 0L + for c in s: result = 256 * result + ord( c ) + return result + + +def digest_integer( m ): + """Convert an integer into a string of bytes, compute + its SHA-1 hash, and convert the result to an integer.""" + # + # I don't expect this function to be used much. I wrote + # it in order to be able to duplicate the examples + # in ECDSAVS. + # + from hashlib import sha1 + return string_to_int( sha1( int_to_string( m ) ).digest() ) + + +def point_is_valid( generator, x, y ): + """Is (x,y) a valid public key based on the specified generator?""" + + # These are the tests specified in X9.62. + + n = generator.order() + curve = generator.curve() + if x < 0 or n <= x or y < 0 or n <= y: + return False + if not curve.contains_point( x, y ): + return False + if not n*ellipticcurve.Point( curve, x, y ) == \ + ellipticcurve.INFINITY: + return False + return True + + + +# NIST Curve P-192: +_p = 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279L +_r = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081L +# s = 0x3045ae6fc8422f64ed579528d38120eae12196d5L +# c = 0x3099d2bbbfcb2538542dcd5fb078b6ef5f3d6fe2c745de65L +_b = 0x64210519e59c80e70fa7e9ab72243049feb8deecc146b9b1L +_Gx = 0x188da80eb03090f67cbf20eb43a18800f4ff0afd82ff1012L +_Gy = 0x07192b95ffc8da78631011ed6b24cdd573f977a11e794811L + +curve_192 = ellipticcurve.CurveFp( _p, -3, _b ) +generator_192 = ellipticcurve.Point( curve_192, _Gx, _Gy, _r ) + + +# NIST Curve P-224: +_p = 26959946667150639794667015087019630673557916260026308143510066298881L +_r = 26959946667150639794667015087019625940457807714424391721682722368061L +# s = 0xbd71344799d5c7fcdc45b59fa3b9ab8f6a948bc5L +# c = 0x5b056c7e11dd68f40469ee7f3c7a7d74f7d121116506d031218291fbL +_b = 0xb4050a850c04b3abf54132565044b0b7d7bfd8ba270b39432355ffb4L +_Gx =0xb70e0cbd6bb4bf7f321390b94a03c1d356c21122343280d6115c1d21L +_Gy = 0xbd376388b5f723fb4c22dfe6cd4375a05a07476444d5819985007e34L + +curve_224 = ellipticcurve.CurveFp( _p, -3, _b ) +generator_224 = ellipticcurve.Point( curve_224, _Gx, _Gy, _r ) + +# NIST Curve P-256: +_p = 115792089210356248762697446949407573530086143415290314195533631308867097853951L +_r = 115792089210356248762697446949407573529996955224135760342422259061068512044369L +# s = 0xc49d360886e704936a6678e1139d26b7819f7e90L +# c = 0x7efba1662985be9403cb055c75d4f7e0ce8d84a9c5114abcaf3177680104fa0dL +_b = 0x5ac635d8aa3a93e7b3ebbd55769886bc651d06b0cc53b0f63bce3c3e27d2604bL +_Gx = 0x6b17d1f2e12c4247f8bce6e563a440f277037d812deb33a0f4a13945d898c296L +_Gy = 0x4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f5L + +curve_256 = ellipticcurve.CurveFp( _p, -3, _b ) +generator_256 = ellipticcurve.Point( curve_256, _Gx, _Gy, _r ) + +# NIST Curve P-384: +_p = 39402006196394479212279040100143613805079739270465446667948293404245721771496870329047266088258938001861606973112319L +_r = 39402006196394479212279040100143613805079739270465446667946905279627659399113263569398956308152294913554433653942643L +# s = 0xa335926aa319a27a1d00896a6773a4827acdac73L +# c = 0x79d1e655f868f02fff48dcdee14151ddb80643c1406d0ca10dfe6fc52009540a495e8042ea5f744f6e184667cc722483L +_b = 0xb3312fa7e23ee7e4988e056be3f82d19181d9c6efe8141120314088f5013875ac656398d8a2ed19d2a85c8edd3ec2aefL +_Gx = 0xaa87ca22be8b05378eb1c71ef320ad746e1d3b628ba79b9859f741e082542a385502f25dbf55296c3a545e3872760ab7L +_Gy = 0x3617de4a96262c6f5d9e98bf9292dc29f8f41dbd289a147ce9da3113b5f0b8c00a60b1ce1d7e819d7a431d7c90ea0e5fL + +curve_384 = ellipticcurve.CurveFp( _p, -3, _b ) +generator_384 = ellipticcurve.Point( curve_384, _Gx, _Gy, _r ) + +# NIST Curve P-521: +_p = 6864797660130609714981900799081393217269435300143305409394463459185543183397656052122559640661454554977296311391480858037121987999716643812574028291115057151L +_r = 6864797660130609714981900799081393217269435300143305409394463459185543183397655394245057746333217197532963996371363321113864768612440380340372808892707005449L +# s = 0xd09e8800291cb85396cc6717393284aaa0da64baL +# c = 0x0b48bfa5f420a34949539d2bdfc264eeeeb077688e44fbf0ad8f6d0edb37bd6b533281000518e19f1b9ffbe0fe9ed8a3c2200b8f875e523868c70c1e5bf55bad637L +_b = 0x051953eb9618e1c9a1f929a21a0b68540eea2da725b99b315f3b8b489918ef109e156193951ec7e937b1652c0bd3bb1bf073573df883d2c34f1ef451fd46b503f00L +_Gx = 0xc6858e06b70404e9cd9e3ecb662395b4429c648139053fb521f828af606b4d3dbaa14b5e77efe75928fe1dc127a2ffa8de3348b3c1856a429bf97e7e31c2e5bd66L +_Gy = 0x11839296a789a3bc0045c8a5fb42c7d1bd998f54449579b446817afbd17273e662c97ee72995ef42640c550b9013fad0761353c7086a272c24088be94769fd16650L + +curve_521 = ellipticcurve.CurveFp( _p, -3, _b ) +generator_521 = ellipticcurve.Point( curve_521, _Gx, _Gy, _r ) + + + +def __main__(): + class TestFailure(Exception): pass + + def test_point_validity( generator, x, y, expected ): + """generator defines the curve; is (x,y) a point on + this curve? "expected" is True if the right answer is Yes.""" + if point_is_valid( generator, x, y ) == expected: + print "Point validity tested as expected." + else: + raise TestFailure("*** Point validity test gave wrong result.") + + def test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, expected ): + """Msg = message, Qx and Qy represent the base point on + elliptic curve c192, R and S are the signature, and + "expected" is True iff the signature is expected to be valid.""" + pubk = Public_key( generator_192, + ellipticcurve.Point( curve_192, Qx, Qy ) ) + got = pubk.verifies( digest_integer( Msg ), Signature( R, S ) ) + if got == expected: + print "Signature tested as expected: got %s, expected %s." % \ + ( got, expected ) + else: + raise TestFailure("*** Signature test failed: got %s, expected %s." % \ + ( got, expected )) + + print "NIST Curve P-192:" + + p192 = generator_192 + + # From X9.62: + + d = 651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659L + Q = d * p192 + if Q.x() != 0x62B12D60690CDCF330BABAB6E69763B471F994DD702D16A5L: + raise TestFailure("*** p192 * d came out wrong.") + else: + print "p192 * d came out right." + + k = 6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654L + R = k * p192 + if R.x() != 0x885052380FF147B734C330C43D39B2C4A89F29B0F749FEADL \ + or R.y() != 0x9CF9FA1CBEFEFB917747A3BB29C072B9289C2547884FD835L: + raise TestFailure("*** k * p192 came out wrong.") + else: + print "k * p192 came out right." + + u1 = 2563697409189434185194736134579731015366492496392189760599L + u2 = 6266643813348617967186477710235785849136406323338782220568L + temp = u1 * p192 + u2 * Q + if temp.x() != 0x885052380FF147B734C330C43D39B2C4A89F29B0F749FEADL \ + or temp.y() != 0x9CF9FA1CBEFEFB917747A3BB29C072B9289C2547884FD835L: + raise TestFailure("*** u1 * p192 + u2 * Q came out wrong.") + else: + print "u1 * p192 + u2 * Q came out right." + + e = 968236873715988614170569073515315707566766479517L + pubk = Public_key( generator_192, generator_192 * d ) + privk = Private_key( pubk, d ) + sig = privk.sign( e, k ) + r, s = sig.r, sig.s + if r != 3342403536405981729393488334694600415596881826869351677613L \ + or s != 5735822328888155254683894997897571951568553642892029982342L: + raise TestFailure("*** r or s came out wrong.") + else: + print "r and s came out right." + + valid = pubk.verifies( e, sig ) + if valid: print "Signature verified OK." + else: raise TestFailure("*** Signature failed verification.") + + valid = pubk.verifies( e-1, sig ) + if not valid: print "Forgery was correctly rejected." + else: raise TestFailure("*** Forgery was erroneously accepted.") + + print "Testing point validity, as per ECDSAVS.pdf B.2.2:" + + test_point_validity( \ + p192, \ + 0xcd6d0f029a023e9aaca429615b8f577abee685d8257cc83aL, \ + 0x00019c410987680e9fb6c0b6ecc01d9a2647c8bae27721bacdfcL, \ + False ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0x00017f2fce203639e9eaf9fb50b81fc32776b30e3b02af16c73bL, \ + 0x95da95c5e72dd48e229d4748d4eee658a9a54111b23b2adbL, \ + False ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0x4f77f8bc7fccbadd5760f4938746d5f253ee2168c1cf2792L, \ + 0x000147156ff824d131629739817edb197717c41aab5c2a70f0f6L, \ + False ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0xc58d61f88d905293bcd4cd0080bcb1b7f811f2ffa41979f6L, \ + 0x8804dc7a7c4c7f8b5d437f5156f3312ca7d6de8a0e11867fL, \ + True ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0xcdf56c1aa3d8afc53c521adf3ffb96734a6a630a4a5b5a70L, \ + 0x97c1c44a5fb229007b5ec5d25f7413d170068ffd023caa4eL, \ + True ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0x89009c0dc361c81e99280c8e91df578df88cdf4b0cdedcedL, \ + 0x27be44a529b7513e727251f128b34262a0fd4d8ec82377b9L, \ + True ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0x6a223d00bd22c52833409a163e057e5b5da1def2a197dd15L, \ + 0x7b482604199367f1f303f9ef627f922f97023e90eae08abfL, \ + True ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0x6dccbde75c0948c98dab32ea0bc59fe125cf0fb1a3798edaL, \ + 0x0001171a3e0fa60cf3096f4e116b556198de430e1fbd330c8835L, \ + False ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0xd266b39e1f491fc4acbbbc7d098430931cfa66d55015af12L, \ + 0x193782eb909e391a3148b7764e6b234aa94e48d30a16dbb2L, \ + False ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0x9d6ddbcd439baa0c6b80a654091680e462a7d1d3f1ffeb43L, \ + 0x6ad8efc4d133ccf167c44eb4691c80abffb9f82b932b8caaL, \ + False ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0x146479d944e6bda87e5b35818aa666a4c998a71f4e95edbcL, \ + 0xa86d6fe62bc8fbd88139693f842635f687f132255858e7f6L, \ + False ) + + test_point_validity( + p192, \ + 0xe594d4a598046f3598243f50fd2c7bd7d380edb055802253L, \ + 0x509014c0c4d6b536e3ca750ec09066af39b4c8616a53a923L, \ + False ) + + print "Trying signature-verification tests from ECDSAVS.pdf B.2.4:" + print "P-192:" + Msg = 0x84ce72aa8699df436059f052ac51b6398d2511e49631bcb7e71f89c499b9ee425dfbc13a5f6d408471b054f2655617cbbaf7937b7c80cd8865cf02c8487d30d2b0fbd8b2c4e102e16d828374bbc47b93852f212d5043c3ea720f086178ff798cc4f63f787b9c2e419efa033e7644ea7936f54462dc21a6c4580725f7f0e7d158L + Qx = 0xd9dbfb332aa8e5ff091e8ce535857c37c73f6250ffb2e7acL + Qy = 0x282102e364feded3ad15ddf968f88d8321aa268dd483ebc4L + R = 0x64dca58a20787c488d11d6dd96313f1b766f2d8efe122916L + S = 0x1ecba28141e84ab4ecad92f56720e2cc83eb3d22dec72479L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, True ) + + Msg = 0x94bb5bacd5f8ea765810024db87f4224ad71362a3c28284b2b9f39fab86db12e8beb94aae899768229be8fdb6c4f12f28912bb604703a79ccff769c1607f5a91450f30ba0460d359d9126cbd6296be6d9c4bb96c0ee74cbb44197c207f6db326ab6f5a659113a9034e54be7b041ced9dcf6458d7fb9cbfb2744d999f7dfd63f4L + Qx = 0x3e53ef8d3112af3285c0e74842090712cd324832d4277ae7L + Qy = 0xcc75f8952d30aec2cbb719fc6aa9934590b5d0ff5a83adb7L + R = 0x8285261607283ba18f335026130bab31840dcfd9c3e555afL + S = 0x356d89e1b04541afc9704a45e9c535ce4a50929e33d7e06cL + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, True ) + + Msg = 0xf6227a8eeb34afed1621dcc89a91d72ea212cb2f476839d9b4243c66877911b37b4ad6f4448792a7bbba76c63bdd63414b6facab7dc71c3396a73bd7ee14cdd41a659c61c99b779cecf07bc51ab391aa3252386242b9853ea7da67fd768d303f1b9b513d401565b6f1eb722dfdb96b519fe4f9bd5de67ae131e64b40e78c42ddL + Qx = 0x16335dbe95f8e8254a4e04575d736befb258b8657f773cb7L + Qy = 0x421b13379c59bc9dce38a1099ca79bbd06d647c7f6242336L + R = 0x4141bd5d64ea36c5b0bd21ef28c02da216ed9d04522b1e91L + S = 0x159a6aa852bcc579e821b7bb0994c0861fb08280c38daa09L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x16b5f93afd0d02246f662761ed8e0dd9504681ed02a253006eb36736b563097ba39f81c8e1bce7a16c1339e345efabbc6baa3efb0612948ae51103382a8ee8bc448e3ef71e9f6f7a9676694831d7f5dd0db5446f179bcb737d4a526367a447bfe2c857521c7f40b6d7d7e01a180d92431fb0bbd29c04a0c420a57b3ed26ccd8aL + Qx = 0xfd14cdf1607f5efb7b1793037b15bdf4baa6f7c16341ab0bL + Qy = 0x83fa0795cc6c4795b9016dac928fd6bac32f3229a96312c4L + R = 0x8dfdb832951e0167c5d762a473c0416c5c15bc1195667dc1L + S = 0x1720288a2dc13fa1ec78f763f8fe2ff7354a7e6fdde44520L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x08a2024b61b79d260e3bb43ef15659aec89e5b560199bc82cf7c65c77d39192e03b9a895d766655105edd9188242b91fbde4167f7862d4ddd61e5d4ab55196683d4f13ceb90d87aea6e07eb50a874e33086c4a7cb0273a8e1c4408f4b846bceae1ebaac1b2b2ea851a9b09de322efe34cebe601653efd6ddc876ce8c2f2072fbL + Qx = 0x674f941dc1a1f8b763c9334d726172d527b90ca324db8828L + Qy = 0x65adfa32e8b236cb33a3e84cf59bfb9417ae7e8ede57a7ffL + R = 0x9508b9fdd7daf0d8126f9e2bc5a35e4c6d800b5b804d7796L + S = 0x36f2bf6b21b987c77b53bb801b3435a577e3d493744bfab0L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x1843aba74b0789d4ac6b0b8923848023a644a7b70afa23b1191829bbe4397ce15b629bf21a8838298653ed0c19222b95fa4f7390d1b4c844d96e645537e0aae98afb5c0ac3bd0e4c37f8daaff25556c64e98c319c52687c904c4de7240a1cc55cd9756b7edaef184e6e23b385726e9ffcba8001b8f574987c1a3fedaaa83ca6dL + Qx = 0x10ecca1aad7220b56a62008b35170bfd5e35885c4014a19fL + Qy = 0x04eb61984c6c12ade3bc47f3c629ece7aa0a033b9948d686L + R = 0x82bfa4e82c0dfe9274169b86694e76ce993fd83b5c60f325L + S = 0xa97685676c59a65dbde002fe9d613431fb183e8006d05633L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x5a478f4084ddd1a7fea038aa9732a822106385797d02311aeef4d0264f824f698df7a48cfb6b578cf3da416bc0799425bb491be5b5ecc37995b85b03420a98f2c4dc5c31a69a379e9e322fbe706bbcaf0f77175e05cbb4fa162e0da82010a278461e3e974d137bc746d1880d6eb02aa95216014b37480d84b87f717bb13f76e1L + Qx = 0x6636653cb5b894ca65c448277b29da3ad101c4c2300f7c04L + Qy = 0xfdf1cbb3fc3fd6a4f890b59e554544175fa77dbdbeb656c1L + R = 0xeac2ddecddfb79931a9c3d49c08de0645c783a24cb365e1cL + S = 0x3549fee3cfa7e5f93bc47d92d8ba100e881a2a93c22f8d50L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0xc598774259a058fa65212ac57eaa4f52240e629ef4c310722088292d1d4af6c39b49ce06ba77e4247b20637174d0bd67c9723feb57b5ead232b47ea452d5d7a089f17c00b8b6767e434a5e16c231ba0efa718a340bf41d67ea2d295812ff1b9277daacb8bc27b50ea5e6443bcf95ef4e9f5468fe78485236313d53d1c68f6ba2L + Qx = 0xa82bd718d01d354001148cd5f69b9ebf38ff6f21898f8aaaL + Qy = 0xe67ceede07fc2ebfafd62462a51e4b6c6b3d5b537b7caf3eL + R = 0x4d292486c620c3de20856e57d3bb72fcde4a73ad26376955L + S = 0xa85289591a6081d5728825520e62ff1c64f94235c04c7f95L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0xca98ed9db081a07b7557f24ced6c7b9891269a95d2026747add9e9eb80638a961cf9c71a1b9f2c29744180bd4c3d3db60f2243c5c0b7cc8a8d40a3f9a7fc910250f2187136ee6413ffc67f1a25e1c4c204fa9635312252ac0e0481d89b6d53808f0c496ba87631803f6c572c1f61fa049737fdacce4adff757afed4f05beb658L + Qx = 0x7d3b016b57758b160c4fca73d48df07ae3b6b30225126c2fL + Qy = 0x4af3790d9775742bde46f8da876711be1b65244b2b39e7ecL + R = 0x95f778f5f656511a5ab49a5d69ddd0929563c29cbc3a9e62L + S = 0x75c87fc358c251b4c83d2dd979faad496b539f9f2ee7a289L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x31dd9a54c8338bea06b87eca813d555ad1850fac9742ef0bbe40dad400e10288acc9c11ea7dac79eb16378ebea9490e09536099f1b993e2653cd50240014c90a9c987f64545abc6a536b9bd2435eb5e911fdfde2f13be96ea36ad38df4ae9ea387b29cced599af777338af2794820c9cce43b51d2112380a35802ab7e396c97aL + Qx = 0x9362f28c4ef96453d8a2f849f21e881cd7566887da8beb4aL + Qy = 0xe64d26d8d74c48a024ae85d982ee74cd16046f4ee5333905L + R = 0xf3923476a296c88287e8de914b0b324ad5a963319a4fe73bL + S = 0xf0baeed7624ed00d15244d8ba2aede085517dbdec8ac65f5L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, True ) + + Msg = 0xb2b94e4432267c92f9fdb9dc6040c95ffa477652761290d3c7de312283f6450d89cc4aabe748554dfb6056b2d8e99c7aeaad9cdddebdee9dbc099839562d9064e68e7bb5f3a6bba0749ca9a538181fc785553a4000785d73cc207922f63e8ce1112768cb1de7b673aed83a1e4a74592f1268d8e2a4e9e63d414b5d442bd0456dL + Qx = 0xcc6fc032a846aaac25533eb033522824f94e670fa997ecefL + Qy = 0xe25463ef77a029eccda8b294fd63dd694e38d223d30862f1L + R = 0x066b1d07f3a40e679b620eda7f550842a35c18b80c5ebe06L + S = 0xa0b0fb201e8f2df65e2c4508ef303bdc90d934016f16b2dcL + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x4366fcadf10d30d086911de30143da6f579527036937007b337f7282460eae5678b15cccda853193ea5fc4bc0a6b9d7a31128f27e1214988592827520b214eed5052f7775b750b0c6b15f145453ba3fee24a085d65287e10509eb5d5f602c440341376b95c24e5c4727d4b859bfe1483d20538acdd92c7997fa9c614f0f839d7L + Qx = 0x955c908fe900a996f7e2089bee2f6376830f76a19135e753L + Qy = 0xba0c42a91d3847de4a592a46dc3fdaf45a7cc709b90de520L + R = 0x1f58ad77fc04c782815a1405b0925e72095d906cbf52a668L + S = 0xf2e93758b3af75edf784f05a6761c9b9a6043c66b845b599L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x543f8af57d750e33aa8565e0cae92bfa7a1ff78833093421c2942cadf9986670a5ff3244c02a8225e790fbf30ea84c74720abf99cfd10d02d34377c3d3b41269bea763384f372bb786b5846f58932defa68023136cd571863b304886e95e52e7877f445b9364b3f06f3c28da12707673fecb4b8071de06b6e0a3c87da160cef3L + Qx = 0x31f7fa05576d78a949b24812d4383107a9a45bb5fccdd835L + Qy = 0x8dc0eb65994a90f02b5e19bd18b32d61150746c09107e76bL + R = 0xbe26d59e4e883dde7c286614a767b31e49ad88789d3a78ffL + S = 0x8762ca831c1ce42df77893c9b03119428e7a9b819b619068L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0xd2e8454143ce281e609a9d748014dcebb9d0bc53adb02443a6aac2ffe6cb009f387c346ecb051791404f79e902ee333ad65e5c8cb38dc0d1d39a8dc90add5023572720e5b94b190d43dd0d7873397504c0c7aef2727e628eb6a74411f2e400c65670716cb4a815dc91cbbfeb7cfe8c929e93184c938af2c078584da045e8f8d1L + Qx = 0x66aa8edbbdb5cf8e28ceb51b5bda891cae2df84819fe25c0L + Qy = 0x0c6bc2f69030a7ce58d4a00e3b3349844784a13b8936f8daL + R = 0xa4661e69b1734f4a71b788410a464b71e7ffe42334484f23L + S = 0x738421cf5e049159d69c57a915143e226cac8355e149afe9L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + Msg = 0x6660717144040f3e2f95a4e25b08a7079c702a8b29babad5a19a87654bc5c5afa261512a11b998a4fb36b5d8fe8bd942792ff0324b108120de86d63f65855e5461184fc96a0a8ffd2ce6d5dfb0230cbbdd98f8543e361b3205f5da3d500fdc8bac6db377d75ebef3cb8f4d1ff738071ad0938917889250b41dd1d98896ca06fbL + Qx = 0xbcfacf45139b6f5f690a4c35a5fffa498794136a2353fc77L + Qy = 0x6f4a6c906316a6afc6d98fe1f0399d056f128fe0270b0f22L + R = 0x9db679a3dafe48f7ccad122933acfe9da0970b71c94c21c1L + S = 0x984c2db99827576c0a41a5da41e07d8cc768bc82f18c9da9L + test_signature_validity( Msg, Qx, Qy, R, S, False ) + + + + print "Testing the example code:" + + # Building a public/private key pair from the NIST Curve P-192: + + g = generator_192 + n = g.order() + + # (random.SystemRandom is supposed to provide + # crypto-quality random numbers, but as Debian recently + # illustrated, a systems programmer can accidentally + # demolish this security, so in serious applications + # further precautions are appropriate.) + + randrange = random.SystemRandom().randrange + + secret = randrange( 1, n ) + pubkey = Public_key( g, g * secret ) + privkey = Private_key( pubkey, secret ) + + # Signing a hash value: + + hash = randrange( 1, n ) + signature = privkey.sign( hash, randrange( 1, n ) ) + + # Verifying a signature for a hash value: + + if pubkey.verifies( hash, signature ): + print "Demo verification succeeded." + else: + raise TestFailure("*** Demo verification failed.") + + if pubkey.verifies( hash-1, signature ): + raise TestFailure( "**** Demo verification failed to reject tampered hash.") + else: + print "Demo verification correctly rejected tampered hash." + +if __name__ == "__main__": + __main__() (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/ellipticcurve.py b/ecdsa/ellipticcurve.py t@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env python +# +# Implementation of elliptic curves, for cryptographic applications. +# +# This module doesn't provide any way to choose a random elliptic +# curve, nor to verify that an elliptic curve was chosen randomly, +# because one can simply use NIST's standard curves. +# +# Notes from X9.62-1998 (draft): +# Nomenclature: +# - Q is a public key. +# The "Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters" include: +# - q is the "field size", which in our case equals p. +# - p is a big prime. +# - G is a point of prime order (5.1.1.1). +# - n is the order of G (5.1.1.1). +# Public-key validation (5.2.2): +# - Verify that Q is not the point at infinity. +# - Verify that X_Q and Y_Q are in [0,p-1]. +# - Verify that Q is on the curve. +# - Verify that nQ is the point at infinity. +# Signature generation (5.3): +# - Pick random k from [1,n-1]. +# Signature checking (5.4.2): +# - Verify that r and s are in [1,n-1]. +# +# Version of 2008.11.25. +# +# Revision history: +# 2005.12.31 - Initial version. +# 2008.11.25 - Change CurveFp.is_on to contains_point. +# +# Written in 2005 by Peter Pearson and placed in the public domain. + +import numbertheory + +class CurveFp( object ): + """Elliptic Curve over the field of integers modulo a prime.""" + def __init__( self, p, a, b ): + """The curve of points satisfying y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b (mod p).""" + self.__p = p + self.__a = a + self.__b = b + + def p( self ): + return self.__p + + def a( self ): + return self.__a + + def b( self ): + return self.__b + + def contains_point( self, x, y ): + """Is the point (x,y) on this curve?""" + return ( y * y - ( x * x * x + self.__a * x + self.__b ) ) % self.__p == 0 + + + +class Point( object ): + """A point on an elliptic curve. Altering x and y is forbidding, + but they can be read by the x() and y() methods.""" + def __init__( self, curve, x, y, order = None ): + """curve, x, y, order; order (optional) is the order of this point.""" + self.__curve = curve + self.__x = x + self.__y = y + self.__order = order + # self.curve is allowed to be None only for INFINITY: + if self.__curve: assert self.__curve.contains_point( x, y ) + if order: assert self * order == INFINITY + + def __cmp__( self, other ): + """Return 0 if the points are identical, 1 otherwise.""" + if self.__curve == other.__curve \ + and self.__x == other.__x \ + and self.__y == other.__y: + return 0 + else: + return 1 + + def __add__( self, other ): + """Add one point to another point.""" + + # X9.62 B.3: + + if other == INFINITY: return self + if self == INFINITY: return other + assert self.__curve == other.__curve + if self.__x == other.__x: + if ( self.__y + other.__y ) % self.__curve.p() == 0: + return INFINITY + else: + return self.double() + + p = self.__curve.p() + + l = ( ( other.__y - self.__y ) * \ + numbertheory.inverse_mod( other.__x - self.__x, p ) ) % p + + x3 = ( l * l - self.__x - other.__x ) % p + y3 = ( l * ( self.__x - x3 ) - self.__y ) % p + + return Point( self.__curve, x3, y3 ) + + def __mul__( self, other ): + """Multiply a point by an integer.""" + + def leftmost_bit( x ): + assert x > 0 + result = 1L + while result <= x: result = 2 * result + return result // 2 + + e = other + if self.__order: e = e % self.__order + if e == 0: return INFINITY + if self == INFINITY: return INFINITY + assert e > 0 + + # From X9.62 D.3.2: + + e3 = 3 * e + negative_self = Point( self.__curve, self.__x, -self.__y, self.__order ) + i = leftmost_bit( e3 ) // 2 + result = self + # print "Multiplying %s by %d (e3 = %d):" % ( self, other, e3 ) + while i > 1: + result = result.double() + if ( e3 & i ) != 0 and ( e & i ) == 0: result = result + self + if ( e3 & i ) == 0 and ( e & i ) != 0: result = result + negative_self + # print ". . . i = %d, result = %s" % ( i, result ) + i = i // 2 + + return result + + def __rmul__( self, other ): + """Multiply a point by an integer.""" + + return self * other + + def __str__( self ): + if self == INFINITY: return "infinity" + return "(%d,%d)" % ( self.__x, self.__y ) + + def double( self ): + """Return a new point that is twice the old.""" + + if self == INFINITY: + return INFINITY + + # X9.62 B.3: + + p = self.__curve.p() + a = self.__curve.a() + + l = ( ( 3 * self.__x * self.__x + a ) * \ + numbertheory.inverse_mod( 2 * self.__y, p ) ) % p + + x3 = ( l * l - 2 * self.__x ) % p + y3 = ( l * ( self.__x - x3 ) - self.__y ) % p + + return Point( self.__curve, x3, y3 ) + + def x( self ): + return self.__x + + def y( self ): + return self.__y + + def curve( self ): + return self.__curve + + def order( self ): + return self.__order + + +# This one point is the Point At Infinity for all purposes: +INFINITY = Point( None, None, None ) + +def __main__(): + + class FailedTest(Exception): pass + def test_add( c, x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3 ): + """We expect that on curve c, (x1,y1) + (x2, y2 ) = (x3, y3).""" + p1 = Point( c, x1, y1 ) + p2 = Point( c, x2, y2 ) + p3 = p1 + p2 + print "%s + %s = %s" % ( p1, p2, p3 ), + if p3.x() != x3 or p3.y() != y3: + raise FailedTest("Failure: should give (%d,%d)." % ( x3, y3 )) + else: + print " Good." + + def test_double( c, x1, y1, x3, y3 ): + """We expect that on curve c, 2*(x1,y1) = (x3, y3).""" + p1 = Point( c, x1, y1 ) + p3 = p1.double() + print "%s doubled = %s" % ( p1, p3 ), + if p3.x() != x3 or p3.y() != y3: + raise FailedTest("Failure: should give (%d,%d)." % ( x3, y3 )) + else: + print " Good." + + def test_double_infinity( c ): + """We expect that on curve c, 2*INFINITY = INFINITY.""" + p1 = INFINITY + p3 = p1.double() + print "%s doubled = %s" % ( p1, p3 ), + if p3.x() != INFINITY.x() or p3.y() != INFINITY.y(): + raise FailedTest("Failure: should give (%d,%d)." % ( INFINITY.x(), INFINITY.y() )) + else: + print " Good." + + def test_multiply( c, x1, y1, m, x3, y3 ): + """We expect that on curve c, m*(x1,y1) = (x3,y3).""" + p1 = Point( c, x1, y1 ) + p3 = p1 * m + print "%s * %d = %s" % ( p1, m, p3 ), + if p3.x() != x3 or p3.y() != y3: + raise FailedTest("Failure: should give (%d,%d)." % ( x3, y3 )) + else: + print " Good." + + + # A few tests from X9.62 B.3: + + c = CurveFp( 23, 1, 1 ) + test_add( c, 3, 10, 9, 7, 17, 20 ) + test_double( c, 3, 10, 7, 12 ) + test_add( c, 3, 10, 3, 10, 7, 12 ) # (Should just invoke double.) + test_multiply( c, 3, 10, 2, 7, 12 ) + + test_double_infinity(c) + + # From X9.62 I.1 (p. 96): + + g = Point( c, 13, 7, 7 ) + + check = INFINITY + for i in range( 7 + 1 ): + p = ( i % 7 ) * g + print "%s * %d = %s, expected %s . . ." % ( g, i, p, check ), + if p == check: + print " Good." + else: + raise FailedTest("Bad.") + check = check + g + + # NIST Curve P-192: + p = 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279L + r = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081L + #s = 0x3045ae6fc8422f64ed579528d38120eae12196d5L + c = 0x3099d2bbbfcb2538542dcd5fb078b6ef5f3d6fe2c745de65L + b = 0x64210519e59c80e70fa7e9ab72243049feb8deecc146b9b1L + Gx = 0x188da80eb03090f67cbf20eb43a18800f4ff0afd82ff1012L + Gy = 0x07192b95ffc8da78631011ed6b24cdd573f977a11e794811L + + c192 = CurveFp( p, -3, b ) + p192 = Point( c192, Gx, Gy, r ) + + # Checking against some sample computations presented + # in X9.62: + + d = 651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659L + Q = d * p192 + if Q.x() != 0x62B12D60690CDCF330BABAB6E69763B471F994DD702D16A5L: + raise FailedTest("p192 * d came out wrong.") + else: + print "p192 * d came out right." + + k = 6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654L + R = k * p192 + if R.x() != 0x885052380FF147B734C330C43D39B2C4A89F29B0F749FEADL \ + or R.y() != 0x9CF9FA1CBEFEFB917747A3BB29C072B9289C2547884FD835L: + raise FailedTest("k * p192 came out wrong.") + else: + print "k * p192 came out right." + + u1 = 2563697409189434185194736134579731015366492496392189760599L + u2 = 6266643813348617967186477710235785849136406323338782220568L + temp = u1 * p192 + u2 * Q + if temp.x() != 0x885052380FF147B734C330C43D39B2C4A89F29B0F749FEADL \ + or temp.y() != 0x9CF9FA1CBEFEFB917747A3BB29C072B9289C2547884FD835L: + raise FailedTest("u1 * p192 + u2 * Q came out wrong.") + else: + print "u1 * p192 + u2 * Q came out right." + +if __name__ == "__main__": + __main__() (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/keys.py b/ecdsa/keys.py t@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +import binascii + +import ecdsa +import der +from curves import NIST192p, find_curve +from util import string_to_number, number_to_string, randrange +from util import sigencode_string, sigdecode_string +from util import oid_ecPublicKey, encoded_oid_ecPublicKey +from hashlib import sha1 + +class BadSignatureError(Exception): + pass +class BadDigestError(Exception): + pass + +class VerifyingKey: + def __init__(self, _error__please_use_generate=None): + if not _error__please_use_generate: + raise TypeError("Please use SigningKey.generate() to construct me") + + @classmethod + def from_public_point(klass, point, curve=NIST192p, hashfunc=sha1): + self = klass(_error__please_use_generate=True) + self.curve = curve + self.default_hashfunc = hashfunc + self.pubkey = ecdsa.Public_key(curve.generator, point) + self.pubkey.order = curve.order + return self + + @classmethod + def from_string(klass, string, curve=NIST192p, hashfunc=sha1): + order = curve.order + assert len(string) == curve.verifying_key_length, \ + (len(string), curve.verifying_key_length) + xs = string[:curve.baselen] + ys = string[curve.baselen:] + assert len(xs) == curve.baselen, (len(xs), curve.baselen) + assert len(ys) == curve.baselen, (len(ys), curve.baselen) + x = string_to_number(xs) + y = string_to_number(ys) + assert ecdsa.point_is_valid(curve.generator, x, y) + import ellipticcurve + point = ellipticcurve.Point(curve.curve, x, y, order) + return klass.from_public_point(point, curve, hashfunc) + + @classmethod + def from_pem(klass, string): + return klass.from_der(der.unpem(string)) + + @classmethod + def from_der(klass, string): + # [[oid_ecPublicKey,oid_curve], point_str_bitstring] + s1,empty = der.remove_sequence(string) + if empty != "": + raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after DER pubkey: %s" % + binascii.hexlify(empty)) + s2,point_str_bitstring = der.remove_sequence(s1) + # s2 = oid_ecPublicKey,oid_curve + oid_pk, rest = der.remove_object(s2) + oid_curve, empty = der.remove_object(rest) + if empty != "": + raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after DER pubkey objects: %s" % + binascii.hexlify(empty)) + assert oid_pk == oid_ecPublicKey, (oid_pk, oid_ecPublicKey) + curve = find_curve(oid_curve) + point_str, empty = der.remove_bitstring(point_str_bitstring) + if empty != "": + raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after pubkey pointstring: %s" % + binascii.hexlify(empty)) + assert point_str.startswith("\x00\x04") + return klass.from_string(point_str[2:], curve) + + def to_string(self): + # VerifyingKey.from_string(vk.to_string()) == vk as long as the + # curves are the same: the curve itself is not included in the + # serialized form + order = self.pubkey.order + x_str = number_to_string(self.pubkey.point.x(), order) + y_str = number_to_string(self.pubkey.point.y(), order) + return x_str + y_str + + def to_pem(self): + return der.topem(self.to_der(), "PUBLIC KEY") + + def to_der(self): + order = self.pubkey.order + x_str = number_to_string(self.pubkey.point.x(), order) + y_str = number_to_string(self.pubkey.point.y(), order) + point_str = "\x00\x04" + x_str + y_str + return der.encode_sequence(der.encode_sequence(encoded_oid_ecPublicKey, + self.curve.encoded_oid), + der.encode_bitstring(point_str)) + + def verify(self, signature, data, hashfunc=None, sigdecode=sigdecode_string): + hashfunc = hashfunc or self.default_hashfunc + digest = hashfunc(data).digest() + return self.verify_digest(signature, digest, sigdecode) + + def verify_digest(self, signature, digest, sigdecode=sigdecode_string): + if len(digest) > self.curve.baselen: + raise BadDigestError("this curve (%s) is too short " + "for your digest (%d)" % (self.curve.name, + 8*len(digest))) + number = string_to_number(digest) + r, s = sigdecode(signature, self.pubkey.order) + sig = ecdsa.Signature(r, s) + if self.pubkey.verifies(number, sig): + return True + raise BadSignatureError + +class SigningKey: + def __init__(self, _error__please_use_generate=None): + if not _error__please_use_generate: + raise TypeError("Please use SigningKey.generate() to construct me") + + @classmethod + def generate(klass, curve=NIST192p, entropy=None, hashfunc=sha1): + secexp = randrange(curve.order, entropy) + return klass.from_secret_exponent(secexp, curve, hashfunc) + + # to create a signing key from a short (arbitrary-length) seed, convert + # that seed into an integer with something like + # secexp=util.randrange_from_seed__X(seed, curve.order), and then pass + # that integer into SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(secexp, curve) + + @classmethod + def from_secret_exponent(klass, secexp, curve=NIST192p, hashfunc=sha1): + self = klass(_error__please_use_generate=True) + self.curve = curve + self.default_hashfunc = hashfunc + self.baselen = curve.baselen + n = curve.order + assert 1 <= secexp < n + pubkey_point = curve.generator*secexp + pubkey = ecdsa.Public_key(curve.generator, pubkey_point) + pubkey.order = n + self.verifying_key = VerifyingKey.from_public_point(pubkey_point, curve, + hashfunc) + self.privkey = ecdsa.Private_key(pubkey, secexp) + self.privkey.order = n + return self + + @classmethod + def from_string(klass, string, curve=NIST192p, hashfunc=sha1): + assert len(string) == curve.baselen, (len(string), curve.baselen) + secexp = string_to_number(string) + return klass.from_secret_exponent(secexp, curve, hashfunc) + + @classmethod + def from_pem(klass, string, hashfunc=sha1): + # the privkey pem file has two sections: "EC PARAMETERS" and "EC + # PRIVATE KEY". The first is redundant. + privkey_pem = string[string.index("-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"):] + return klass.from_der(der.unpem(privkey_pem), hashfunc) + @classmethod + def from_der(klass, string, hashfunc=sha1): + # SEQ([int(1), octetstring(privkey),cont[0], oid(secp224r1), + # cont[1],bitstring]) + s, empty = der.remove_sequence(string) + if empty != "": + raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after DER privkey: %s" % + binascii.hexlify(empty)) + one, s = der.remove_integer(s) + if one != 1: + raise der.UnexpectedDER("expected '1' at start of DER privkey," + " got %d" % one) + privkey_str, s = der.remove_octet_string(s) + tag, curve_oid_str, s = der.remove_constructed(s) + if tag != 0: + raise der.UnexpectedDER("expected tag 0 in DER privkey," + " got %d" % tag) + curve_oid, empty = der.remove_object(curve_oid_str) + if empty != "": + raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after DER privkey " + "curve_oid: %s" % binascii.hexlify(empty)) + curve = find_curve(curve_oid) + + # we don't actually care about the following fields + # + #tag, pubkey_bitstring, s = der.remove_constructed(s) + #if tag != 1: + # raise der.UnexpectedDER("expected tag 1 in DER privkey, got %d" + # % tag) + #pubkey_str = der.remove_bitstring(pubkey_bitstring) + #if empty != "": + # raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after DER privkey " + # "pubkeystr: %s" % binascii.hexlify(empty)) + + # our from_string method likes fixed-length privkey strings + if len(privkey_str) < curve.baselen: + privkey_str = "\x00"*(curve.baselen-len(privkey_str)) + privkey_str + return klass.from_string(privkey_str, curve, hashfunc) + + def to_string(self): + secexp = self.privkey.secret_multiplier + s = number_to_string(secexp, self.privkey.order) + return s + + def to_pem(self): + # TODO: "BEGIN ECPARAMETERS" + return der.topem(self.to_der(), "EC PRIVATE KEY") + + def to_der(self): + # SEQ([int(1), octetstring(privkey),cont[0], oid(secp224r1), + # cont[1],bitstring]) + encoded_vk = "\x00\x04" + self.get_verifying_key().to_string() + return der.encode_sequence(der.encode_integer(1), + der.encode_octet_string(self.to_string()), + der.encode_constructed(0, self.curve.encoded_oid), + der.encode_constructed(1, der.encode_bitstring(encoded_vk)), + ) + + def get_verifying_key(self): + return self.verifying_key + + def sign(self, data, entropy=None, hashfunc=None, sigencode=sigencode_string): + """ + hashfunc= should behave like hashlib.sha1 . The output length of the + hash (in bytes) must not be longer than the length of the curve order + (rounded up to the nearest byte), so using SHA256 with nist256p is + ok, but SHA256 with nist192p is not. (In the 2**-96ish unlikely event + of a hash output larger than the curve order, the hash will + effectively be wrapped mod n). + + Use hashfunc=hashlib.sha1 to match openssl's -ecdsa-with-SHA1 mode, + or hashfunc=hashlib.sha256 for openssl-1.0.0's -ecdsa-with-SHA256. + """ + + hashfunc = hashfunc or self.default_hashfunc + h = hashfunc(data).digest() + return self.sign_digest(h, entropy, sigencode) + + def sign_digest(self, digest, entropy=None, sigencode=sigencode_string): + if len(digest) > self.curve.baselen: + raise BadDigestError("this curve (%s) is too short " + "for your digest (%d)" % (self.curve.name, + 8*len(digest))) + number = string_to_number(digest) + r, s = self.sign_number(number, entropy) + return sigencode(r, s, self.privkey.order) + + def sign_number(self, number, entropy=None): + # returns a pair of numbers + order = self.privkey.order + # privkey.sign() may raise RuntimeError in the amazingly unlikely + # (2**-192) event that r=0 or s=0, because that would leak the key. + # We could re-try with a different 'k', but we couldn't test that + # code, so I choose to allow the signature to fail instead. + k = randrange(order, entropy) + assert 1 <= k < order + sig = self.privkey.sign(number, k) + return sig.r, sig.s (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/numbertheory.py b/ecdsa/numbertheory.py t@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env python +# +# Provide some simple capabilities from number theory. +# +# Version of 2008.11.14. +# +# Written in 2005 and 2006 by Peter Pearson and placed in the public domain. +# Revision history: +# 2008.11.14: Use pow( base, exponent, modulus ) for modular_exp. +# Make gcd and lcm accept arbitrarly many arguments. + + + +import math +import types + + +class Error( Exception ): + """Base class for exceptions in this module.""" + pass + +class SquareRootError( Error ): + pass + +class NegativeExponentError( Error ): + pass + + +def modular_exp( base, exponent, modulus ): + "Raise base to exponent, reducing by modulus" + if exponent < 0: + raise NegativeExponentError( "Negative exponents (%d) not allowed" \ + % exponent ) + return pow( base, exponent, modulus ) +# result = 1L +# x = exponent +# b = base + 0L +# while x > 0: +# if x % 2 > 0: result = (result * b) % modulus +# x = x // 2 +# b = ( b * b ) % modulus +# return result + + +def polynomial_reduce_mod( poly, polymod, p ): + """Reduce poly by polymod, integer arithmetic modulo p. + + Polynomials are represented as lists of coefficients + of increasing powers of x.""" + + # This module has been tested only by extensive use + # in calculating modular square roots. + + # Just to make this easy, require a monic polynomial: + assert polymod[-1] == 1 + + assert len( polymod ) > 1 + + while len( poly ) >= len( polymod ): + if poly[-1] != 0: + for i in range( 2, len( polymod ) + 1 ): + poly[-i] = ( poly[-i] - poly[-1] * polymod[-i] ) % p + poly = poly[0:-1] + + return poly + + + +def polynomial_multiply_mod( m1, m2, polymod, p ): + """Polynomial multiplication modulo a polynomial over ints mod p. + + Polynomials are represented as lists of coefficients + of increasing powers of x.""" + + # This is just a seat-of-the-pants implementation. + + # This module has been tested only by extensive use + # in calculating modular square roots. + + # Initialize the product to zero: + + prod = ( len( m1 ) + len( m2 ) - 1 ) * [0] + + # Add together all the cross-terms: + + for i in range( len( m1 ) ): + for j in range( len( m2 ) ): + prod[i+j] = ( prod[i+j] + m1[i] * m2[j] ) % p + + return polynomial_reduce_mod( prod, polymod, p ) + + + + +def polynomial_exp_mod( base, exponent, polymod, p ): + """Polynomial exponentiation modulo a polynomial over ints mod p. + + Polynomials are represented as lists of coefficients + of increasing powers of x.""" + + # Based on the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, algorithm 2.227. + + # This module has been tested only by extensive use + # in calculating modular square roots. + + assert exponent < p + + if exponent == 0: return [ 1 ] + + G = base + k = exponent + if k%2 == 1: s = G + else: s = [ 1 ] + + while k > 1: + k = k // 2 + G = polynomial_multiply_mod( G, G, polymod, p ) + if k%2 == 1: s = polynomial_multiply_mod( G, s, polymod, p ) + + return s + + + +def jacobi( a, n ): + """Jacobi symbol""" + + # Based on the Handbook of Applied Cryptography (HAC), algorithm 2.149. + + # This function has been tested by comparison with a small + # table printed in HAC, and by extensive use in calculating + # modular square roots. + + assert n >= 3 + assert n%2 == 1 + a = a % n + if a == 0: return 0 + if a == 1: return 1 + a1, e = a, 0 + while a1%2 == 0: + a1, e = a1//2, e+1 + if e%2 == 0 or n%8 == 1 or n%8 == 7: s = 1 + else: s = -1 + if a1 == 1: return s + if n%4 == 3 and a1%4 == 3: s = -s + return s * jacobi( n % a1, a1 ) + + + + +def square_root_mod_prime( a, p ): + """Modular square root of a, mod p, p prime.""" + + # Based on the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, algorithms 3.34 to 3.39. + + # This module has been tested for all values in [0,p-1] for + # every prime p from 3 to 1229. + + assert 0 <= a < p + assert 1 < p + + if a == 0: return 0 + if p == 2: return a + + jac = jacobi( a, p ) + if jac == -1: raise SquareRootError( "%d has no square root modulo %d" \ + % ( a, p ) ) + + if p % 4 == 3: return modular_exp( a, (p+1)//4, p ) + + if p % 8 == 5: + d = modular_exp( a, (p-1)//4, p ) + if d == 1: return modular_exp( a, (p+3)//8, p ) + if d == p-1: return ( 2 * a * modular_exp( 4*a, (p-5)//8, p ) ) % p + raise RuntimeError, "Shouldn't get here." + + for b in range( 2, p ): + if jacobi( b*b-4*a, p ) == -1: + f = ( a, -b, 1 ) + ff = polynomial_exp_mod( ( 0, 1 ), (p+1)//2, f, p ) + assert ff[1] == 0 + return ff[0] + raise RuntimeError, "No b found." + + + +def inverse_mod( a, m ): + """Inverse of a mod m.""" + + if a < 0 or m <= a: a = a % m + + # From Ferguson and Schneier, roughly: + + c, d = a, m + uc, vc, ud, vd = 1, 0, 0, 1 + while c != 0: + q, c, d = divmod( d, c ) + ( c, ) + uc, vc, ud, vd = ud - q*uc, vd - q*vc, uc, vc + + # At this point, d is the GCD, and ud*a+vd*m = d. + # If d == 1, this means that ud is a inverse. + + assert d == 1 + if ud > 0: return ud + else: return ud + m + + +def gcd2(a, b): + """Greatest common divisor using Euclid's algorithm.""" + while a: + a, b = b%a, a + return b + + +def gcd( *a ): + """Greatest common divisor. + + Usage: gcd( [ 2, 4, 6 ] ) + or: gcd( 2, 4, 6 ) + """ + + if len( a ) > 1: return reduce( gcd2, a ) + if hasattr( a[0], "__iter__" ): return reduce( gcd2, a[0] ) + return a[0] + + +def lcm2(a,b): + """Least common multiple of two integers.""" + + return (a*b)//gcd(a,b) + + +def lcm( *a ): + """Least common multiple. + + Usage: lcm( [ 3, 4, 5 ] ) + or: lcm( 3, 4, 5 ) + """ + + if len( a ) > 1: return reduce( lcm2, a ) + if hasattr( a[0], "__iter__" ): return reduce( lcm2, a[0] ) + return a[0] + + + +def factorization( n ): + """Decompose n into a list of (prime,exponent) pairs.""" + + assert isinstance( n, types.IntType ) or isinstance( n, types.LongType ) + + if n < 2: return [] + + result = [] + d = 2 + + # Test the small primes: + + for d in smallprimes: + if d > n: break + q, r = divmod( n, d ) + if r == 0: + count = 1 + while d <= n: + n = q + q, r = divmod( n, d ) + if r != 0: break + count = count + 1 + result.append( ( d, count ) ) + + # If n is still greater than the last of our small primes, + # it may require further work: + + if n > smallprimes[-1]: + if is_prime( n ): # If what's left is prime, it's easy: + result.append( ( n, 1 ) ) + else: # Ugh. Search stupidly for a divisor: + d = smallprimes[-1] + while 1: + d = d + 2 # Try the next divisor. + q, r = divmod( n, d ) + if q < d: break # n < d*d means we're done, n = 1 or prime. + if r == 0: # d divides n. How many times? + count = 1 + n = q + while d <= n: # As long as d might still divide n, + q, r = divmod( n, d ) # see if it does. + if r != 0: break + n = q # It does. Reduce n, increase count. + count = count + 1 + result.append( ( d, count ) ) + if n > 1: result.append( ( n, 1 ) ) + + return result + + + +def phi( n ): + """Return the Euler totient function of n.""" + + assert isinstance( n, types.IntType ) or isinstance( n, types.LongType ) + + if n < 3: return 1 + + result = 1 + ff = factorization( n ) + for f in ff: + e = f[1] + if e > 1: + result = result * f[0] ** (e-1) * ( f[0] - 1 ) + else: + result = result * ( f[0] - 1 ) + return result + + +def carmichael( n ): + """Return Carmichael function of n. + + Carmichael(n) is the smallest integer x such that + m**x = 1 mod n for all m relatively prime to n. + """ + + return carmichael_of_factorized( factorization( n ) ) + + +def carmichael_of_factorized( f_list ): + """Return the Carmichael function of a number that is + represented as a list of (prime,exponent) pairs. + """ + + if len( f_list ) < 1: return 1 + + result = carmichael_of_ppower( f_list[0] ) + for i in range( 1, len( f_list ) ): + result = lcm( result, carmichael_of_ppower( f_list[i] ) ) + + return result + +def carmichael_of_ppower( pp ): + """Carmichael function of the given power of the given prime. + """ + + p, a = pp + if p == 2 and a > 2: return 2**(a-2) + else: return (p-1) * p**(a-1) + + + +def order_mod( x, m ): + """Return the order of x in the multiplicative group mod m. + """ + + # Warning: this implementation is not very clever, and will + # take a long time if m is very large. + + if m <= 1: return 0 + + assert gcd( x, m ) == 1 + + z = x + result = 1 + while z != 1: + z = ( z * x ) % m + result = result + 1 + return result + + +def largest_factor_relatively_prime( a, b ): + """Return the largest factor of a relatively prime to b. + """ + + while 1: + d = gcd( a, b ) + if d <= 1: break + b = d + while 1: + q, r = divmod( a, d ) + if r > 0: + break + a = q + return a + + +def kinda_order_mod( x, m ): + """Return the order of x in the multiplicative group mod m', + where m' is the largest factor of m relatively prime to x. + """ + + return order_mod( x, largest_factor_relatively_prime( m, x ) ) + + +def is_prime( n ): + """Return True if x is prime, False otherwise. + + We use the Miller-Rabin test, as given in Menezes et al. p. 138. + This test is not exact: there are composite values n for which + it returns True. + + In testing the odd numbers from 10000001 to 19999999, + about 66 composites got past the first test, + 5 got past the second test, and none got past the third. + Since factors of 2, 3, 5, 7, and 11 were detected during + preliminary screening, the number of numbers tested by + Miller-Rabin was (19999999 - 10000001)*(2/3)*(4/5)*(6/7) + = 4.57 million. + """ + + # (This is used to study the risk of false positives:) + global miller_rabin_test_count + + miller_rabin_test_count = 0 + + if n <= smallprimes[-1]: + if n in smallprimes: return True + else: return False + + if gcd( n, 2*3*5*7*11 ) != 1: return False + + # Choose a number of iterations sufficient to reduce the + # probability of accepting a composite below 2**-80 + # (from Menezes et al. Table 4.4): + + t = 40 + n_bits = 1 + int( math.log( n, 2 ) ) + for k, tt in ( ( 100, 27 ), + ( 150, 18 ), + ( 200, 15 ), + ( 250, 12 ), + ( 300, 9 ), + ( 350, 8 ), + ( 400, 7 ), + ( 450, 6 ), + ( 550, 5 ), + ( 650, 4 ), + ( 850, 3 ), + ( 1300, 2 ), + ): + if n_bits < k: break + t = tt + + # Run the test t times: + + s = 0 + r = n - 1 + while ( r % 2 ) == 0: + s = s + 1 + r = r // 2 + for i in xrange( t ): + a = smallprimes[ i ] + y = modular_exp( a, r, n ) + if y != 1 and y != n-1: + j = 1 + while j <= s - 1 and y != n - 1: + y = modular_exp( y, 2, n ) + if y == 1: + miller_rabin_test_count = i + 1 + return False + j = j + 1 + if y != n-1: + miller_rabin_test_count = i + 1 + return False + return True + + +def next_prime( starting_value ): + "Return the smallest prime larger than the starting value." + + if starting_value < 2: return 2 + result = ( starting_value + 1 ) | 1 + while not is_prime( result ): result = result + 2 + return result + + +smallprimes = [2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, + 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, + 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, + 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, + 199, 211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, + 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, + 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, + 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, + 443, 449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, + 503, 509, 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, + 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, 619, 631, + 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 673, 677, 683, 691, + 701, 709, 719, 727, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, + 769, 773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, + 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, 907, + 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, + 983, 991, 997, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033, + 1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091, 1093, + 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1123, 1129, 1151, 1153, 1163, + 1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213, 1217, 1223, 1229] + +miller_rabin_test_count = 0 + +def __main__(): + + # Making sure locally defined exceptions work: + # p = modular_exp( 2, -2, 3 ) + # p = square_root_mod_prime( 2, 3 ) + + + print "Testing gcd..." + assert gcd( 3*5*7, 3*5*11, 3*5*13 ) == 3*5 + assert gcd( [ 3*5*7, 3*5*11, 3*5*13 ] ) == 3*5 + assert gcd( 3 ) == 3 + + print "Testing lcm..." + assert lcm( 3, 5*3, 7*3 ) == 3*5*7 + assert lcm( [ 3, 5*3, 7*3 ] ) == 3*5*7 + assert lcm( 3 ) == 3 + + print "Testing next_prime..." + bigprimes = ( 999671, + 999683, + 999721, + 999727, + 999749, + 999763, + 999769, + 999773, + 999809, + 999853, + 999863, + 999883, + 999907, + 999917, + 999931, + 999953, + 999959, + 999961, + 999979, + 999983 ) + + for i in xrange( len( bigprimes ) - 1 ): + assert next_prime( bigprimes[i] ) == bigprimes[ i+1 ] + + error_tally = 0 + + # Test the square_root_mod_prime function: + + for p in smallprimes: + print "Testing square_root_mod_prime for modulus p = %d." % p + squares = [] + + for root in range( 0, 1+p//2 ): + sq = ( root * root ) % p + squares.append( sq ) + calculated = square_root_mod_prime( sq, p ) + if ( calculated * calculated ) % p != sq: + error_tally = error_tally + 1 + print "Failed to find %d as sqrt( %d ) mod %d. Said %d." % \ + ( root, sq, p, calculated ) + + for nonsquare in range( 0, p ): + if nonsquare not in squares: + try: + calculated = square_root_mod_prime( nonsquare, p ) + except SquareRootError: + pass + else: + error_tally = error_tally + 1 + print "Failed to report no root for sqrt( %d ) mod %d." % \ + ( nonsquare, p ) + + # Test the jacobi function: + for m in range( 3, 400, 2 ): + print "Testing jacobi for modulus m = %d." % m + if is_prime( m ): + squares = [] + for root in range( 1, m ): + if jacobi( root * root, m ) != 1: + error_tally = error_tally + 1 + print "jacobi( %d * %d, %d ) != 1" % ( root, root, m ) + squares.append( root * root % m ) + for i in range( 1, m ): + if not i in squares: + if jacobi( i, m ) != -1: + error_tally = error_tally + 1 + print "jacobi( %d, %d ) != -1" % ( i, m ) + else: # m is not prime. + f = factorization( m ) + for a in range( 1, m ): + c = 1 + for i in f: + c = c * jacobi( a, i[0] ) ** i[1] + if c != jacobi( a, m ): + error_tally = error_tally + 1 + print "%d != jacobi( %d, %d )" % ( c, a, m ) + + +# Test the inverse_mod function: + print "Testing inverse_mod . . ." + import random + n_tests = 0 + for i in range( 100 ): + m = random.randint( 20, 10000 ) + for j in range( 100 ): + a = random.randint( 1, m-1 ) + if gcd( a, m ) == 1: + n_tests = n_tests + 1 + inv = inverse_mod( a, m ) + if inv <= 0 or inv >= m or ( a * inv ) % m != 1: + error_tally = error_tally + 1 + print "%d = inverse_mod( %d, %d ) is wrong." % ( inv, a, m ) + assert n_tests > 1000 + print n_tests, " tests of inverse_mod completed." + + class FailedTest(Exception): pass + print error_tally, "errors detected." + if error_tally != 0: + raise FailedTest("%d errors detected" % error_tally) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + __main__() (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/test_pyecdsa.py b/ecdsa/test_pyecdsa.py t@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@ +import unittest +import os +import time +import shutil +import subprocess +from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify +from hashlib import sha1, sha256 + +from keys import SigningKey, VerifyingKey +from keys import BadSignatureError +import util +from util import sigencode_der, sigencode_strings +from util import sigdecode_der, sigdecode_strings +from curves import Curve, UnknownCurveError +from curves import NIST192p, NIST224p, NIST256p, NIST384p, NIST521p +import der + +class SubprocessError(Exception): + pass + +def run_openssl(cmd): + OPENSSL = "openssl" + p = subprocess.Popen([OPENSSL] + cmd.split(), + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) + stdout, ignored = p.communicate() + if p.returncode != 0: + raise SubprocessError("cmd '%s %s' failed: rc=%s, stdout/err was %s" % + (OPENSSL, cmd, p.returncode, stdout)) + return stdout + +BENCH = False + +class ECDSA(unittest.TestCase): + def test_basic(self): + priv = SigningKey.generate() + pub = priv.get_verifying_key() + + data = "blahblah" + sig = priv.sign(data) + + self.failUnless(pub.verify(sig, data)) + self.failUnlessRaises(BadSignatureError, pub.verify, sig, data+"bad") + + pub2 = VerifyingKey.from_string(pub.to_string()) + self.failUnless(pub2.verify(sig, data)) + + def test_bad_usage(self): + # sk=SigningKey() is wrong + self.failUnlessRaises(TypeError, SigningKey) + self.failUnlessRaises(TypeError, VerifyingKey) + + def test_lengths(self): + default = NIST192p + priv = SigningKey.generate() + pub = priv.get_verifying_key() + self.failUnlessEqual(len(pub.to_string()), default.verifying_key_length) + sig = priv.sign("data") + self.failUnlessEqual(len(sig), default.signature_length) + if BENCH: + print + for curve in (NIST192p, NIST224p, NIST256p, NIST384p, NIST521p): + start = time.time() + priv = SigningKey.generate(curve=curve) + pub1 = priv.get_verifying_key() + keygen_time = time.time() - start + pub2 = VerifyingKey.from_string(pub1.to_string(), curve) + self.failUnlessEqual(pub1.to_string(), pub2.to_string()) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(pub1.to_string()), + curve.verifying_key_length) + start = time.time() + sig = priv.sign("data") + sign_time = time.time() - start + self.failUnlessEqual(len(sig), curve.signature_length) + if BENCH: + start = time.time() + pub1.verify(sig, "data") + verify_time = time.time() - start + print "%s: siglen=%d, keygen=%0.3fs, sign=%0.3f, verify=%0.3f" \ + % (curve.name, curve.signature_length, + keygen_time, sign_time, verify_time) + + def test_serialize(self): + seed = "secret" + curve = NIST192p + secexp1 = util.randrange_from_seed__trytryagain(seed, curve.order) + secexp2 = util.randrange_from_seed__trytryagain(seed, curve.order) + self.failUnlessEqual(secexp1, secexp2) + priv1 = SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(secexp1, curve) + priv2 = SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(secexp2, curve) + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(priv1.to_string()), + hexlify(priv2.to_string())) + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.to_pem(), priv2.to_pem()) + pub1 = priv1.get_verifying_key() + pub2 = priv2.get_verifying_key() + data = "data" + sig1 = priv1.sign(data) + sig2 = priv2.sign(data) + self.failUnless(pub1.verify(sig1, data)) + self.failUnless(pub2.verify(sig1, data)) + self.failUnless(pub1.verify(sig2, data)) + self.failUnless(pub2.verify(sig2, data)) + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(pub1.to_string()), + hexlify(pub2.to_string())) + + def test_nonrandom(self): + s = "all the entropy in the entire world, compressed into one line" + def not_much_entropy(numbytes): + return s[:numbytes] + # we control the entropy source, these two keys should be identical: + priv1 = SigningKey.generate(entropy=not_much_entropy) + priv2 = SigningKey.generate(entropy=not_much_entropy) + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(priv1.get_verifying_key().to_string()), + hexlify(priv2.get_verifying_key().to_string())) + # likewise, signatures should be identical. Obviously you'd never + # want to do this with keys you care about, because the secrecy of + # the private key depends upon using different random numbers for + # each signature + sig1 = priv1.sign("data", entropy=not_much_entropy) + sig2 = priv2.sign("data", entropy=not_much_entropy) + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(sig1), hexlify(sig2)) + + def failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(self, priv1, priv2): + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.privkey.secret_multiplier, + priv2.privkey.secret_multiplier) + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.privkey.public_key.generator, + priv2.privkey.public_key.generator) + + def failIfPrivkeysEqual(self, priv1, priv2): + self.failIfEqual(priv1.privkey.secret_multiplier, + priv2.privkey.secret_multiplier) + + def test_privkey_creation(self): + s = "all the entropy in the entire world, compressed into one line" + def not_much_entropy(numbytes): + return s[:numbytes] + priv1 = SigningKey.generate() + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.baselen, NIST192p.baselen) + + priv1 = SigningKey.generate(curve=NIST224p) + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.baselen, NIST224p.baselen) + + priv1 = SigningKey.generate(entropy=not_much_entropy) + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.baselen, NIST192p.baselen) + priv2 = SigningKey.generate(entropy=not_much_entropy) + self.failUnlessEqual(priv2.baselen, NIST192p.baselen) + self.failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(priv1, priv2) + + priv1 = SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(secexp=3) + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.baselen, NIST192p.baselen) + priv2 = SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(secexp=3) + self.failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(priv1, priv2) + + priv1 = SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(secexp=4, curve=NIST224p) + self.failUnlessEqual(priv1.baselen, NIST224p.baselen) + + def test_privkey_strings(self): + priv1 = SigningKey.generate() + s1 = priv1.to_string() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(s1), str) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(s1), NIST192p.baselen) + priv2 = SigningKey.from_string(s1) + self.failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(priv1, priv2) + + s1 = priv1.to_pem() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(s1), str) + self.failUnless(s1.startswith("-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----")) + self.failUnless(s1.strip().endswith("-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----")) + priv2 = SigningKey.from_pem(s1) + self.failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(priv1, priv2) + + s1 = priv1.to_der() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(s1), str) + priv2 = SigningKey.from_der(s1) + self.failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(priv1, priv2) + + priv1 = SigningKey.generate(curve=NIST256p) + s1 = priv1.to_pem() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(s1), str) + self.failUnless(s1.startswith("-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----")) + self.failUnless(s1.strip().endswith("-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----")) + priv2 = SigningKey.from_pem(s1) + self.failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(priv1, priv2) + + s1 = priv1.to_der() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(s1), str) + priv2 = SigningKey.from_der(s1) + self.failUnlessPrivkeysEqual(priv1, priv2) + + def failUnlessPubkeysEqual(self, pub1, pub2): + self.failUnlessEqual(pub1.pubkey.point, pub2.pubkey.point) + self.failUnlessEqual(pub1.pubkey.generator, pub2.pubkey.generator) + self.failUnlessEqual(pub1.curve, pub2.curve) + + def test_pubkey_strings(self): + priv1 = SigningKey.generate() + pub1 = priv1.get_verifying_key() + s1 = pub1.to_string() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(s1), str) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(s1), NIST192p.verifying_key_length) + pub2 = VerifyingKey.from_string(s1) + self.failUnlessPubkeysEqual(pub1, pub2) + + priv1 = SigningKey.generate(curve=NIST256p) + pub1 = priv1.get_verifying_key() + s1 = pub1.to_string() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(s1), str) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(s1), NIST256p.verifying_key_length) + pub2 = VerifyingKey.from_string(s1, curve=NIST256p) + self.failUnlessPubkeysEqual(pub1, pub2) + + pub1_der = pub1.to_der() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(pub1_der), str) + pub2 = VerifyingKey.from_der(pub1_der) + self.failUnlessPubkeysEqual(pub1, pub2) + + self.failUnlessRaises(der.UnexpectedDER, + VerifyingKey.from_der, pub1_der+"junk") + badpub = VerifyingKey.from_der(pub1_der) + class FakeGenerator: + def order(self): return 123456789 + badcurve = Curve("unknown", None, FakeGenerator(), (1,2,3,4,5,6)) + badpub.curve = badcurve + badder = badpub.to_der() + self.failUnlessRaises(UnknownCurveError, VerifyingKey.from_der, badder) + + pem = pub1.to_pem() + self.failUnlessEqual(type(pem), str) + self.failUnless(pem.startswith("-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----"), pem) + self.failUnless(pem.strip().endswith("-----END PUBLIC KEY-----"), pem) + pub2 = VerifyingKey.from_pem(pem) + self.failUnlessPubkeysEqual(pub1, pub2) + + def test_signature_strings(self): + priv1 = SigningKey.generate() + pub1 = priv1.get_verifying_key() + data = "data" + + sig = priv1.sign(data) + self.failUnlessEqual(type(sig), str) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(sig), NIST192p.signature_length) + self.failUnless(pub1.verify(sig, data)) + + sig = priv1.sign(data, sigencode=sigencode_strings) + self.failUnlessEqual(type(sig), tuple) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(sig), 2) + self.failUnlessEqual(type(sig[0]), str) + self.failUnlessEqual(type(sig[1]), str) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(sig[0]), NIST192p.baselen) + self.failUnlessEqual(len(sig[1]), NIST192p.baselen) + self.failUnless(pub1.verify(sig, data, sigdecode=sigdecode_strings)) + + sig_der = priv1.sign(data, sigencode=sigencode_der) + self.failUnlessEqual(type(sig_der), str) + self.failUnless(pub1.verify(sig_der, data, sigdecode=sigdecode_der)) + + def test_hashfunc(self): + sk = SigningKey.generate(curve=NIST256p, hashfunc=sha256) + data = "security level is 128 bits" + sig = sk.sign(data) + vk = VerifyingKey.from_string(sk.get_verifying_key().to_string(), + curve=NIST256p, hashfunc=sha256) + self.failUnless(vk.verify(sig, data)) + + sk2 = SigningKey.generate(curve=NIST256p) + sig2 = sk2.sign(data, hashfunc=sha256) + vk2 = VerifyingKey.from_string(sk2.get_verifying_key().to_string(), + curve=NIST256p, hashfunc=sha256) + self.failUnless(vk2.verify(sig2, data)) + + vk3 = VerifyingKey.from_string(sk.get_verifying_key().to_string(), + curve=NIST256p) + self.failUnless(vk3.verify(sig, data, hashfunc=sha256)) + + +class OpenSSL(unittest.TestCase): + # test interoperability with OpenSSL tools. Note that openssl's ECDSA + # sign/verify arguments changed between 0.9.8 and 1.0.0: the early + # versions require "-ecdsa-with-SHA1", the later versions want just + # "-SHA1" (or to leave out that argument entirely, which means the + # signature will use some default digest algorithm, probably determined + # by the key, probably always SHA1). + # + # openssl ecparam -name secp224r1 -genkey -out privkey.pem + # openssl ec -in privkey.pem -text -noout # get the priv/pub keys + # openssl dgst -ecdsa-with-SHA1 -sign privkey.pem -out data.sig data.txt + # openssl asn1parse -in data.sig -inform DER + # data.sig is 64 bytes, probably 56b plus ASN1 overhead + # openssl dgst -ecdsa-with-SHA1 -prverify privkey.pem -signature data.sig data.txt ; echo $? + # openssl ec -in privkey.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem + # openssl ec -in privkey.pem -pubout -outform DER -out pubkey.der + + def get_openssl_messagedigest_arg(self): + v = run_openssl("version") + # e.g. "OpenSSL 1.0.0 29 Mar 2010", or "OpenSSL 1.0.0a 1 Jun 2010", + # or "OpenSSL 0.9.8o 01 Jun 2010" + vs = v.split()[1].split(".") + if vs >= ["1","0","0"]: + return "-SHA1" + else: + return "-ecdsa-with-SHA1" + + # sk: 1:OpenSSL->python 2:python->OpenSSL + # vk: 3:OpenSSL->python 4:python->OpenSSL + # sig: 5:OpenSSL->python 6:python->OpenSSL + + def test_from_openssl_nist192p(self): + return self.do_test_from_openssl(NIST192p, "prime192v1") + def test_from_openssl_nist224p(self): + return self.do_test_from_openssl(NIST224p, "secp224r1") + def test_from_openssl_nist384p(self): + return self.do_test_from_openssl(NIST384p, "secp384r1") + def test_from_openssl_nist521p(self): + return self.do_test_from_openssl(NIST521p, "secp521r1") + + def do_test_from_openssl(self, curve, curvename): + # OpenSSL: create sk, vk, sign. + # Python: read vk(3), checksig(5), read sk(1), sign, check + mdarg = self.get_openssl_messagedigest_arg() + if os.path.isdir("t"): + shutil.rmtree("t") + os.mkdir("t") + run_openssl("ecparam -name %s -genkey -out t/privkey.pem" % curvename) + run_openssl("ec -in t/privkey.pem -pubout -out t/pubkey.pem") + data = "data" + open("t/data.txt","wb").write(data) + run_openssl("dgst %s -sign t/privkey.pem -out t/data.sig t/data.txt" % mdarg) + run_openssl("dgst %s -verify t/pubkey.pem -signature t/data.sig t/data.txt" % mdarg) + pubkey_pem = open("t/pubkey.pem").read() + vk = VerifyingKey.from_pem(pubkey_pem) # 3 + sig_der = open("t/data.sig","rb").read() + self.failUnless(vk.verify(sig_der, data, # 5 + hashfunc=sha1, sigdecode=sigdecode_der)) + + sk = SigningKey.from_pem(open("t/privkey.pem").read()) # 1 + sig = sk.sign(data) + self.failUnless(vk.verify(sig, data)) + + def test_to_openssl_nist192p(self): + self.do_test_to_openssl(NIST192p, "prime192v1") + def test_to_openssl_nist224p(self): + self.do_test_to_openssl(NIST224p, "secp224r1") + def test_to_openssl_nist384p(self): + self.do_test_to_openssl(NIST384p, "secp384r1") + def test_to_openssl_nist521p(self): + self.do_test_to_openssl(NIST521p, "secp521r1") + + def do_test_to_openssl(self, curve, curvename): + # Python: create sk, vk, sign. + # OpenSSL: read vk(4), checksig(6), read sk(2), sign, check + mdarg = self.get_openssl_messagedigest_arg() + if os.path.isdir("t"): + shutil.rmtree("t") + os.mkdir("t") + sk = SigningKey.generate(curve=curve) + vk = sk.get_verifying_key() + data = "data" + open("t/pubkey.der","wb").write(vk.to_der()) # 4 + open("t/pubkey.pem","wb").write(vk.to_pem()) # 4 + sig_der = sk.sign(data, hashfunc=sha1, sigencode=sigencode_der) + open("t/data.sig","wb").write(sig_der) # 6 + open("t/data.txt","wb").write(data) + open("t/baddata.txt","wb").write(data+"corrupt") + + self.failUnlessRaises(SubprocessError, run_openssl, + "dgst %s -verify t/pubkey.der -keyform DER -signature t/data.sig t/baddata.txt" % mdarg) + run_openssl("dgst %s -verify t/pubkey.der -keyform DER -signature t/data.sig t/data.txt" % mdarg) + + open("t/privkey.pem","wb").write(sk.to_pem()) # 2 + run_openssl("dgst %s -sign t/privkey.pem -out t/data.sig2 t/data.txt" % mdarg) + run_openssl("dgst %s -verify t/pubkey.pem -signature t/data.sig2 t/data.txt" % mdarg) + +class DER(unittest.TestCase): + def test_oids(self): + oid_ecPublicKey = der.encode_oid(1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1) + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(oid_ecPublicKey), "06072a8648ce3d0201") + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(NIST224p.encoded_oid), "06052b81040021") + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(NIST256p.encoded_oid), + "06082a8648ce3d030107") + x = oid_ecPublicKey + "more" + x1, rest = der.remove_object(x) + self.failUnlessEqual(x1, (1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1)) + self.failUnlessEqual(rest, "more") + + def test_integer(self): + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_integer(0), "\x02\x01\x00") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_integer(1), "\x02\x01\x01") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_integer(127), "\x02\x01\x7f") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_integer(128), "\x02\x02\x00\x80") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_integer(256), "\x02\x02\x01\x00") + #self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_integer(-1), "\x02\x01\xff") + + def s(n): return der.remove_integer(der.encode_integer(n) + "junk") + self.failUnlessEqual(s(0), (0, "junk")) + self.failUnlessEqual(s(1), (1, "junk")) + self.failUnlessEqual(s(127), (127, "junk")) + self.failUnlessEqual(s(128), (128, "junk")) + self.failUnlessEqual(s(256), (256, "junk")) + self.failUnlessEqual(s(1234567890123456789012345678901234567890), + ( 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890,"junk")) + + def test_number(self): + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_number(0), "\x00") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_number(127), "\x7f") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_number(128), "\x81\x00") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_number(3*128+7), "\x83\x07") + #self.failUnlessEqual(der.read_number("\x81\x9b"+"more"), (155, 2)) + #self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_number(155), "\x81\x9b") + for n in (0, 1, 2, 127, 128, 3*128+7, 840, 10045): #, 155): + x = der.encode_number(n) + "more" + n1, llen = der.read_number(x) + self.failUnlessEqual(n1, n) + self.failUnlessEqual(x[llen:], "more") + + def test_length(self): + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_length(0), "\x00") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_length(127), "\x7f") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_length(128), "\x81\x80") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_length(255), "\x81\xff") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_length(256), "\x82\x01\x00") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_length(3*256+7), "\x82\x03\x07") + self.failUnlessEqual(der.read_length("\x81\x9b"+"more"), (155, 2)) + self.failUnlessEqual(der.encode_length(155), "\x81\x9b") + for n in (0, 1, 2, 127, 128, 255, 256, 3*256+7, 155): + x = der.encode_length(n) + "more" + n1, llen = der.read_length(x) + self.failUnlessEqual(n1, n) + self.failUnlessEqual(x[llen:], "more") + + def test_sequence(self): + x = der.encode_sequence("ABC", "DEF") + "GHI" + self.failUnlessEqual(x, "\x30\x06ABCDEFGHI") + x1, rest = der.remove_sequence(x) + self.failUnlessEqual(x1, "ABCDEF") + self.failUnlessEqual(rest, "GHI") + + def test_constructed(self): + x = der.encode_constructed(0, NIST224p.encoded_oid) + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(x), "a007" + "06052b81040021") + x = der.encode_constructed(1, unhexlify("0102030a0b0c")) + self.failUnlessEqual(hexlify(x), "a106" + "0102030a0b0c") + +class Util(unittest.TestCase): + def test_trytryagain(self): + tta = util.randrange_from_seed__trytryagain + for i in range(1000): + seed = "seed-%d" % i + for order in (2**8-2, 2**8-1, 2**8, 2**8+1, 2**8+2, + 2**16-1, 2**16+1): + n = tta(seed, order) + self.failUnless(1 <= n < order, (1, n, order)) + # this trytryagain *does* provide long-term stability + self.failUnlessEqual("%x"%(tta("seed", NIST224p.order)), + "6fa59d73bf0446ae8743cf748fc5ac11d5585a90356417e97155c3bc") + + def test_randrange(self): + # util.randrange does not provide long-term stability: we might + # change the algorithm in the future. + for i in range(1000): + entropy = util.PRNG("seed-%d" % i) + for order in (2**8-2, 2**8-1, 2**8, + 2**16-1, 2**16+1, + ): + # that oddball 2**16+1 takes half our runtime + n = util.randrange(order, entropy=entropy) + self.failUnless(1 <= n < order, (1, n, order)) + + def OFF_test_prove_uniformity(self): + order = 2**8-2 + counts = dict([(i, 0) for i in range(1, order)]) + assert 0 not in counts + assert order not in counts + for i in range(1000000): + seed = "seed-%d" % i + n = util.randrange_from_seed__trytryagain(seed, order) + counts[n] += 1 + # this technique should use the full range + self.failUnless(counts[order-1]) + for i in range(1, order): + print "%3d: %s" % (i, "*"*(counts[i]//100)) + + +def __main__(): + unittest.main() +if __name__ == "__main__": + __main__() (DIR) diff --git a/ecdsa/util.py b/ecdsa/util.py t@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ + +import os +import math +import binascii +from hashlib import sha256 +import der +from curves import orderlen + +# RFC5480: +# The "unrestricted" algorithm identifier is: +# id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { +# iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } + +oid_ecPublicKey = (1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1) +encoded_oid_ecPublicKey = der.encode_oid(*oid_ecPublicKey) + +def randrange(order, entropy=None): + """Return a random integer k such that 1 <= k < order, uniformly + distributed across that range. For simplicity, this only behaves well if + 'order' is fairly close (but below) a power of 256. The try-try-again + algorithm we use takes longer and longer time (on average) to complete as + 'order' falls, rising to a maximum of avg=512 loops for the worst-case + (256**k)+1 . All of the standard curves behave well. There is a cutoff at + 10k loops (which raises RuntimeError) to prevent an infinite loop when + something is really broken like the entropy function not working. + + Note that this function is not declared to be forwards-compatible: we may + change the behavior in future releases. The entropy= argument (which + should get a callable that behaves like os.entropy) can be used to + achieve stability within a given release (for repeatable unit tests), but + should not be used as a long-term-compatible key generation algorithm. + """ + # we could handle arbitrary orders (even 256**k+1) better if we created + # candidates bit-wise instead of byte-wise, which would reduce the + # worst-case behavior to avg=2 loops, but that would be more complex. The + # change would be to round the order up to a power of 256, subtract one + # (to get 0xffff..), use that to get a byte-long mask for the top byte, + # generate the len-1 entropy bytes, generate one extra byte and mask off + # the top bits, then combine it with the rest. Requires jumping back and + # forth between strings and integers a lot. + + if entropy is None: + entropy = os.urandom + assert order > 1 + bytes = orderlen(order) + dont_try_forever = 10000 # gives about 2**-60 failures for worst case + while dont_try_forever > 0: + dont_try_forever -= 1 + candidate = string_to_number(entropy(bytes)) + 1 + if 1 <= candidate < order: + return candidate + continue + raise RuntimeError("randrange() tried hard but gave up, either something" + " is very wrong or you got realllly unlucky. Order was" + " %x" % order) + +class PRNG: + # this returns a callable which, when invoked with an integer N, will + # return N pseudorandom bytes. Note: this is a short-term PRNG, meant + # primarily for the needs of randrange_from_seed__trytryagain(), which + # only needs to run it a few times per seed. It does not provide + # protection against state compromise (forward security). + def __init__(self, seed): + self.generator = self.block_generator(seed) + + def __call__(self, numbytes): + return "".join([self.generator.next() for i in range(numbytes)]) + + def block_generator(self, seed): + counter = 0 + while True: + for byte in sha256("prng-%d-%s" % (counter, seed)).digest(): + yield byte + counter += 1 + +def randrange_from_seed__overshoot_modulo(seed, order): + # hash the data, then turn the digest into a number in [1,order). + # + # We use David-Sarah Hopwood's suggestion: turn it into a number that's + # sufficiently larger than the group order, then modulo it down to fit. + # This should give adequate (but not perfect) uniformity, and simple + # code. There are other choices: try-try-again is the main one. + base = PRNG(seed)(2*orderlen(order)) + number = (int(binascii.hexlify(base), 16) % (order-1)) + 1 + assert 1 <= number < order, (1, number, order) + return number + +def lsb_of_ones(numbits): + return (1 << numbits) - 1 +def bits_and_bytes(order): + bits = int(math.log(order-1, 2)+1) + bytes = bits // 8 + extrabits = bits % 8 + return bits, bytes, extrabits + +# the following randrange_from_seed__METHOD() functions take an +# arbitrarily-sized secret seed and turn it into a number that obeys the same +# range limits as randrange() above. They are meant for deriving consistent +# signing keys from a secret rather than generating them randomly, for +# example a protocol in which three signing keys are derived from a master +# secret. You should use a uniformly-distributed unguessable seed with about +# curve.baselen bytes of entropy. To use one, do this: +# seed = os.urandom(curve.baselen) # or other starting point +# secexp = ecdsa.util.randrange_from_seed__trytryagain(sed, curve.order) +# sk = SigningKey.from_secret_exponent(secexp, curve) + +def randrange_from_seed__truncate_bytes(seed, order, hashmod=sha256): + # hash the seed, then turn the digest into a number in [1,order), but + # don't worry about trying to uniformly fill the range. This will lose, + # on average, four bits of entropy. + bits, bytes, extrabits = bits_and_bytes(order) + if extrabits: + bytes += 1 + base = hashmod(seed).digest()[:bytes] + base = "\x00"*(bytes-len(base)) + base + number = 1+int(binascii.hexlify(base), 16) + assert 1 <= number < order + return number + +def randrange_from_seed__truncate_bits(seed, order, hashmod=sha256): + # like string_to_randrange_truncate_bytes, but only lose an average of + # half a bit + bits = int(math.log(order-1, 2)+1) + maxbytes = (bits+7) // 8 + base = hashmod(seed).digest()[:maxbytes] + base = "\x00"*(maxbytes-len(base)) + base + topbits = 8*maxbytes - bits + if topbits: + base = chr(ord(base[0]) & lsb_of_ones(topbits)) + base[1:] + number = 1+int(binascii.hexlify(base), 16) + assert 1 <= number < order + return number + +def randrange_from_seed__trytryagain(seed, order): + # figure out exactly how many bits we need (rounded up to the nearest + # bit), so we can reduce the chance of looping to less than 0.5 . This is + # specified to feed from a byte-oriented PRNG, and discards the + # high-order bits of the first byte as necessary to get the right number + # of bits. The average number of loops will range from 1.0 (when + # order=2**k-1) to 2.0 (when order=2**k+1). + assert order > 1 + bits, bytes, extrabits = bits_and_bytes(order) + generate = PRNG(seed) + while True: + extrabyte = "" + if extrabits: + extrabyte = chr(ord(generate(1)) & lsb_of_ones(extrabits)) + guess = string_to_number(extrabyte + generate(bytes)) + 1 + if 1 <= guess < order: + return guess + + +def number_to_string(num, order): + l = orderlen(order) + fmt_str = "%0" + str(2*l) + "x" + string = binascii.unhexlify(fmt_str % num) + assert len(string) == l, (len(string), l) + return string + +def string_to_number(string): + return int(binascii.hexlify(string), 16) + +def string_to_number_fixedlen(string, order): + l = orderlen(order) + assert len(string) == l, (len(string), l) + return int(binascii.hexlify(string), 16) + +# these methods are useful for the sigencode= argument to SK.sign() and the +# sigdecode= argument to VK.verify(), and control how the signature is packed +# or unpacked. + +def sigencode_strings(r, s, order): + r_str = number_to_string(r, order) + s_str = number_to_string(s, order) + return (r_str, s_str) + +def sigencode_string(r, s, order): + # for any given curve, the size of the signature numbers is + # fixed, so just use simple concatenation + r_str, s_str = sigencode_strings(r, s, order) + return r_str + s_str + +def sigencode_der(r, s, order): + return der.encode_sequence(der.encode_integer(r), der.encode_integer(s)) + + +def sigdecode_string(signature, order): + l = orderlen(order) + assert len(signature) == 2*l, (len(signature), 2*l) + r = string_to_number_fixedlen(signature[:l], order) + s = string_to_number_fixedlen(signature[l:], order) + return r, s + +def sigdecode_strings(rs_strings, order): + (r_str, s_str) = rs_strings + l = orderlen(order) + assert len(r_str) == l, (len(r_str), l) + assert len(s_str) == l, (len(s_str), l) + r = string_to_number_fixedlen(r_str, order) + s = string_to_number_fixedlen(s_str, order) + return r, s + +def sigdecode_der(sig_der, order): + #return der.encode_sequence(der.encode_integer(r), der.encode_integer(s)) + rs_strings, empty = der.remove_sequence(sig_der) + if empty != "": + raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after DER sig: %s" % + binascii.hexlify(empty)) + r, rest = der.remove_integer(rs_strings) + s, empty = der.remove_integer(rest) + if empty != "": + raise der.UnexpectedDER("trailing junk after DER numbers: %s" % + binascii.hexlify(empty)) + return r, s +